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MITRE ATT&CK® ICS Asset

A0010: Safety Controller

Safety controllers are typically a type of field device used to perform the safety critical function. Safety controllers often support the deployment of custom programs/logic, similar to a PLC, but can also be tailored for sector specific functions/applications. The safety controllers typically utilize redundant hardware and processors to ensure they operate reliably if a component fails.

ICSA0010ICS AssetObject v1.1 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

A safety controller is an embedded ICS asset responsible for safety-critical functions, often using custom logic and redundant hardware to keep operating during component failure. Its business importance is that compromise, misconfiguration, or unauthorized change can affect the last line of automated protection for industrial operations. The ATT&CK relationship context shows this asset is relevant to behaviors such as program download/upload, I/O manipulation, alarm modification, denial of service, restart/shutdown, firmware update mode abuse, process-state monitoring, network discovery/sniffing, and removable media movement.

Executive priority

Treat safety controllers as high-priority cyber-physical risk assets, not ordinary controllers. Leaders should ask whether these devices are inventoried, change-controlled, segmented, monitored, and included in incident response and safety assurance processes. Budget and audit focus should prioritize evidence that only authorized engineering activity can modify safety logic, that unauthorized discovery or network access would be noticed, and that response plans account for scenarios where safety functions may be unavailable, altered, or placed into maintenance/update states.

Technical view

For SOC, OT engineering, and IR teams, the key validation question is whether you can distinguish approved safety-controller maintenance from unauthorized interaction. ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this asset, so coverage must be derived from local architecture and the related techniques targeting it. Validate monitoring around engineering workstations and vendor tools used for program upload/download, online edits, program append, controller tasking changes, firmware/update modes, restart/shutdown events, I/O and alarm setting changes, process state access, and unusual discovery or sniffing near safety networks. Because the asset platform is Embedded, host-level telemetry may be limited; network, engineering-station, controller audit, historian, and operator-console evidence often decide visibility.

Likely telemetry

  • Safety controller inventory, firmware/version, configuration, and logic baselines where available
  • Engineering workstation logs and vendor software activity for upload, download, online edit, append, and tasking changes
  • Controller event/audit logs for mode changes, restart/shutdown, firmware update mode, alarms, overrides, and configuration changes where supported
  • OT network traffic metadata and packet captures for controller communications, discovery, broadcast/multicast, port scanning, and possible adversary-in-the-middle conditions
  • Historian, OPC, HMI, alarm, and process-state records showing reads, writes, alarm changes, and abnormal I/O behavior

Detection direction

  • Build allowlists of expected engineering stations, protocols, maintenance windows, and accounts that may communicate with safety controllers.
  • Alert on program upload/download, online edit, program append, controller tasking changes, alarm setting changes, I/O overrides, restart/shutdown, or firmware/update mode activity outside approved change windows.
  • Correlate network discovery, port scans, broadcast or multicast discovery, and sniffing indicators with asset criticality; these may be early-stage behaviors before controller modification.
  • Compare controller logic/configuration and alarm settings against known-good baselines after maintenance, incidents, or unexplained process anomalies.
  • Tune false positives around legitimate commissioning, testing, vendor maintenance, and safety proof-test activities; require change-ticket correlation rather than treating all engineering activity as malicious.

Mitigation priorities

  • Maintain an authoritative inventory of safety controllers, their network locations, approved engineering paths, firmware/configuration state, and responsible process owners.
  • Enforce strict change management for safety logic, alarm settings, firmware/update modes, and controller tasking, with independent review for safety-critical changes.
  • Limit access to safety controllers to approved engineering workstations, accounts, and maintenance windows; separate safety-system access from general enterprise and control-network access where architecture permits.
  • Baseline and periodically verify controller programs, configurations, alarm settings, and I/O-related settings against approved versions.
  • Monitor and control removable media and third-party/contractor access for environments where safety controllers are isolated but physically reachable.
Analyst notes and limits

This object is an ATT&CK for ICS asset, not a technique. The practical value comes from treating it as a critical target class and mapping the related techniques to defensive validation. The supplied relationships indicate a broad set of adversary behaviors that may target safety controllers, especially engineering changes, network discovery, process-state observation, I/O and alarm manipulation, device disruption, and removable media movement.

MITRE provides no official detection guidance for A0010, no tactics for the asset itself, and only the Embedded platform. This take does not assert active exploitation, specific vendor exposure, or guaranteed detection. Local safety architecture, controller capabilities, logging support, engineering workflows, and process hazard analysis are required to determine actual risk and coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Safety Controller

Safety controllers are typically a type of field device used to perform the safety critical function. Safety controllers often support the deployment of custom programs/logic, similar to a PLC, but can also be tailored for sector specific functions/applications. The safety controllers typically utilize redundant hardware and processors to ensure they operate reliably if a component fails.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

60 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
ICS T0846.003 Multicast Discovery Sub-technique Multicast Discovery targets this object.
ICS T1693.002 Module Firmware Sub-technique Module Firmware targets this object.
ICS T0859 Valid Accounts Valid Accounts targets this object.
ICS T0846.001 Port Scan Sub-technique Port Scan targets this object.
ICS T0884 Connection Proxy Connection Proxy targets this object.
ICS T1691 Block Operational Technology Message Block Operational Technology Message targets this object.
ICS T0890 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Privilege Escalation targets this object.
ICS T0834 Native API Native API targets this object.
ICS T0801 Monitor Process State Monitor Process State targets this object.
ICS T1694 Insecure Credentials Insecure Credentials targets this object.
ICS T1692.002 Reporting Message Sub-technique Reporting Message targets this object.
ICS T0871 Execution through API Execution through API targets this object.
ICS T0842 Network Sniffing Network Sniffing targets this object.
ICS T0877 I/O Image I/O Image targets this object.
ICS T0851 Rootkit Rootkit targets this object.
ICS T0809 Data Destruction Data Destruction targets this object.
ICS T0845 Program Upload Program Upload targets this object.
ICS T0821 Modify Controller Tasking Modify Controller Tasking targets this object.
ICS T1693.001 System Firmware Sub-technique System Firmware targets this object.
ICS T0866 Exploitation of Remote Services Exploitation of Remote Services targets this object.
ICS T0843.001 Download All Sub-technique Download All targets this object.
ICS T0874 Hooking Hooking targets this object.
ICS T0878 Alarm Suppression Alarm Suppression targets this object.
ICS T0830 Adversary-in-the-Middle Adversary-in-the-Middle targets this object.
ICS T0814 Denial of Service Denial of Service targets this object.
ICS T1692.001 Command Message Sub-technique Command Message targets this object.
ICS T1695.002 Ethernet Sub-technique Ethernet targets this object.
ICS T0835 Manipulate I/O Image Manipulate I/O Image targets this object.
ICS T0843.002 Online Edit Sub-technique Online Edit targets this object.
ICS T0843.003 Program Append Sub-technique Program Append targets this object.
ICS T0868 Detect Operating Mode Detect Operating Mode targets this object.
ICS T0820 Exploitation for Evasion Exploitation for Evasion targets this object.
ICS T1694.001 Default Credentials Sub-technique Default Credentials targets this object.
ICS T0889 Modify Program Modify Program targets this object.
ICS T0840 Network Connection Enumeration Network Connection Enumeration targets this object.
ICS T0885 Commonly Used Port Commonly Used Port targets this object.
ICS T0843 Program Download Program Download targets this object.
ICS T0800 Activate Firmware Update Mode Activate Firmware Update Mode targets this object.
ICS T0869 Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Application Layer Protocol targets this object.
ICS T0846 Remote System Discovery Remote System Discovery targets this object.
ICS T1693 Modify Firmware Modify Firmware targets this object.
ICS T1691.001 Command Message Sub-technique Command Message targets this object.
ICS T0861 Point & Tag Identification Point & Tag Identification targets this object.
ICS T1692 Unauthorized Message Unauthorized Message targets this object.
ICS T0892 Change Credential Change Credential targets this object.
ICS T1691.002 Reporting Message Sub-technique Reporting Message targets this object.
ICS T1695 Block Communications Block Communications targets this object.
ICS T0846.002 Broadcast Discovery Sub-technique Broadcast Discovery targets this object.
ICS T0881 Service Stop Service Stop targets this object.
ICS T0872 Indicator Removal on Host Indicator Removal on Host targets this object.
ICS T0838 Modify Alarm Settings Modify Alarm Settings targets this object.
ICS T0862 Supply Chain Compromise Supply Chain Compromise targets this object.
ICS T0847 Replication Through Removable Media Replication Through Removable Media targets this object.
ICS T0888 Remote System Information Discovery Remote System Information Discovery targets this object.
ICS T1695.003 Wi-Fi Sub-technique Wi-Fi targets this object.
ICS T0858 Change Operating Mode Change Operating Mode targets this object.
ICS T0806 Brute Force I/O Brute Force I/O targets this object.
ICS T0816 Device Restart/Shutdown Device Restart/Shutdown targets this object.
ICS T0848 Rogue Master Rogue Master targets this object.
ICS T1695.001 Serial COM Sub-technique Serial COM targets this object.
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

targets · Technique T0846.003: Multicast Discovery ICS targets · Technique T1693.002: Module Firmware ICS targets · Technique T0859: Valid Accounts ICS targets · Technique T0846.001: Port Scan ICS targets · Technique T0884: Connection Proxy ICS targets · Technique T1691: Block Operational Technology Message ICS targets · Technique T0890: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation ICS targets · Technique T0834: Native API ICS targets · Technique T0801: Monitor Process State ICS targets · Technique T1694: Insecure Credentials ICS targets · Technique T1692.002: Reporting Message ICS targets · Technique T0871: Execution through API ICS targets · Technique T0842: Network Sniffing ICS targets · Technique T0877: I/O Image ICS targets · Technique T0851: Rootkit ICS targets · Technique T0809: Data Destruction ICS targets · Technique T0845: Program Upload ICS targets · Technique T0821: Modify Controller Tasking ICS targets · Technique T1693.001: System Firmware ICS targets · Technique T0866: Exploitation of Remote Services ICS targets · Technique T0843.001: Download All ICS targets · Technique T0874: Hooking ICS targets · Technique T0878: Alarm Suppression ICS targets · Technique T0830: Adversary-in-the-Middle ICS
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
daf468fa75f8e253...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.1 Current bundle daf468fa75f8…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Guidance - NIST SP800-82

    Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    SIGTTO ESD 2021

    Society of International Gas Tanker & Terminal Operators Ltd. (2021). ESD Systems: Recommendations for Emergency Shutdown and Related Safety Systems (Second Edition). Retrieved September 28, 2023.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attack A0010
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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