S0527: CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader is a tool designed to evade analysis and download additional payloads used by Kimsuky.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0527: CSPY Downloader describes [CSPY Downloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0527) is a tool designed to evade analysis and download additional payloads used by [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094).(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)
Executive priority
S0527: CSPY Downloader is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0527: CSPY Downloader by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0527: CSPY Downloader appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader is a tool designed to evade analysis and download additional payloads used by Kimsuky.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | CSPY Downloader has the ability to self delete.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | CSPY Downloader can write to the Registry under the |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | CSPY Downloader can use the schtasks utility to bypass UAC.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | CSPY Downloader has come signed with revoked certificates.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | CSPY Downloader can download additional tools to a compromised host.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique | CSPY Downloader has attempted to appear as a legitimate Windows service with a fake description claiming it is used to support packed applications.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | CSPY Downloader can use GET requests to download additional payloads from C2.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | CSPY Downloader has been delivered via malicious documents with embedded macros.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique | CSPY Downloader can bypass UAC using the SilentCleanup task to execute the binary with elevated privileges.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1497.001 | System ChecksSub-technique | CSPY Downloader can search loaded modules, PEB structure, file paths, Registry keys, and memory to determine if it is being debugged or running in a virtual environment.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.002 | Software PackingSub-technique | CSPY Downloader has been packed with UPX.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070 | Indicator Removal | CSPY Downloader has the ability to remove values it writes to the Registry.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0094: Kimsuky
Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]
DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | b00c06c57d25… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | b00c06c57d25… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020
Dahan, A. et al. (2020, November 2). Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite. Retrieved November 6, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0527Open source URL
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