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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0074: Sakula

Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015. [1]

EnterpriseS0074MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Sakula is a Windows remote access tool documented by ATT&CK as surfacing in 2012 and being used in intrusions through 2015. Its business relevance is less about the age of the malware name and more about the behaviors ATT&CK links to it: persistence through Windows services and Run keys, execution through cmd.exe/rundll32/DLL abuse, file cleanup, tool transfer, and encrypted or web-based command-and-control. These are common decision points for whether a SOC can see and contain remote access after initial compromise.

Executive priority

Treat Sakula as a validation case for Windows intrusion readiness. Leaders should ask whether endpoint, identity, proxy, and incident response teams can prove visibility into service creation, startup persistence, suspicious command shell use, DLL/rundll32 execution, inbound tool transfer, and encrypted outbound communications. This object also supports budget and audit discussions around endpoint logging, egress control, privileged access governance, and evidence retention, because several related behaviors are designed to persist, elevate, blend into normal administration, or remove traces.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no dedicated detection text for Sakula, so defenders should validate coverage from the related techniques rather than rely on a malware signature alone. For Windows hosts, prioritize process creation and parent-child analysis for cmd.exe and rundll32.exe, monitoring of service creation/modification and Registry Run key or startup folder changes, DLL loading or suspicious DLL execution paths, file creation followed by deletion, and evidence of tool transfer. Network teams should confirm visibility into outbound web-protocol communications and encrypted command-and-control patterns where metadata, destination reputation, proxy logs, and host correlation can be used without assuming payload inspection.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation events, including cmd.exe and rundll32.exe parent-child relationships
  • Windows service creation, modification, and service configuration change logs
  • Registry monitoring for Run keys and startup persistence locations
  • File system telemetry for dropped tools, DLLs, encoded/encrypted files, and subsequent deletion
  • DLL load or module execution telemetry where available

Detection direction

  • Map current detections to the ATT&CK relationships: T1059.003, T1218.011, T1574.001, T1543.003, T1547.001, T1548.002, T1105, T1070.004, T1027.013, T1071.001, and T1573.001.
  • Tune detections for suspicious combinations, such as rundll32.exe or cmd.exe activity followed by service or Run key persistence, outbound web traffic, tool transfer, or file deletion.
  • Account for false positives from legitimate administration, software deployment, Windows services, login scripts, and normal DLL use; require context such as unusual path, user, host role, command line, timing, or external destination.
  • Do not depend only on static malware signatures because related behavior includes encrypted/encoded files and symmetric cryptography for command-and-control.
  • Use the Deep Panda relationship as threat-intelligence context only; do not infer current activity or attribution without local evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Reduce administrative exposure on Windows systems and review local administrator rights, since related behavior includes UAC bypass and persistence mechanisms that benefit from elevated privileges.
  • Harden and monitor Windows service creation/modification, Registry Run keys, startup folders, rundll32.exe usage, and DLL search/loading behavior.
  • Apply application control or execution control policies where feasible to constrain unauthorized binaries, DLLs, scripts, and administrative utilities.
  • Strengthen egress controls, proxy enforcement, DNS logging, and network monitoring for web-based and encrypted outbound communications.
  • Ensure incident response procedures preserve endpoint, service, registry, file system, proxy, DNS, and firewall evidence quickly, because related behavior includes file deletion and trace reduction.
Additional notes and limits

The official ATT&CK description identifies Sakula as a RAT and cites Dell SecureWorks reporting. ATT&CK relates this software to Deep Panda and to multiple Windows-relevant execution, persistence, privilege-escalation, stealth, tool-transfer, and command-and-control techniques. The most useful defensive value is to test whether those behaviors are observable and actionable in the local environment.

ATT&CK provides no official detection guidance, no aliases, and no object-level tactics for Sakula in the supplied fields. The relationship data indicates techniques associated with the malware, but local telemetry is required to determine exposure, detection quality, or incident relevance. No active exploitation, current campaign activity, or guaranteed detection coverage is established by the supplied fields.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Sakula

Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

11 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Sakula uses single-byte XOR obfuscation to obfuscate many of its files.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Sakula has the capability to download files.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Most Sakula samples maintain persistence by setting the Registry Run key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ in the HKLM or HKCU hive, with the Registry value and file name varying by sample.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Sakula uses HTTP for C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

Sakula contains UAC bypass code for both 32- and 64-bit systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Sakula encodes C2 traffic with single-byte XOR keys.[1]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

Sakula uses DLL side-loading, typically using a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations or McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box to load malicious DLL files.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Sakula calls cmd.exe to run various DLL files via rundll32 and also to perform file cleanup. Sakula also has the capability to invoke a reverse shell.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

Sakula calls cmd.exe to run various DLL files via rundll32.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

Some Sakula samples install themselves as services for persistence by calling WinExec with the net start argument.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Some Sakula samples use cmd.exe to delete temporary files.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0009: Deep Panda

Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications. [1] The intrusion into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to Deep Panda. [2] This group is also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther. [3] Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion. [4] Some analysts track Deep Panda and APT19 as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same. [5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1548.002: Bypass User Account ControlEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1574.001: DLLEnterpriseuses · GroupG0009: Deep PandaEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
37c3845d9e9fb8f6...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.2Current bundle37c3845d9e9f…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  2. [2]
    ThreatConnect Anthem

    ThreatConnect Research Team. (2015, February 27). The Anthem Hack: All Roads Lead to China. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  4. [4]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  5. [5]
    mitre-attackS0074
    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    mitre-attackS0074
    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackS0074
    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  9. [9]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  10. [10]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  11. [11]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  12. [12]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  13. [13]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  14. [14]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  15. [15]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  16. [16]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  17. [17]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  18. [18]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  19. [19]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  20. [20]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  21. [21]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  22. [22]
    ThreatConnect Anthem

    ThreatConnect Research Team. (2015, February 27). The Anthem Hack: All Roads Lead to China. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  24. [24]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  25. [25]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  26. [26]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  27. [27]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  28. [28]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  29. [29]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

Source and licensing

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