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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0180: Volgmer

Volgmer is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. It has been used since at least 2013 to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. Its primary delivery mechanism is suspected to be spearphishing. [1]

EnterpriseS0180MalwareObject v1.3Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0180: Volgmer describes [Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. It has been used since at least 2013 to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. Its primary delivery mechanism is suspected to be spearphishing. (Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)

Executive priority

S0180: Volgmer is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0180: Volgmer by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0180: Volgmer appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Volgmer

Volgmer is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. It has been used since at least 2013 to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. Its primary delivery mechanism is suspected to be spearphishing. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

19 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Volgmer can list directories on a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

Volgmer installs a copy of itself in a randomly selected service, then overwrites the ServiceDLL entry in the service's Registry entry. Some Volgmer variants also install .dll files as services with names generated by a list of hard-coded strings.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

Volgmer checks the system for certain Registry keys.[2]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Volgmer can gather system information, the computer name, OS version, drive and serial information from the victim's machine.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Volgmer executes payloads using the Windows API call CreateProcessW().[2]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Volgmer uses a simple XOR cipher to encrypt traffic and files.[2]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

Volgmer queries the system to identify existing services.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Volgmer can download remote files and additional payloads to the victim's machine.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Volgmer can gather a list of processes.[3]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Volgmer can gather the IP address from the victim's machine.[3]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Volgmer can execute commands on the victim's machine.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

Some Volgmer variants use SSL to encrypt C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.011Fileless StorageSub-technique

Volgmer stores an encoded configuration file in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Volgmer modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security.[2][3]

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

Some Volgmer variants add new services with display names generated by a list of hard-coded strings such as Application, Background, Security, and Windows, presumably as a way to masquerade as a legitimate service.[2][3]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

A Volgmer variant is encoded using a simple XOR cipher.[2]

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

Volgmer can gather information about TCP connection state.[3]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Volgmer can delete files and itself after infection to avoid analysis.[2]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Volgmer deobfuscates its strings and APIs once its executed.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0032: Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0032: Lazarus GroupEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1007: System Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.002: Asymmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.011: Fileless StorageEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.004: Masquerade Task or ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1049: System Network Connections DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
354a87500bbc2be9...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundle354a87500bbc…
19.11.3Older bundle354a87500bbc…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017

    US-CERT. (2017, November 22). Alert (TA17-318B): HIDDEN COBRA – North Korean Trojan: Volgmer. Retrieved December 7, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017

    US-CERT. (2017, November 01). Malware Analysis Report (MAR) - 10135536-D. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014

    Yagi, J. (2014, August 24). Trojan.Volgmer. Retrieved July 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Volgmer

    (Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017) (Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017) (Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)

  5. [5]
    mitre-attackS0180
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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