S0153: RedLeaves

RedLeaves is a Windows malware family in ATT&CK associated through relationships with menuPass and overlapping in code with PlugX. Its practical significance is not one single technique, but the combination of post-compromise behaviors ATT&CK links to it: host and network discovery, command execution, persistence through Windows startup mechanisms, credential access from browsers, screen capture, file transfer, cleanup, and web-based command-and-control that may use encryption or non-standard ports.

Executive priority

Treat RedLeaves as a validation case for Windows endpoint resilience and post-compromise visibility. Leadership should ask whether the organization can prove coverage for suspicious autoruns, command-shell activity, browser credential access, file transfer, and abnormal outbound web traffic. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection guidance for this object, confidence should come from local telemetry tests, incident response playbooks, and audit-ready evidence of endpoint, identity, and egress-control monitoring rather than from the malware name alone.

Technical view

SOC and IR teams should validate behavior-based coverage on Windows rather than relying only on family signatures. The relationship set points to discovery via system, user, file, network configuration, and network connection enumeration; execution through Windows Command Shell; persistence through Registry Run Keys, Startup Folder, and Shortcut Modification; DLL abuse; browser credential access; screen capture; ingress tool transfer; file deletion; and command-and-control over web protocols, non-standard ports, and symmetric encryption. Detection engineering should correlate endpoint process, file, registry, module-load, credential-store, and network telemetry into attack chains that distinguish routine administration from unusual post-compromise sequencing.

Likely telemetry

Windows process creation and command-line logs, especially cmd.exe and discovery utilities
Registry autorun changes, Startup Folder writes, and shortcut creation or modification events
File creation, deletion, rename, and staging activity for transferred or encoded/encrypted files
DLL load events and suspicious DLL placement or execution context
Browser credential store file access and related endpoint alerts

Detection direction

Build detections around ATT&CK-related behaviors rather than the RedLeaves name, since official detection text is not provided.
Correlate discovery commands followed by persistence changes, tool transfer, credential-store access, or outbound web traffic to reduce false positives from legitimate administration.
Tune autorun, Startup Folder, shortcut, and DLL-abuse detections for known enterprise software installers and management tools.
Review egress monitoring for web protocols on unexpected ports and encrypted command-and-control patterns, while accounting for legitimate proxies and business applications.
Confirm Windows endpoint coverage first; related ATT&CK techniques list broader platforms, but this malware object is supplied with Windows as its platform.

Mitigation priorities

Prioritize reliable Windows endpoint logging and retention for process, registry, file, DLL, and network events.
Harden and monitor autorun locations, Startup Folders, shortcut execution paths, and DLL loading behavior.
Limit credential exposure by reducing browser-stored passwords where feasible and monitoring access to browser credential stores.
Apply least privilege and application control principles to reduce unauthorized command execution, tool transfer, and persistence.
Enforce egress controls and proxy visibility for outbound web traffic, including review of non-standard protocol and port pairings.

Analyst notes and limits

The ATT&CK object identifies RedLeaves as a malware family used by menuPass, with code overlap with PlugX and possible basis in the open source tool Trochilus. External references include PwC and FireEye reporting from 2017, a BUGJUICE equivalence assessment, and a social media reference. The most useful defensive value is the relationship-driven behavior map, not a static label.

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for RedLeaves, and the object itself has no specified tactics. The malware platform is Windows, while several related techniques have broader platform lists that should not be assumed for this object without local evidence. This take does not assess current exploitation, customer exposure, or detection coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

RedLeaves

RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus. [1] [2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques 17 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1547.009	Shortcut Modification Sub-technique	RedLeaves attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence.[1]CitationAccenture Hogfish April 2018
Enterprise	T1574.001	DLL Sub-technique	RedLeaves is launched through use of DLL search order hijacking to load a malicious dll.[2]
Enterprise	T1555.003	Credentials from Web Browsers Sub-technique	RedLeaves can gather browser usernames and passwords.CitationAccenture Hogfish April 2018
Enterprise	T1113	Screen Capture	RedLeaves can capture screenshots.[2]CitationAccenture Hogfish April 2018
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded File Sub-technique	A RedLeaves configuration file is encrypted with a simple XOR key, 0x53.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.004	File Deletion Sub-technique	RedLeaves can delete specified files.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command Shell Sub-technique	RedLeaves can receive and execute commands with cmd.exe. It can also provide a reverse shell.[1][2]
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	RedLeaves can obtain information about network parameters.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	RedLeaves can gather extended system information including the hostname, OS version number, platform, memory information, time elapsed since system startup, and CPU information.[1]CitationAccenture Hogfish April 2018
Enterprise	T1573.001	Symmetric Cryptography Sub-technique	RedLeaves has encrypted C2 traffic with RC4, previously using keys of 88888888 and babybear.[1]
Enterprise	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	RedLeaves can obtain information about the logged on user both locally and for Remote Desktop sessions.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web Protocols Sub-technique	RedLeaves can communicate to its C2 over HTTP and HTTPS if directed.[2]CitationAccenture Hogfish April 2018
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	RedLeaves can enumerate and search for files and directories.[1][2]
Enterprise	T1571	Non-Standard Port	RedLeaves can use HTTP over non-standard ports, such as 995, for C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Sub-technique	RedLeaves attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence. If this fails, it attempts to add Registry Run keys.[1]CitationAccenture Hogfish April 2018
Enterprise	T1049	System Network Connections Discovery	RedLeaves can enumerate drives and Remote Desktop sessions.[1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	RedLeaves is capable of downloading a file from a specified URL.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0045: menuPass

menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.[1][2]

menuPass has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[3][4][5][6][7][1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release: 19.1
Object version: 1.2
Created: Dec 14, 2017, 16:46 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Sep 12, 2024, 19:32 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: e69364a45113831d...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.1	Jun 3, 2026, 07:54 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.2	Sep 12, 2024, 19:32 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`e69364a45113…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.
Open source URL
[2]
FireEye APT10 April 2017

FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.
Open source URL
[3]
BUGJUICE

Based on similarities in reported malware behavior and open source reporting, it is assessed that the malware named BUGJUICE by FireEye is likely the same as the malware RedLeaves. (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017) (Citation: Twitter Nick Carr APT10)
[4]
RedLeaves

(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)
[5]
Twitter Nick Carr APT10

Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved September 12, 2024.
Open source URL
[6]
mitre-attack S0153
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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