S0034: NETEAGLE

S0034: NETEAGLE describes [NETEAGLE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0034) is a backdoor developed by [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.” (Citation: FireEye APT30)

Executive priority

S0034: NETEAGLE is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0034: NETEAGLE by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0034: NETEAGLE appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

NETEAGLE

NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.” [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques11 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1573.001	Symmetric CryptographySub-technique	NETEAGLE will decrypt resources it downloads with HTTP requests by using RC4 with the key "ScoutEagle."[1]
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	NETEAGLE can send process listings over the C2 channel.[1]
Enterprise	T1071	Application Layer Protocol	Adversaries can also use NETEAGLE to establish an RDP connection with a controller over TCP/7519.
Enterprise	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	NETEAGLE is capable of reading files over the C2 channel.[1]
Enterprise	T1568	Dynamic Resolution	NETEAGLE can use HTTP to download resources that contain an IP address and port number pair to connect to for C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	NETEAGLE allows adversaries to enumerate and modify the infected host's file system. It supports searching for directories, creating directories, listing directory contents, reading and writing to files, retrieving file attributes, and retrieving volume information.[1]
Enterprise	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique	The "SCOUT" variant of NETEAGLE achieves persistence by adding itself to the `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` Registry key.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	NETEAGLE will attempt to detect if the infected host is configured to a proxy. If so, NETEAGLE will send beacons via an HTTP POST request. NETEAGLE will also use HTTP to download resources that contain an IP address and Port Number pair to connect to for further C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	NETEAGLE allows adversaries to execute shell commands on the infected host.[1]
Enterprise	T1008	Fallback Channels	NETEAGLE will attempt to detect if the infected host is configured to a proxy. If so, NETEAGLE will send beacons via an HTTP POST request; otherwise it will send beacons via UDP/6000.[1]
Enterprise	T1095	Non-Application Layer Protocol	If NETEAGLE does not detect a proxy configured on the infected machine, it will send beacons via UDP/6000. Also, after retrieving a C2 IP address and Port Number, NETEAGLE will initiate a TCP connection to this socket. The ensuing connection is a plaintext C2 channel in which commands are specified by DWORDs.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0013: APT30

APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.1
Created: May 31, 2017, 21:32 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Nov 17, 2024, 15:05 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 870f8bb9730efaa2...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Nov 17, 2024, 15:05 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`870f8bb9730e…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Nov 17, 2024, 15:05 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`870f8bb9730e…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
FireEye APT30
FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS0034
Open source URL

Source and licensing

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