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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0386: Ursnif

Ursnif is a banking trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spread through various automated exploit kits, Spearphishing Attachments, and malicious links.[1][2] Ursnif is associated primarily with data theft, but variants also include components (backdoors, spyware, file injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behaviors.[3]

EnterpriseS0386MalwareObject v1.5Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0386: Ursnif describes [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is a banking trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spread through various automated exploit kits, [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)s, and malicious links.(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Citation: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016) [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is associated primarily with data theft, but variants also include components (backdoors, spyware, file injectors, etc.) capable of a wi...

Executive priority

S0386: Ursnif is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0386: Ursnif by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0386: Ursnif appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Ursnif

Ursnif is a banking trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spread through various automated exploit kits, Spearphishing Attachments, and malicious links.[1][2] Ursnif is associated primarily with data theft, but variants also include components (backdoors, spyware, file injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behaviors.[3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

35 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

Ursnif has gathered information about running services.[3]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Ursnif has used Registry Run keys to establish automatic execution at system startup.CitationTrendMicro PE_URSNIF.A2CitationTrendMicro BKDR_URSNIF.SM

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Ursnif has dropped payload and configuration files to disk. Ursnif has also been used to download and execute additional payloads.CitationTrendMicro PE_URSNIF.A2CitationTrendMicro BKDR_URSNIF.SM

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Ursnif has used an XOR-based algorithm to encrypt Tor clients dropped to disk.[2] Ursnif droppers have also been delivered as password-protected zip files that execute base64 encoded PowerShell commands.CitationBromium Ursnif Mar 2017

EnterpriseT1090.003Multi-hop ProxySub-technique

Ursnif has used Tor for C2.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

Ursnif has used tmp files to stage gathered information.[3]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Ursnif has used CreateProcessW to create child processes.[4]

EnterpriseT1497.003Time Based ChecksSub-technique

Ursnif has used a 30 minute delay after execution to evade sandbox monitoring tools.CitationTrendMicro Ursnif File Dec 2014

EnterpriseT1559.001Component Object ModelSub-technique

Ursnif droppers have used COM objects to execute the malware's full executable payload.CitationBromium Ursnif Mar 2017

EnterpriseT1056.004Credential API HookingSub-technique

Ursnif has hooked APIs to perform a wide variety of information theft, such as monitoring traffic from browsers.[3]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Ursnif has gathered information about running processes.[3]CitationTrendMicro BKDR_URSNIF.SM

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Ursnif has used HTTP POSTs to exfil gathered information.[3][4][2]

EnterpriseT1132Data Encoding

Ursnif has used encoded data in HTTP URLs for C2.[2]

EnterpriseT1055.005Thread Local StorageSub-technique

Ursnif has injected code into target processes via thread local storage callbacks.[3]CitationTrendMicro PE_URSNIF.A2[4]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Ursnif has used crypto key information stored in the Registry to decrypt Tor clients dropped to disk.[2]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Ursnif has used strings from legitimate system files and existing folders for its file, folder, and Registry entry names.[3]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Ursnif has collected files from victim machines, including certificates and cookies.CitationTrendMicro BKDR_URSNIF.SM

EnterpriseT1027.010Command ObfuscationSub-technique

Ursnif droppers execute base64 encoded PowerShell commands.CitationBromium Ursnif Mar 2017

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

Ursnif has used hooked APIs to take screenshots.[3]CitationTrendMicro BKDR_URSNIF.SM

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

Ursnif has registered itself as a system service in the Registry for automatic execution at system startup.CitationTrendMicro PE_URSNIF.A2

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

Ursnif droppers have used PowerShell in download cradles to download and execute the malware's full executable payload.CitationBromium Ursnif Mar 2017

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Ursnif has used HTTPS for C2.[3][4][2]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Ursnif has deleted data staged in tmp files after exfiltration.[3]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

Ursnif has used Reg to query the Registry for installed programs.[3]CitationTrendMicro BKDR_URSNIF.SM

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Ursnif has used Registry modifications as part of its installation routine.CitationTrendMicro BKDR_URSNIF.SM[2]

EnterpriseT1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsSub-technique

Ursnif has used a DGA to generate domain names for C2.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Ursnif droppers have used VBA macros to download and execute the malware's full executable payload.CitationBromium Ursnif Mar 2017

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Ursnif has used Systeminfo to gather system information.[3]

EnterpriseT1090Proxy

Ursnif has used a peer-to-peer (P2P) network for C2.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Ursnif droppers have used WMI classes to execute PowerShell commands.CitationBromium Ursnif Mar 2017

EnterpriseT1055.012Process HollowingSub-technique

Ursnif has used process hollowing to inject into child processes.[4]

EnterpriseT1185Browser Session Hijacking

Ursnif has injected HTML codes into banking sites to steal sensitive online banking information (ex: usernames and passwords).CitationTrendMicro BKDR_URSNIF.SM

EnterpriseT1080Taint Shared Content

Ursnif has copied itself to and infected files in network drives for propagation.[3]CitationTrendMicro Ursnif File Dec 2014

EnterpriseT1091Replication Through Removable Media

Ursnif has copied itself to and infected removable drives for propagation.[3]CitationTrendMicro Ursnif File Dec 2014

EnterpriseT1564.003Hidden WindowSub-technique

Ursnif droppers have used COM properties to execute malware in hidden windows.CitationBromium Ursnif Mar 2017

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0127: TA551

TA551 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2018. [1] The group has primarily targeted English, German, Italian, and Japanese speakers through email-based malware distribution campaigns. [2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1007: System Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090.003: Multi-hop ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.003: Time Based ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1559.001: Component Object ModelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056.004: Credential API HookingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132: Data EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055.005: Thread Local StorageEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.010: Command ObfuscationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1113: Screen CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.5
Created
Modified
Raw hash
01b386732b43a84b...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.5Current bundle01b386732b43…
19.21.5Older bundle01b386732b43…
19.11.5Older bundle01b386732b43…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016

    NJCCIC. (2016, September 27). Ursnif. Retrieved September 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016

    Proofpoint Staff. (2016, August 25). Nightmare on Tor Street: Ursnif variant Dreambot adds Tor functionality. Retrieved June 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015

    Caragay, R. (2015, March 26). URSNIF: The Multifaceted Malware. Retrieved June 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    FireEye Ursnif Nov 2017

    Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection. Retrieved June 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Dreambot

    (Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Citation: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016)

  6. [6]
    Gozi-ISFB

    (Citation: FireEye Ursnif Nov 2017)(Citation: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016)

  7. [7]
    PE_URSNIF

    (Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015)

  8. [8]
    Ursnif

    (Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)

  9. [9]
    mitre-attackS0386
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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