S0136: USBStealer
USBStealer is malware that has been used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL. [1] [2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0136: USBStealer describes [USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) is malware that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with [ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045). (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)
Executive priority
S0136: USBStealer is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0136: USBStealer by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0136: USBStealer appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
USBStealer
USBStealer is malware that has been used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL. [1] [2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1025 | Data from Removable Media | Once a removable media device is inserted back into the first victim, USBStealer collects data from it that was exfiltrated from a second victim.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | Most strings in USBStealer are encrypted using 3DES and XOR and reversed.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | USBStealer searches victim drives for files matching certain extensions (“.skr”,“.pkr” or “.key”) or names.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1052.001 | Exfiltration over USBSub-technique | USBStealer exfiltrates collected files via removable media from air-gapped victims.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.006 | TimestompSub-technique | USBStealer sets the timestamps of its dropper files to the last-access and last-write timestamps of a standard Windows library chosen on the system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | USBStealer registers itself under a Registry Run key with the name "USB Disk Security."[1] |
| Enterprise | T1119 | Automated Collection | For all non-removable drives on a victim, USBStealer executes automated collection of certain files for later exfiltration.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | USBStealer mimics a legitimate Russian program called USB Disk Security.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1020 | Automated Exfiltration | USBStealer automatically exfiltrates collected files via removable media when an infected device connects to an air-gapped victim machine after initially being connected to an internet-enabled victim machine. [1] |
| Enterprise | T1092 | Communication Through Removable Media | USBStealer drops commands for a second victim onto a removable media drive inserted into the first victim, and commands are executed when the drive is inserted into the second victim.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1091 | Replication Through Removable Media | USBStealer drops itself onto removable media and relies on Autorun to execute the malicious file when a user opens the removable media on another system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | USBStealer has several commands to delete files associated with the malware from the victim.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1120 | Peripheral Device Discovery | USBStealer monitors victims for insertion of removable drives. When dropped onto a second victim, it also enumerates drives connected to the system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | USBStealer collects files matching certain criteria from the victim and stores them in a local directory for later exfiltration.[1][2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0007: APT28
APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.3 | Current bundle | 457177f131d5… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.3 | Older bundle | 457177f131d5… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014
Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017.
- [2]Kaspersky Sofacy
Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS0136Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.