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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0074: Sakula

Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015. [1]

EnterpriseS0074MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0074: Sakula describes [Sakula](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0074) is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015. (Citation: Dell Sakula)

Executive priority

S0074: Sakula is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0074: Sakula by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0074: Sakula appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Sakula

Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

11 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Sakula uses single-byte XOR obfuscation to obfuscate many of its files.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Sakula has the capability to download files.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Most Sakula samples maintain persistence by setting the Registry Run key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ in the HKLM or HKCU hive, with the Registry value and file name varying by sample.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Sakula uses HTTP for C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

Sakula contains UAC bypass code for both 32- and 64-bit systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Sakula encodes C2 traffic with single-byte XOR keys.[1]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

Sakula uses DLL side-loading, typically using a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations or McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box to load malicious DLL files.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Sakula calls cmd.exe to run various DLL files via rundll32 and also to perform file cleanup. Sakula also has the capability to invoke a reverse shell.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

Sakula calls cmd.exe to run various DLL files via rundll32.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

Some Sakula samples install themselves as services for persistence by calling WinExec with the net start argument.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Some Sakula samples use cmd.exe to delete temporary files.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0009: Deep Panda

Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications. [1] The intrusion into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to Deep Panda. [2] This group is also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther. [3] Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion. [4] Some analysts track Deep Panda and APT19 as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same. [5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0009: Deep PandaEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1548.002: Bypass User Account ControlEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1574.001: DLLEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
37c3845d9e9fb8f6...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundle37c3845d9e9f…
19.11.2Older bundle37c3845d9e9f…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Dell Sakula

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.

  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0074
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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