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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1027: Heyoka Backdoor

Heyoka Backdoor is a custom backdoor--based on the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool--that has been used by Aoqin Dragon since at least 2013.[1][2]

EnterpriseS1027MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1027: Heyoka Backdoor describes [Heyoka Backdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1027) is a custom backdoor--based on the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool--that has been used by [Aoqin Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1007) since at least 2013.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022)(Citation: Sourceforge Heyoka 2022)

Executive priority

S1027: Heyoka Backdoor is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1027: Heyoka Backdoor by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1027: Heyoka Backdoor appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Heyoka Backdoor

Heyoka Backdoor is a custom backdoor--based on the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool--that has been used by Aoqin Dragon since at least 2013.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

Heyoka Backdoor can inject a DLL into rundll32.exe for execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Heyoka Backdoor has the ability to delete folders and files from a targeted system.[1]

EnterpriseT1572Protocol Tunneling

Heyoka Backdoor can use spoofed DNS requests to create a bidirectional tunnel between a compromised host and its C2 servers.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Heyoka Backdoor can decrypt its payload prior to execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.004DNSSub-technique

Heyoka Backdoor can use DNS tunneling for C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

Heyoka Backdoor can enumerate drives on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

Heyoka Backdoor can check if it is running as a service on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Heyoka Backdoor can gather process information.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

Heyoka Backdoor can use rundll32.exe to gain execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Heyoka Backdoor has the ability to search the compromised host for files.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Heyoka Backdoor can establish persistence with the auto start function including using the value `EverNoteTrayUService`.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Heyoka Backdoor can encrypt its payload.[1]

EnterpriseT1120Peripheral Device Discovery

Heyoka Backdoor can identify removable media attached to victim's machines.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

Heyoka Backdoor has been named `srvdll.dll` to appear as a legitimate service.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Heyoka Backdoor has been spread through malicious document lures.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1007: Aoqin Dragon

Aoqin Dragon is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2013. Aoqin Dragon has primarily targeted government, education, and telecommunication organizations in Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam. Security researchers noted a potential association between Aoqin Dragon and UNC94, based on malware, infrastructure, and targets.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
0858597c49cad6c5...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle0858597c49ca…
19.11.1Older bundle0858597c49ca…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022

    Chen, Joey. (2022, June 9). Aoqin Dragon | Newly-Discovered Chinese-linked APT Has Been Quietly Spying On Organizations For 10 Years. Retrieved July 14, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Sourceforge Heyoka 2022

    Sourceforge. (n.d.). Heyoka POC Exfiltration Tool. Retrieved October 11, 2022.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS1027
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.