S1027: Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor is a custom backdoor--based on the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool--that has been used by Aoqin Dragon since at least 2013.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1027: Heyoka Backdoor describes [Heyoka Backdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1027) is a custom backdoor--based on the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool--that has been used by [Aoqin Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1007) since at least 2013.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022)(Citation: Sourceforge Heyoka 2022)
Executive priority
S1027: Heyoka Backdoor is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1027: Heyoka Backdoor by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1027: Heyoka Backdoor appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor is a custom backdoor--based on the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool--that has been used by Aoqin Dragon since at least 2013.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique | Heyoka Backdoor can inject a DLL into rundll32.exe for execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | Heyoka Backdoor has the ability to delete folders and files from a targeted system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | Heyoka Backdoor can use spoofed DNS requests to create a bidirectional tunnel between a compromised host and its C2 servers.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Heyoka Backdoor can decrypt its payload prior to execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.004 | DNSSub-technique | Heyoka Backdoor can use DNS tunneling for C2 communications.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1680 | Local Storage Discovery | Heyoka Backdoor can enumerate drives on a compromised host.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1007 | System Service Discovery | Heyoka Backdoor can check if it is running as a service on a compromised host.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | Heyoka Backdoor can gather process information.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32Sub-technique | Heyoka Backdoor can use rundll32.exe to gain execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Heyoka Backdoor has the ability to search the compromised host for files.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | Heyoka Backdoor can establish persistence with the auto start function including using the value `EverNoteTrayUService`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | Heyoka Backdoor can encrypt its payload.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1120 | Peripheral Device Discovery | Heyoka Backdoor can identify removable media attached to victim's machines.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique | Heyoka Backdoor has been named `srvdll.dll` to appear as a legitimate service.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | Heyoka Backdoor has been spread through malicious document lures.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1007: Aoqin Dragon
Aoqin Dragon is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2013. Aoqin Dragon has primarily targeted government, education, and telecommunication organizations in Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam. Security researchers noted a potential association between Aoqin Dragon and UNC94, based on malware, infrastructure, and targets.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 0858597c49ca… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 0858597c49ca… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022
Chen, Joey. (2022, June 9). Aoqin Dragon | Newly-Discovered Chinese-linked APT Has Been Quietly Spying On Organizations For 10 Years. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
Open source URL - [2]Sourceforge Heyoka 2022
Sourceforge. (n.d.). Heyoka POC Exfiltration Tool. Retrieved October 11, 2022.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS1027Open source URL
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