S0414: BabyShark
Security context for executives and security teams
S0414: BabyShark describes [BabyShark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0414) is a Microsoft Visual Basic (VB) script-based malware family that is believed to be associated with several North Korean campaigns. (Citation: Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019)
Executive priority
S0414: BabyShark is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0414: BabyShark by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0414: BabyShark appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
BabyShark
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | BabyShark has used scheduled tasks to maintain persistence.CitationCrowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | |
| Enterprise | T1218.005 | MshtaSub-technique | BabyShark has used mshta.exe to download and execute applications from a remote server.CitationCISA AA20-301A Kimsuky |
| Enterprise | T1056.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | BabyShark has a PowerShell-based remote administration ability that can implement a PowerShell or C# based keylogger.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual BasicSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | BabyShark has the ability to decode downloaded files prior to execution.CitationCISA AA20-301A Kimsuky |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0094: Kimsuky
Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]
DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 180e07105da0… | ||
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 180e07105da0… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 180e07105da0… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019
Unit 42. (2019, February 22). New BabyShark Malware Targets U.S. National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved October 7, 2019.
Open source URL - [2]Mandiant APT43 March 2024
Mandiant. (2024, March 14). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved May 3, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]Unit42 BabyShark Apr 2019
Lim, M.. (2019, April 26). BabyShark Malware Part Two – Attacks Continue Using KimJongRAT and PCRat . Retrieved October 7, 2019.
Open source URL - [4]BabyShark
(Citation: Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019)(Citation: Unit42 BabyShark Apr 2019)
- [5]LATEOP
(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)
- [6]mitre-attackS0414Open source URL
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