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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0170: Helminth

Helminth is a backdoor that has at least two variants - one written in VBScript and PowerShell that is delivered via a macros in Excel spreadsheets, and one that is a standalone Windows executable. [1]

EnterpriseS0170MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0170: Helminth describes [Helminth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0170) is a backdoor that has at least two variants - one written in VBScript and PowerShell that is delivered via a macros in Excel spreadsheets, and one that is a standalone Windows executable. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)

Executive priority

S0170: Helminth is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0170: Helminth by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0170: Helminth appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Helminth

Helminth is a backdoor that has at least two variants - one written in VBScript and PowerShell that is delivered via a macros in Excel spreadsheets, and one that is a standalone Windows executable. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

21 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Helminth has used a scheduled task for persistence.CitationClearSky OilRig Jan 2017

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

Helminth samples have been signed with legitimate, compromised code signing certificates owned by software company AI Squared.CitationClearSky OilRig Jan 2017

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

The Helminth config file is encrypted with RC4.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Helminth establishes persistence by creating a shortcut in the Start Menu folder.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Helminth encrypts data sent to its C2 server over HTTP with RC4.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.009Shortcut ModificationSub-technique

Helminth establishes persistence by creating a shortcut.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.004DNSSub-technique

Helminth can use DNS for C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Helminth can use HTTP for C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

One version of Helminth uses a PowerShell script.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

One version of Helminth consists of VBScript scripts.[1]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

The executable version of Helminth has a module to log keystrokes.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Helminth can download additional files.[1]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

Helminth creates folders to store output from batch scripts prior to sending the information to its C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1115Clipboard Data

The executable version of Helminth has a module to log clipboard contents.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Helminth can provide a remote shell. One version of Helminth uses batch scripting.[1]

EnterpriseT1119Automated Collection

A Helminth VBScript receives a batch script to execute a set of commands in a command prompt.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

For C2 over HTTP, Helminth encodes data with base64 and sends it via the "Cookie" field of HTTP requests. For C2 over DNS, Helminth converts ASCII characters into their hexadecimal values and sends the data in cleartext.[1]

EnterpriseT1030Data Transfer Size Limits

Helminth splits data into chunks up to 23 bytes and sends the data in DNS queries to its C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Helminth has used Tasklist to get information on processes.CitationUnit 42 Playbook Dec 2017

EnterpriseT1069.001Local GroupsSub-technique

Helminth has checked the local administrators group.CitationUnit 42 Playbook Dec 2017

EnterpriseT1069.002Domain GroupsSub-technique

Helminth has checked for the domain admin group and Exchange Trusted Subsystem groups using the commands net group Exchange Trusted Subsystem /domain and net group domain admins /domain.CitationUnit 42 Playbook Dec 2017

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0049: OilRig

OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0049: OilRigEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1553.002: Code SigningEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.009: Shortcut ModificationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.004: DNSEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056.001: KeyloggingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1115: Clipboard DataEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1119: Automated CollectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1030: Data Transfer Size LimitsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1069.001: Local GroupsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1069.002: Domain GroupsEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
a128767e59c8a653...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundlea128767e59c8…
19.11.2Older bundlea128767e59c8…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Palo Alto OilRig May 2016

    Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.

  2. [2]
    Helminth

    (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0170
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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