LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1015: Milan

Milan is a backdoor implant based on DanBot that was written in Visual C++ and .NET. Milan has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2020.[1][2]

EnterpriseS1015MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1015: Milan describes [Milan](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1015) is a backdoor implant based on [DanBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1014) that was written in Visual C++ and .NET. [Milan](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1015) has been used by [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001) since at least June 2020.(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)

Executive priority

S1015: Milan is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1015: Milan by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1015: Milan appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Milan

Milan is a backdoor implant based on DanBot that was written in Visual C++ and .NET. Milan has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2020.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

20 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Milan can establish persistence on a targeted host with scheduled tasks.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

Milan has saved files prior to upload from a compromised host to folders beginning with the characters `a9850d2f`.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.004DNSSub-technique

Milan has the ability to use DNS for C2 communications.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Milan can enumerate the targeted machine's name and GUID.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Milan can run `C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cmd /c ipconfig /all 2>&1` to discover network settings.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Milan can identify users registered to a targeted machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Milan can encode files containing information about the targeted system.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Milan has received files from C2 and stored them in log folders beginning with the character sequence `a9850d2f`.[1]

EnterpriseT1559.001Component Object ModelSub-technique

Milan can use a COM component to generate scheduled tasks.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Milan can use HTTPS for communication with C2.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

Milan can query `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid` to retrieve the machine GUID.[3]

EnterpriseT1036Masquerading

Milan has used an executable named `companycatalogue` to appear benign.[1]

EnterpriseT1572Protocol Tunneling

Milan can use a custom protocol tunneled through DNS or HTTP.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Milan can use `cmd.exe` for discovery actions on a targeted system.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Milan can use the API `DnsQuery_A` for DNS resolution.[2]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Milan can upload files from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

Milan has run `C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cmd /c dir c:\users\ /s 2>&1` to discover local accounts.[1]

EnterpriseT1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsSub-technique

Milan can use hardcoded domains as an input for domain generation algorithms.[3]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Milan can delete files via `C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ping 1.1.1.1 -n 1 -w 3000 > Nul & rmdir /s /q`.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.007Double File ExtensionSub-technique

Milan has used an executable named `companycatalog.exe.config` to appear benign.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1001: HEXANE

HEXANE is a cyber espionage threat group that has targeted oil & gas, telecommunications, aviation, and internet service provider organizations since at least 2017. Targeted companies have been located in the Middle East and Africa, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia. HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to APT33 and OilRig but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.004: DNSEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1559.001: Component Object ModelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036: MasqueradingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1572: Protocol TunnelingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1568.002: Domain Generation AlgorithmsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.007: Double File ExtensionEnterpriseuses · GroupG1001: HEXANEEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
05e591065b67b82e...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.1Current bundle05e591065b67…
19.21.1Older bundle05e591065b67…
19.11.1Older bundle05e591065b67…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021

    ClearSky Cyber Security . (2021, August). New Iranian Espionage Campaign By “Siamesekitten” - Lyceum. Retrieved June 6, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021

    Kayal, A. et al. (2021, October). LYCEUM REBORN: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Retrieved June 14, 2022.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Accenture Lyceum Targets November 2021

    Accenture. (2021, November 9). Who are latest targets of cyber group Lyceum?. Retrieved June 16, 2022.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    James

    (Citation: Accenture Lyceum Targets November 2021)

  5. [5]
    mitre-attackS1015
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use