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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0084: Mis-Type

Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used in Operation Dust Storm by 2012.[1]

EnterpriseS0084MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0084: Mis-Type describes [Mis-Type](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0084) is a backdoor hybrid that was used in [Operation Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0016) by 2012.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)

Executive priority

S0084: Mis-Type is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0084: Mis-Type by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0084: Mis-Type appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Mis-Type

Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used in Operation Dust Storm by 2012.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

18 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1106Native API

Mis-Type has used Windows API calls, including `NetUserAdd` and `NetUserDel`.[1]

EnterpriseT1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Mis-Type has created registry keys for persistence, including `HKCU\Software\bkfouerioyou`, `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{6afa8072-b2b1-31a8-b5c1-{Unique Identifier}`, and `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{3BF41072-B2B1-31A8-B5C1-{Unique Identifier}`.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Mis-Type may create a file containing the results of the command cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Mis-Type has used `cmd.exe` to run commands on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Mis-Type has downloaded additional malware and files onto a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Mis-Type saves itself as a file named `msdtc.exe`, which is also the name of the legitimate Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service binary.[1]CitationMicrosoft DTC

EnterpriseT1136.001Local AccountSub-technique

Mis-Type may create a temporary user on the system named `Lost_{Unique Identifier}`.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

Mis-Type uses Base64 encoding for C2 traffic.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Mis-Type network traffic can communicate over HTTP.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Mis-Type runs tests to determine the privilege level of the compromised user.[1]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

Mis-Type may create a file containing the results of the command cmd.exe /c net user {Username}.[1]

EnterpriseT1008Fallback Channels

Mis-Type first attempts to use a Base64-encoded network protocol over a raw TCP socket for C2, and if that method fails, falls back to a secondary HTTP-based protocol to communicate to an alternate C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Mis-Type has collected files and data from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

The initial beacon packet for Mis-Type contains the operating system version and file system of the victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Mis-Type has transmitted collected files and data to its C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

Mis-Type network traffic can communicate over a raw socket.[1]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

Mis-Type has been injected directly into a running process, including `explorer.exe`.[1]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

Mis-Type has temporarily stored collected information to the files `“%AppData%\{Unique Identifier}\HOSTRURKLSR”` and `“%AppData%\{Unique Identifier}\NEWERSSEMP”`.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

CampaignEnterprise

C0016: Operation Dust Storm

Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]

Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · CampaignC0016: Operation Dust StormEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547: Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1136.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1008: Fallback ChannelsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1095: Non-Application Layer ProtocolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055: Process InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
0506573bf7f096ce...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundle0506573bf7f0…
19.11.2Older bundle0506573bf7f0…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Cylance Dust Storm

    Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0084
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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