LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0084: Mis-Type

Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used in Operation Dust Storm by 2012.[1]

EnterpriseS0084MalwareObject v1.2Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Mis-Type matters because ATT&CK describes it as a Windows backdoor hybrid associated with Operation Dust Storm and linked to behaviors that support persistence, discovery, command-and-control, data staging, and exfiltration. For leaders, the value is not the malware name alone; it is a test case for whether the organization can see a compromised Windows host being surveyed, maintained, used for command execution, and leveraged to move data out over C2 channels.

Executive priority

Treat this as a readiness and control-validation issue rather than a signature-only problem. Executives should ask whether SOC and IR teams can prove visibility across Windows endpoint activity, local account and autostart changes, suspicious command shell use, process injection indicators, and outbound C2-like traffic. The relationship to a long-running espionage campaign makes it relevant to resilience, sensitive-data protection, and audit evidence for monitoring and response capability, but the supplied ATT&CK data does not support claims of current activity or customer exposure.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for Mis-Type, so defenders should validate coverage through its related techniques. In the Windows context supplied for the malware, focus on correlations across Windows Command Shell execution, Native API and Process Injection behaviors, system/user/account/network discovery, local data staging, tool transfer, fallback C2, web-protocol C2, non-application-layer communications, standard encoding, exfiltration over C2, local account creation, and boot/logon autostart persistence. Detection should emphasize behavior chains rather than a single indicator because several mapped techniques can overlap with legitimate administration.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry, especially cmd.exe and administrative utilities used for discovery
  • EDR or host telemetry for process injection, native API abuse, suspicious parent-child process relationships, and memory-related activity
  • File system telemetry for local data staging, unusual file placement, and names or locations that mimic legitimate resources
  • Local account and group management logs, including account creation or privilege-related changes
  • Registry, service, startup folder, scheduled autostart, and other boot/logon persistence telemetry on Windows

Detection direction

  • Build detections around sequences: discovery commands followed by staging, outbound C2, tool transfer, persistence, or exfiltration-like activity.
  • Tune Windows command-shell detections to separate routine administration from unusual execution context, user, host, timing, or destination patterns.
  • Validate that monitoring covers both application-layer web traffic and less common protocol paths, since related techniques include Web Protocols, Fallback Channels, and Non-Application Layer Protocol.
  • Look for local account creation and boot/logon autostart changes in combination with other suspicious host behaviors, not only as isolated events.
  • Review blind spots where endpoint controls cannot inspect process injection, encoded C2 content, or encrypted web traffic metadata sufficiently.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize reliable Windows endpoint logging and EDR visibility before relying on malware-family-specific indicators.
  • Restrict unnecessary local administrator rights and monitor local account creation to reduce persistence opportunities.
  • Harden and monitor boot/logon autostart locations and require change-control evidence for legitimate persistence mechanisms.
  • Apply application control and execution policy where feasible to reduce unauthorized tool transfer and command execution.
  • Enforce egress control and network monitoring so fallback channels, unusual protocols, and unexpected outbound web communications are reviewable.
Additional notes and limits

The strongest decision value comes from the relationships: Mis-Type is sparse as a standalone ATT&CK malware object, but it maps to a broad behavior set spanning execution, persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion/stealth, discovery, collection, command-and-control, and exfiltration. Detection engineering should therefore use technique coverage validation and local baselining rather than depend on a supplied ATT&CK detection recommendation.

Official ATT&CK detection guidance is not provided. The malware object lists Windows as the platform and has no explicit malware-level tactics, so platform and tactic interpretation should remain tied to the supplied relationships and local evidence. The supplied fields support historical use in Operation Dust Storm by 2012, not current exploitation, attribution in a given incident, or guaranteed detection coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Mis-Type

Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used in Operation Dust Storm by 2012.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

18 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1106Native API

Mis-Type has used Windows API calls, including `NetUserAdd` and `NetUserDel`.[1]

EnterpriseT1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Mis-Type has created registry keys for persistence, including `HKCU\Software\bkfouerioyou`, `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{6afa8072-b2b1-31a8-b5c1-{Unique Identifier}`, and `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{3BF41072-B2B1-31A8-B5C1-{Unique Identifier}`.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Mis-Type may create a file containing the results of the command cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Mis-Type has used `cmd.exe` to run commands on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Mis-Type has downloaded additional malware and files onto a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Mis-Type saves itself as a file named `msdtc.exe`, which is also the name of the legitimate Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service binary.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1136.001Local AccountSub-technique

Mis-Type may create a temporary user on the system named `Lost_{Unique Identifier}`.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

Mis-Type uses Base64 encoding for C2 traffic.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Mis-Type network traffic can communicate over HTTP.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Mis-Type runs tests to determine the privilege level of the compromised user.[1]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

Mis-Type may create a file containing the results of the command cmd.exe /c net user {Username}.[1]

EnterpriseT1008Fallback Channels

Mis-Type first attempts to use a Base64-encoded network protocol over a raw TCP socket for C2, and if that method fails, falls back to a secondary HTTP-based protocol to communicate to an alternate C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Mis-Type has collected files and data from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

The initial beacon packet for Mis-Type contains the operating system version and file system of the victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Mis-Type has transmitted collected files and data to its C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

Mis-Type network traffic can communicate over a raw socket.[1]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

Mis-Type has been injected directly into a running process, including `explorer.exe`.[1]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

Mis-Type has temporarily stored collected information to the files `“%AppData%\{Unique Identifier}\HOSTRURKLSR”` and `“%AppData%\{Unique Identifier}\NEWERSSEMP”`.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

CampaignEnterprise

C0016: Operation Dust Storm

Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]

Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547: Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · CampaignC0016: Operation Dust StormEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1136.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1008: Fallback ChannelsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1095: Non-Application Layer ProtocolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055: Process InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
0506573bf7f096ce...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.2Current bundle0506573bf7f0…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Microsoft DTC

    Microsoft. (2011, January 12). Distributed Transaction Coordinator. Retrieved February 25, 2016.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    mitre-attackS0084
    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    mitre-attackS0084
    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackS0084
    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Microsoft DTC

    Microsoft. (2011, January 12). Distributed Transaction Coordinator. Retrieved February 25, 2016.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use