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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0447: Lokibot

Lokibot is a widely distributed information stealer that was first reported in 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other credentials. Lokibot can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow an attacker to install additional payloads.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseS0447MalwareObject v2.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0447: Lokibot describes [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a widely distributed information stealer that was first reported in 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other credentials. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow an attacker to install additional payloads.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)(Citation: CISA Lokibot September 20...

Executive priority

S0447: Lokibot is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0447: Lokibot by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0447: Lokibot appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Lokibot

Lokibot is a widely distributed information stealer that was first reported in 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other credentials. Lokibot can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow an attacker to install additional payloads.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

28 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Lokibot has used VBS scripts and XLS macros for execution.[4]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Lokibot is delivered via a malicious XLS attachment contained within a spearhpishing email.[4]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

Lokibot has used several packing methods for obfuscation.[1]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

Lokibot has obfuscated strings with base64 encoding.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Lokibot has decoded and decrypted its stages multiple times using hard-coded keys to deliver the final payload, and has decoded its server response hex string using XOR.[4]

EnterpriseT1555Credentials from Password Stores

Lokibot has stolen credentials from multiple applications and data sources including Windows OS credentials, email clients, FTP, and SFTP clients.[1]

EnterpriseT1620Reflective Code Loading

Lokibot has reflectively loaded the decoded DLL into memory.[4]

EnterpriseT1055.012Process HollowingSub-technique

Lokibot has used process hollowing to inject itself into legitimate Windows process.[1][4]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Lokibot has the ability to discover the username on the infected host.CitationFSecure Lokibot November 2019

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Lokibot can search for specific files on an infected host.[4]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

Lokibot has the ability to capture input on the compromised host via keylogging.CitationFSecure Lokibot November 2019

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Lokibot has used cmd /c commands embedded within batch scripts.[4]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Lokibot has modified the Registry as part of its UAC bypass process.[4]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Lokibot embedded the commands schtasks /Run /TN \Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup\SilentCleanup /I inside a batch script.[4]

EnterpriseT1497.003Time Based ChecksSub-technique

Lokibot has performed a time-based anti-debug check before downloading its third stage.[4]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Lokibot has the ability to initiate contact with command and control (C2) to exfiltrate stolen data.CitationFSecure Lokibot November 2019

EnterpriseT1053Scheduled Task/Job

Lokibot's second stage DLL has set a timer using “timeSetEvent” to schedule its next execution.[4]

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

Lokibot has utilized multiple techniques to bypass UAC.[4]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Lokibot has the ability to discover the computer name and Windows product name/version.CitationFSecure Lokibot November 2019

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Lokibot has used LoadLibrary(), GetProcAddress() and CreateRemoteThread() API functions to execute its shellcode.[4]

EnterpriseT1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique

Lokibot has the ability to copy itself to a hidden file and directory.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

Lokibot has used PowerShell commands embedded inside batch scripts.[4]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Lokibot has the ability to discover the domain name of the infected host.CitationFSecure Lokibot November 2019

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Lokibot will delete its dropped files after bypassing UAC.[4]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Lokibot has tricked recipients into enabling malicious macros by getting victims to click "enable content" in email attachments.CitationTrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018[4]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Lokibot has used HTTP for C2 communications.[1][4]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Lokibot downloaded several staged items onto the victim's machine.[4]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

Lokibot has demonstrated the ability to steal credentials from multiple applications and data sources including Safari and the Chromium and Mozilla Firefox-based web browsers.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0083: SilverTerrierEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1555: Credentials from Password StoresEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1620: Reflective Code LoadingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055.012: Process HollowingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056.001: KeyloggingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.003: Time Based ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053: Scheduled Task/JobEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1548.002: Bypass User Account ControlEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1564.001: Hidden Files and DirectoriesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
3d9c6a4f57f60025...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.0Current bundle3d9c6a4f57f6…
19.12.0Older bundle3d9c6a4f57f6…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Infoblox Lokibot January 2019

    Hoang, M. (2019, January 31). Malicious Activity Report: Elements of Lokibot Infostealer. Retrieved May 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Morphisec Lokibot April 2020

    Cheruku, H. (2020, April 15). LOKIBOT WITH AUTOIT OBFUSCATOR + FRENCHY SHELLCODE. Retrieved May 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    CISA Lokibot September 2020

    DHS/CISA. (2020, September 22). Alert (AA20-266A) LokiBot Malware . Retrieved September 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Talos Lokibot Jan 2021

    Muhammad, I., Unterbrink, H.. (2021, January 6). A Deep Dive into Lokibot Infection Chain. Retrieved August 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Lokibot

    (Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)(Citation: Talos Lokibot Jan 2021)

  6. [6]
    mitre-attackS0447
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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