S0011: Taidoor

Taidoor is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese government cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks.[1] Taidoor has primarily been used against Taiwanese government organizations since at least 2010.[2]

EnterpriseS0011MalwareObject v2.1ModifiedApr 10, 2024, 22:36 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S0011: Taidoor describes [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese government cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks.(Citation: CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021) [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) has primarily been used against Taiwanese government organizations since at least 2010.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)

Executive priority

S0011: Taidoor is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0011: Taidoor by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0011: Taidoor appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Taidoor

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques20 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1124	System Time Discovery	Taidoor can use `GetLocalTime` and `GetSystemTime` to collect system time.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	Taidoor can copy cmd.exe into the system temp folder.[1]
Enterprise	T1112	Modify Registry	Taidoor has the ability to modify the Registry on compromised hosts using `RegDeleteValueA` and `RegCreateKeyExA`.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	Taidoor has used HTTP GET and POST requests for C2.[2]
Enterprise	T1573.001	Symmetric CryptographySub-technique	Taidoor uses RC4 to encrypt the message body of HTTP content.[2][1]
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	Taidoor has the ability to use native APIs for execution including `GetProcessHeap`, `GetProcAddress`, and `LoadLibrary`.[2][1]
Enterprise	T1070.004	File DeletionSub-technique	Taidoor can use `DeleteFileA` to remove files from infected hosts.[1]
Enterprise	T1566.001	Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique	Taidoor has been delivered through spearphishing emails.[2]
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	Taidoor has collected the MAC address of a compromised host; it can also use `GetAdaptersInfo` to identify network adapters.[2][1]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Taidoor can use a stream cipher to decrypt stings used by the malware.[1]
Enterprise	T1012	Query Registry	Taidoor can query the Registry on compromised hosts using `RegQueryValueExA`.[1]
Enterprise	T1055.001	Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique	Taidoor can perform DLL loading.[2][1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Taidoor has downloaded additional files onto a compromised host.[2]
Enterprise	T1005	Data from Local System	Taidoor can upload data and files from a victim's machine.[2]
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	Taidoor can search for specific files.[1]
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	Taidoor can use `GetCurrentProcessId` for process discovery.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	Taidoor can use encrypted string blocks for obfuscation.[1]
Enterprise	T1204.002	Malicious FileSub-technique	Taidoor has relied upon a victim to click on a malicious email attachment.[2]
Enterprise	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique	Taidoor has modified the `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` key for persistence.[2]
Enterprise	T1095	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Taidoor can use TCP for C2 communications.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 2.1
Created: May 31, 2017, 21:32 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 10, 2024, 22:36 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: b024d003d908b355...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	2.1	Apr 10, 2024, 22:36 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`b024d003d908…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	2.1	Apr 10, 2024, 22:36 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`b024d003d908…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021
CISA, FBI, DOD. (2021, August). MAR-10292089-1.v2 – Chinese Remote Access Trojan: TAIDOOR. Retrieved August 24, 2021.
Open source URL
[2]
TrendMicro Taidoor
Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
[3]
mitre-attackS0011
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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