S0113: Prikormka

S0113: Prikormka describes [Prikormka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0113) is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008. (Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait)

Executive priority

S0113: Prikormka is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0113: Prikormka by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0113: Prikormka appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Prikormka

Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques20 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1573.001	Symmetric CryptographySub-technique	Prikormka encrypts some C2 traffic with the Blowfish cipher.[1]
Enterprise	T1056.001	KeyloggingSub-technique	Prikormka contains a keylogger module that collects keystrokes and the titles of foreground windows.[1]
Enterprise	T1218.011	Rundll32Sub-technique	Prikormka uses rundll32.exe to load its DLL.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	Some resources in Prikormka are encrypted with a simple XOR operation or encoded with Base64.[1]
Enterprise	T1113	Screen Capture	Prikormka contains a module that captures screenshots of the victim's desktop.[1]
Enterprise	T1120	Peripheral Device Discovery	A module in Prikormka collects information on available printers and disk drives.[1]
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	A module in Prikormka collects information from the victim about its IP addresses and MAC addresses.[1]
Enterprise	T1555.003	Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique	A module in Prikormka gathers logins and passwords stored in applications on the victims, including Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and several other browsers.[1]
Enterprise	T1555	Credentials from Password Stores	A module in Prikormka collects passwords stored in applications installed on the victim.[1]
Enterprise	T1574.001	DLLSub-technique	Prikormka uses DLL search order hijacking for persistence by saving itself as ntshrui.dll to the Windows directory so it will load before the legitimate ntshrui.dll saved in the System32 subdirectory.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	A module in Prikormka collects information from the victim about Windows OS version, computer name, battery info, and physical memory.[1]
Enterprise	T1025	Data from Removable Media	Prikormka contains a module that collects documents with certain extensions from removable media or fixed drives connected via USB.[1]
Enterprise	T1518.001	Security Software DiscoverySub-technique	A module in Prikormka collects information from the victim about installed anti-virus software.[1]
Enterprise	T1132.001	Standard EncodingSub-technique	Prikormka encodes C2 traffic with Base64.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.004	File DeletionSub-technique	After encrypting its own log files, the log encryption module in Prikormka deletes the original, unencrypted files from the host.[1]
Enterprise	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique	Prikormka adds itself to a Registry Run key with the name guidVGA or guidVSA.[1]
Enterprise	T1074.001	Local Data StagingSub-technique	Prikormka creates a directory, `%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\SKC\`, which is used to store collected log files.[1]
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	A module in Prikormka collects information about the paths, size, and creation time of files with specific file extensions, but not the actual content of the file.[1]
Enterprise	T1560	Archive Collected Data	After collecting documents from removable media, Prikormka compresses the collected files, and encrypts it with Blowfish.[1]
Enterprise	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	A module in Prikormka collects information from the victim about the current user name.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.4
Created: May 31, 2017, 21:33 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 11, 2024, 00:25 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: a35eee39dcca0c4f...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.4	Apr 11, 2024, 00:25 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`a35eee39dcca…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.4	Apr 11, 2024, 00:25 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`a35eee39dcca…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
ESET Operation Groundbait
Cherepanov, A.. (2016, May 17). Operation Groundbait: Analysis of a surveillance toolkit. Retrieved May 18, 2016.
[2]
mitre-attackS0113
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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