T0835: Manipulate I/O Image
Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. [1] During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table. [2] The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules.
One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status.
Security context for executives and security teams
T0835: Manipulate I/O Image describes Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson December 2010) During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table. (Citation: Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath) The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where...
Executive priority
T0835: Manipulate I/O Image is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T0835: Manipulate I/O Image by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (inhibit-response-function), supported platforms (None), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether T0835: Manipulate I/O Image appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Manipulate I/O Image
Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. [1] During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table. [2] The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules.
One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0603: Stuxnet
Stuxnet was the first publicly reported malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. Stuxnet is a large and complex malware that utilized multiple behaviors, including numerous zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.[1][2][3][4] Stuxnet was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.[1]
S1006: PLC-Blaster
PLC-Blaster is a piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them. Once this worm has infected its target and attempted to infect other devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many modules. [1] [2]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 3c502ce79338… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 3c502ce79338… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson December 2010
Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson 2010, December Programmable logic controller hardware Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath
Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson 2010, December Programmable logic controller hardware Retrieved. 2018/03/29 PLC Ladder Logic Basics Retrieved. 2021/10/11
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackT0835Open source URL
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