S1006: PLC-Blaster
PLC-Blaster is a piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them. Once this worm has infected its target and attempted to infect other devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many modules. [1] [2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1006: PLC-Blaster describes [PLC-Blaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1006) is a piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them. Once this worm has infected its target and attempted to infect other devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many modules. (Citation: Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke March 2016) (Citation: Spenneberg, Ralf 2016)
Executive priority
S1006: PLC-Blaster is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1006: PLC-Blaster by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1006: PLC-Blaster appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
PLC-Blaster
PLC-Blaster is a piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them. Once this worm has infected its target and attempted to infect other devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many modules. [1] [2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T0821 | Modify Controller Tasking | PLC-Blaster's code is stored in OB9999. The original code on the target is untouched. The OB is automatically detected by the PLC and executed. [1] |
| ICS | T0834 | Native API | PLC-Blaster uses the system function blocks TCON and TDISCON to initiate and destroy TCP connections to arbitrary systems. Buffers may be sent and received on these connections with TRCV und TSEND system function blocks. [1] |
| ICS | T0843 | Program Download | PLC-Blaster utilizes the PLC communication and management API to load executable Program Organization Units. [1] |
| ICS | T0814 | Denial of Service | The execution on the PLC can be stopped by violating the cycle time limit. The PLC-Blaster implements an endless loop triggering an error condition within the PLC with the impact of a DoS. [1] |
| ICS | T0835 | Manipulate I/O Image | PLC-Blaster may manipulate any outputs of the PLC. Using the POU POKE any value within the process image may be modified. [1] |
| ICS | T0889 | Modify Program | PLC-Blaster copies itself to various Program Organization Units (POU) on the target device. The POUs include the Data Block, Function, and Function Block. [1] |
| ICS | T0858 | Change Operating Mode | PLC-Blaster stops the execution of the user program on the target to enable the transfer of its own code. The worm then copies itself to the target and subsequently starts the target PLC again. [1] |
| ICS | T0846.001 | Port ScanSub-technique | PLC-Blaster scans the network to find other Siemens S7 PLC devices to infect. It locates these devices by checking for a service listening on TCP port 102.[1] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 845994ea400b… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 845994ea400b… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke March 2016
Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke 2016, March 31 Plc-blaster: A worm living solely in the plc. Retrieved. 2017/09/19
Open source URL - [2]Spenneberg, Ralf 2016
Spenneberg, Ralf 2016 PLC-Blaster Retrieved. 2019/06/06
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS1006Open source URL
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