S0471: build_downer
build_downer is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0471: build_downer describes [build_downer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0471) is a downloader that has been used by [BRONZE BUTLER](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0060) since at least 2019.(Citation: Trend Micro Tick November 2019)
Executive priority
S0471: build_downer is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0471: build_downer by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0471: build_downer appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
build_downer
build_downer is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | build_downer has the ability to use the |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique | build_downer has added itself to the Registry Run key as "NVIDIA" to appear legitimate.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | build_downer has the ability to add itself to the Registry Run key for persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.003 | SteganographySub-technique | build_downer can extract malware from a downloaded JPEG.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1124 | System Time Discovery | build_downer has the ability to determine the local time to ensure malware installation only happens during the hours that the infected system is active.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | build_downer has the ability to detect if the infected host is running an anti-virus process.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1680 | Local Storage Discovery | build_downer has the ability to send system volume information to C2.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | build_downer has the ability to download files from C2 to the infected host.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0060: BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 2e6fdbcb8d53… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 2e6fdbcb8d53… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Trend Micro Tick November 2019
Chen, J. et al. (2019, November). Operation ENDTRADE: TICK’s Multi-Stage Backdoors for Attacking Industries and Stealing Classified Data. Retrieved June 9, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0471Open source URL
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