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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0153: RedLeaves

RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus. [1] [2]

EnterpriseS0153MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0153: RedLeaves describes [RedLeaves](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0153) is a malware family used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045). The code overlaps with [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus. (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)

Executive priority

S0153: RedLeaves is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0153: RedLeaves by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0153: RedLeaves appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

RedLeaves

RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus. [1] [2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

17 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1547.009Shortcut ModificationSub-technique

RedLeaves attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence.[1]CitationAccenture Hogfish April 2018

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

RedLeaves is launched through use of DLL search order hijacking to load a malicious dll.[2]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

RedLeaves can gather browser usernames and passwords.CitationAccenture Hogfish April 2018

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

RedLeaves can capture screenshots.[2]CitationAccenture Hogfish April 2018

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

A RedLeaves configuration file is encrypted with a simple XOR key, 0x53.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

RedLeaves can delete specified files.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

RedLeaves can receive and execute commands with cmd.exe. It can also provide a reverse shell.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

RedLeaves can obtain information about network parameters.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

RedLeaves can gather extended system information including the hostname, OS version number, platform, memory information, time elapsed since system startup, and CPU information.[1]CitationAccenture Hogfish April 2018

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

RedLeaves has encrypted C2 traffic with RC4, previously using keys of 88888888 and babybear.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

RedLeaves can obtain information about the logged on user both locally and for Remote Desktop sessions.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

RedLeaves can communicate to its C2 over HTTP and HTTPS if directed.[2]CitationAccenture Hogfish April 2018

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

RedLeaves can enumerate and search for files and directories.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1571Non-Standard Port

RedLeaves can use HTTP over non-standard ports, such as 995, for C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

RedLeaves attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence. If this fails, it attempts to add Registry Run keys.[1]CitationAccenture Hogfish April 2018

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

RedLeaves can enumerate drives and Remote Desktop sessions.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

RedLeaves is capable of downloading a file from a specified URL.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0045: menuPass

menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.[1][2]

menuPass has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[3][4][5][6][7][1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0045: menuPassEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.009: Shortcut ModificationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1574.001: DLLEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1555.003: Credentials from Web BrowsersEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1113: Screen CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1571: Non-Standard PortEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1049: System Network Connections DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
e69364a45113831d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundlee69364a45113…
19.11.2Older bundlee69364a45113…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

    PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FireEye APT10 April 2017

    FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    BUGJUICE

    Based on similarities in reported malware behavior and open source reporting, it is assessed that the malware named BUGJUICE by FireEye is likely the same as the malware RedLeaves. (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017) (Citation: Twitter Nick Carr APT10)

  4. [4]
    RedLeaves

    (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)

  5. [5]
    Twitter Nick Carr APT10

    Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved September 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    mitre-attackS0153
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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