LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0269: QUADAGENT

QUADAGENT is a PowerShell backdoor used by OilRig. [1]

EnterpriseS0269MalwareObject v1.2Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0269: QUADAGENT describes [QUADAGENT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0269) is a PowerShell backdoor used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049). (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)

Executive priority

S0269: QUADAGENT is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0269: QUADAGENT by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0269: QUADAGENT appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

QUADAGENT

QUADAGENT is a PowerShell backdoor used by OilRig. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

17 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1071.004DNSSub-technique

QUADAGENT uses DNS for C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

QUADAGENT uses HTTPS and HTTP for C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

QUADAGENT uses AES and a preshared key to decrypt the custom Base64 routine used to encode strings and scripts.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

QUADAGENT encodes C2 communications with base64.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

QUADAGENT uses VBScripts.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

QUADAGENT gathers the current domain the victim system belongs to.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.010Command ObfuscationSub-technique

QUADAGENT was likely obfuscated using `Invoke-Obfuscation`.[1]CitationGitHub Invoke-Obfuscation

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

QUADAGENT uses cmd.exe to execute scripts and commands on the victim’s machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

QUADAGENT used the PowerShell filenames Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 and SystemDiskClean.ps1.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.011Fileless StorageSub-technique

QUADAGENT stores a session identifier unique to the compromised system as well as a pre-shared key used for encrypting and decrypting C2 communications within a Registry key (such as `HKCU\Office365DCOMCheck`) in the `HKCU` hive.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

QUADAGENT has a command to delete its Registry key and scheduled task.[1]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

QUADAGENT checks if a value exists within a Registry key in the HKCU hive whose name is the same as the scheduled task it has created.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

QUADAGENT uses PowerShell scripts for execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1008Fallback Channels

QUADAGENT uses multiple protocols (HTTPS, HTTP, DNS) for its C2 server as fallback channels if communication with one is unsuccessful.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

QUADAGENT modifies an HKCU Registry key to store a session identifier unique to the compromised system as well as a pre-shared key used for encrypting and decrypting C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

QUADAGENT gathers the victim username.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

QUADAGENT creates a scheduled task to maintain persistence on the victim’s machine.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0049: OilRig

OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0049: OilRigEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.004: DNSEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.010: Command ObfuscationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.011: Fileless StorageEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1008: Fallback ChannelsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
238fbe8908f11765...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundle238fbe8908f1…
19.11.2Older bundle238fbe8908f1…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    QUADAGENT

    (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0269
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use