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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0153: RedLeaves

RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus. [1] [2]

EnterpriseS0153MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

RedLeaves is a Windows malware family in ATT&CK associated through relationships with menuPass and overlapping in code with PlugX. Its practical significance is not one single technique, but the combination of post-compromise behaviors ATT&CK links to it: host and network discovery, command execution, persistence through Windows startup mechanisms, credential access from browsers, screen capture, file transfer, cleanup, and web-based command-and-control that may use encryption or non-standard ports.

Executive priority

Treat RedLeaves as a validation case for Windows endpoint resilience and post-compromise visibility. Leadership should ask whether the organization can prove coverage for suspicious autoruns, command-shell activity, browser credential access, file transfer, and abnormal outbound web traffic. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection guidance for this object, confidence should come from local telemetry tests, incident response playbooks, and audit-ready evidence of endpoint, identity, and egress-control monitoring rather than from the malware name alone.

Technical view

SOC and IR teams should validate behavior-based coverage on Windows rather than relying only on family signatures. The relationship set points to discovery via system, user, file, network configuration, and network connection enumeration; execution through Windows Command Shell; persistence through Registry Run Keys, Startup Folder, and Shortcut Modification; DLL abuse; browser credential access; screen capture; ingress tool transfer; file deletion; and command-and-control over web protocols, non-standard ports, and symmetric encryption. Detection engineering should correlate endpoint process, file, registry, module-load, credential-store, and network telemetry into attack chains that distinguish routine administration from unusual post-compromise sequencing.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows process creation and command-line logs, especially cmd.exe and discovery utilities
  • Registry autorun changes, Startup Folder writes, and shortcut creation or modification events
  • File creation, deletion, rename, and staging activity for transferred or encoded/encrypted files
  • DLL load events and suspicious DLL placement or execution context
  • Browser credential store file access and related endpoint alerts

Detection direction

  • Build detections around ATT&CK-related behaviors rather than the RedLeaves name, since official detection text is not provided.
  • Correlate discovery commands followed by persistence changes, tool transfer, credential-store access, or outbound web traffic to reduce false positives from legitimate administration.
  • Tune autorun, Startup Folder, shortcut, and DLL-abuse detections for known enterprise software installers and management tools.
  • Review egress monitoring for web protocols on unexpected ports and encrypted command-and-control patterns, while accounting for legitimate proxies and business applications.
  • Confirm Windows endpoint coverage first; related ATT&CK techniques list broader platforms, but this malware object is supplied with Windows as its platform.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize reliable Windows endpoint logging and retention for process, registry, file, DLL, and network events.
  • Harden and monitor autorun locations, Startup Folders, shortcut execution paths, and DLL loading behavior.
  • Limit credential exposure by reducing browser-stored passwords where feasible and monitoring access to browser credential stores.
  • Apply least privilege and application control principles to reduce unauthorized command execution, tool transfer, and persistence.
  • Enforce egress controls and proxy visibility for outbound web traffic, including review of non-standard protocol and port pairings.
Additional notes and limits

The ATT&CK object identifies RedLeaves as a malware family used by menuPass, with code overlap with PlugX and possible basis in the open source tool Trochilus. External references include PwC and FireEye reporting from 2017, a BUGJUICE equivalence assessment, and a social media reference. The most useful defensive value is the relationship-driven behavior map, not a static label.

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for RedLeaves, and the object itself has no specified tactics. The malware platform is Windows, while several related techniques have broader platform lists that should not be assumed for this object without local evidence. This take does not assess current exploitation, customer exposure, or detection coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

RedLeaves

RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus. [1] [2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

17 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1547.009Shortcut ModificationSub-technique

RedLeaves attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

RedLeaves is launched through use of DLL search order hijacking to load a malicious dll.[2]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

RedLeaves can gather browser usernames and passwords.[3]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

RedLeaves can capture screenshots.[2][3]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

A RedLeaves configuration file is encrypted with a simple XOR key, 0x53.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

RedLeaves can delete specified files.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

RedLeaves can receive and execute commands with cmd.exe. It can also provide a reverse shell.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

RedLeaves can obtain information about network parameters.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

RedLeaves can gather extended system information including the hostname, OS version number, platform, memory information, time elapsed since system startup, and CPU information.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

RedLeaves has encrypted C2 traffic with RC4, previously using keys of 88888888 and babybear.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

RedLeaves can obtain information about the logged on user both locally and for Remote Desktop sessions.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

RedLeaves can communicate to its C2 over HTTP and HTTPS if directed.[2][3]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

RedLeaves can enumerate and search for files and directories.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1571Non-Standard Port

RedLeaves can use HTTP over non-standard ports, such as 995, for C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

RedLeaves attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence. If this fails, it attempts to add Registry Run keys.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

RedLeaves can enumerate drives and Remote Desktop sessions.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

RedLeaves is capable of downloading a file from a specified URL.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0045: menuPass

menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.[1][2]

menuPass has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[3][4][5][6][7][1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1547.009: Shortcut ModificationEnterpriseuses · GroupG0045: menuPassEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1574.001: DLLEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1555.003: Credentials from Web BrowsersEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1113: Screen CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1571: Non-Standard PortEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1049: System Network Connections DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
e69364a45113831d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.2Current bundlee69364a45113…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

    PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FireEye APT10 April 2017

    FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Accenture Hogfish April 2018

    Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018.

  4. [4]
    DOJ APT10 Dec 2018

    United States District Court Southern District of New York (USDC SDNY) . (2018, December 17). United States of America v. Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong. Retrieved April 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    BUGJUICE

    Based on similarities in reported malware behavior and open source reporting, it is assessed that the malware named BUGJUICE by FireEye is likely the same as the malware RedLeaves. (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017) (Citation: Twitter Nick Carr APT10)

  6. [6]
    BUGJUICE

    Based on similarities in reported malware behavior and open source reporting, it is assessed that the malware named BUGJUICE by FireEye is likely the same as the malware RedLeaves. (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017) (Citation: Twitter Nick Carr APT10)

  7. [7]
    BUGJUICE

    Based on similarities in reported malware behavior and open source reporting, it is assessed that the malware named BUGJUICE by FireEye is likely the same as the malware RedLeaves. (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017) (Citation: Twitter Nick Carr APT10)

  8. [8]
    FireEye APT10 April 2017

    FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    FireEye APT10 April 2017

    FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

    PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

    PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    RedLeaves

    (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)

  13. [13]
    RedLeaves

    (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)

  14. [14]
    RedLeaves

    (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)

  15. [15]
    Twitter Nick Carr APT10

    Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved September 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Twitter Nick Carr APT10

    Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved September 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Twitter Nick Carr APT10

    Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved September 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    mitre-attackS0153
    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    mitre-attackS0153
    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    mitre-attackS0153
    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Accenture Hogfish April 2018

    Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018.

  22. [22]
    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

    PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

    PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    DOJ APT10 Dec 2018

    United States District Court Southern District of New York (USDC SDNY) . (2018, December 17). United States of America v. Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong. Retrieved April 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

    PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

    PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    FireEye APT10 April 2017

    FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    FireEye APT10 April 2017

    FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Accenture Hogfish April 2018

    Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018.

  30. [30]
    Accenture Hogfish April 2018

    Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018.

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    Accenture Hogfish April 2018

    Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018.

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    Accenture Hogfish April 2018

    Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018.

  33. [33]
    FireEye APT10 April 2017

    FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    FireEye APT10 April 2017

    FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

    PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

    PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

    PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
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    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

    PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
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    FireEye APT10 April 2017

    FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.

    Open source URL
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    FireEye APT10 April 2017

    FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.

    Open source URL
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    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

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    PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017

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    Open source URL
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