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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0691: Neoichor

Neoichor is C2 malware used by Ke3chang since at least 2019; similar malware families used by the group include Leeson and Numbldea.[1]

EnterpriseS0691MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0691: Neoichor describes [Neoichor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0691) is C2 malware used by [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) since at least 2019; similar malware families used by the group include Leeson and Numbldea.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)

Executive priority

S0691: Neoichor is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0691: Neoichor by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0691: Neoichor appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Neoichor

Neoichor is C2 malware used by Ke3chang since at least 2019; similar malware families used by the group include Leeson and Numbldea.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

11 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1016.001Internet Connection DiscoverySub-technique

Neoichor can check for Internet connectivity by contacting bing[.]com with the request format `bing[.]com?id=`.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Neoichor can download additional files onto a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1614.001System Language DiscoverySub-technique

Neoichor can identify the system language on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Neoichor can collect the user name from a victim's machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Neoichor has the ability to configure browser settings by modifying Registry entries under `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer`.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Neoichor can upload files from a victim's machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Neoichor can gather the IP address from an infected host.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Neoichor can collect the OS version and computer name from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1559.001Component Object ModelSub-technique

Neoichor can use the Internet Explorer (IE) COM interface to connect and receive commands from C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Neoichor can use HTTP for C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1070Indicator Removal

Neoichor can clear the browser history on a compromised host by changing the `ClearBrowsingHistoryOnExit` value to 1 in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Privacy` Registry key.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0004: Ke3chang

Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. Ke3chang has targeted oil, government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since at least 2010.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
01694c5c82e9fc28...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle01694c5c82e9…
19.11.0Older bundle01694c5c82e9…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Microsoft NICKEL December 2021

    MSTIC. (2021, December 6). NICKEL targeting government organizations across Latin America and Europe. Retrieved March 18, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0691
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.