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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1564.003: Hidden Window

Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.

Adversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.[1]

On macOS, the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.

Similarly, on Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as PowerShell, Jscript, and Visual Basic to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden.[2]

The Windows Registry can also be edited to hide application windows from the current user. For example, by setting the `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\%SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will open off screen and be hidden.[3]

In addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding explorer.exe process.[4][5] All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session,[4] will be invisible to other desktops windows.

Adversaries may also leverage cmd.exe[6] as a parent process, and then utilize a LOLBin, such as DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe,[7][8] to hide windows.

EnterpriseT1564.003Sub-techniqueObject v2.0 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Hidden Window is a stealth behavior where activity that would normally be visible to a user is deliberately kept out of sight. For leaders, the practical issue is not the window itself; it is that user-visible warning signs can be removed while scripts, remote access activity, or administrative-looking processes continue running. Because ATT&CK lists Linux, macOS, and Windows, coverage should be validated across endpoint types rather than treated as a Windows-only concern.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as an endpoint visibility and execution-control issue. Hidden windows can reduce the chance that users notice suspicious activity, which increases dependence on SOC telemetry, managed detection, and incident response process maturity. Leadership should ask whether endpoint logging can show hidden or non-interactive execution, whether script and application-control policies are enforced, and whether exceptions for administrative tooling are documented for audit and incident review. The many ATT&CK relationships to groups and PlugX make this a useful detection-engineering validation case, but they do not by themselves prove exposure or active targeting.

Technical view

ATT&CK describes this sub-technique under Hide Artifacts and the stealth tactic. Validate monitoring for hidden PowerShell execution such as WindowStyle Hidden, suspicious script hosts including JScript and Visual Basic contexts, Registry changes that alter console window positioning, macOS plist use of apple.awt.UIElement for Java applications, and Windows hidden desktop behavior associated with CreateDesktop() or hidden VNC-style activity. Also review command-line parent/child relationships involving cmd.exe and LOLBins such as DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe when windows are suppressed. Official ATT&CK detection text is not provided, but the relationship to DET0128 indicates a detection strategy exists for Hidden Windows; teams should map that strategy to local telemetry and testable analytics.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation events with command line, parent process, user, integrity/session context, and working directory
  • PowerShell execution logs and command-line parameters, including hidden window style indicators
  • Script host execution telemetry for PowerShell, JScript, and Visual Basic-related activity
  • Windows Registry modification events for console or application window-position settings
  • macOS application plist contents and file modification telemetry, especially apple.awt.UIElement usage

Detection direction

  • Do not rely on user reports or visible pop-ups; validate machine telemetry that records non-interactive or hidden execution.
  • Tune detections around suspicious combinations: hidden-window flags plus script execution, unusual parent-child chains, off-screen console Registry changes, or hidden desktop behavior.
  • Separate legitimate administrative suppression from suspicious use by baselining approved software deployment, endpoint management, and automation tools.
  • Review macOS coverage separately; plist-based Dock/icon hiding may not appear in the same telemetry pipeline as Windows process analytics.
  • Use relationship context from known groups and PlugX as threat-intelligence enrichment, not as proof of local compromise.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with M1033 Limit Software Installation: restrict unauthorized software and reduce the ability to introduce tools that hide user-facing activity.
  • Apply M1038 Execution Prevention: enforce application control and script-blocking policies appropriate to the environment.
  • Harden and monitor administrative scripting paths, especially PowerShell and Windows script hosts, while preserving documented business automation use cases.
  • Review least-privilege and endpoint-management controls so ordinary users cannot install or run unapproved remote access or LOLBin-abusing workflows.
  • Maintain audit evidence for approved exceptions, policy enforcement, and detection tests so SOC and compliance teams can demonstrate coverage.
Analyst notes and limits

This object is T1564.003 Hidden Window, a sub-technique of T1564 Hide Artifacts, with platforms listed as Linux, macOS, and Windows. ATT&CK relationships include mitigation by M1033 and M1038, detection by DET0128, revocation replacement of T1143, and use by multiple groups and PlugX. Those relationships support prioritization and enrichment, but local risk depends on endpoint mix, scripting exposure, administrative practices, and telemetry quality.

The supplied ATT&CK object does not include official detection text, and relationship descriptions are partial for several related objects. This take therefore provides validation direction rather than guaranteed analytics or coverage claims. It does not claim active exploitation, attribution against any organization, or confirmed customer exposure.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Hidden Window

Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.

Adversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.[1]

On macOS, the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.

Similarly, on Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as PowerShell, Jscript, and Visual Basic to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden.[2]

The Windows Registry can also be edited to hide application windows from the current user. For example, by setting the `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\%SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will open off screen and be hidden.[3]

In addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding explorer.exe process.[4][5] All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session,[4] will be invisible to other desktops windows.

Adversaries may also leverage cmd.exe[6] as a parent process, and then utilize a LOLBin, such as DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe,[7][8] to hide windows.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

2 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1143 Hidden Window Hidden Window revoked by this object.
Enterprise T1564 Hide Artifacts This object subtechnique of Hide Artifacts.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0022: APT3

APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.[1][2] This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.[1][3] As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.[4]

Group Enterprise

G1055: VOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE is a threat group assessed to operate on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Active since at least mid-2022, VOID MANTICORE has targeted government entities, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations across Albania, Israel, and the United States.[1][2] VOID MANTICORE conducts destructive cyber operations, combining wiper attacks with hack-and-leak campaigns. The group has operated under multiple public-facing personas, including HomeLand Justice in operations against Albania, Karma and Karma Below in campaigns targeting Israeli organizations, and Handala Hack, its current primary persona, which has claimed activity against Israeli and U.S. entities, including a March 2026 attack against Stryker Corporation.[1][3] VOID MANTICORE has been observed collaborating with Scarred Manticore, which has been linked to initial access operations preceding VOID MANTICORE’s activity.[4]

Group Enterprise

G0007: APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.

Group Enterprise

G0073: APT19

APT19 is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign was used to target seven law and investment firms. [1] Some analysts track APT19 and Deep Panda as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same. [2] [3] [4]

Group Enterprise

G0046: FIN7

FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of FIN7 was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using Carbanak, leading these groups to be tracked separately.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

Group Enterprise

G1051: Medusa Group

Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” [1] [2] Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. [3] For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally. [4]

Group Enterprise

G0009: Deep Panda

Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications. [1] The intrusion into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to Deep Panda. [2] This group is also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther. [3] Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion. [4] Some analysts track Deep Panda and APT19 as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same. [5]

Group Enterprise

G0078: Gorgon Group

Gorgon Group is a threat group consisting of members who are suspected to be Pakistan-based or have other connections to Pakistan. The group has performed a mix of criminal and targeted attacks, including campaigns against government organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States. [1]

Group Enterprise

G0052: CopyKittens

CopyKittens is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G0126: Higaisa

Higaisa is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. Higaisa has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. Higaisa was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G0047: Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-governmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name Gamaredon Group derives from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon," found in early campaigns.[1][2][3][4][5]

In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed Gamaredon Group to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment later supported by multiple independent cybersecurity researchers. [6][5]

Group Enterprise

G0079: DarkHydrus

DarkHydrus is a threat group that has targeted government agencies and educational institutions in the Middle East since at least 2016. The group heavily leverages open-source tools and custom payloads for carrying out attacks. [1] [2]

Malware Enterprise

S0373: Astaroth

Astaroth is a Trojan and information stealer known to affect companies in Europe, Brazil, and throughout Latin America. It has been known publicly since at least late 2017. [1][2][3]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1199: LockBit 2.0

LockBit 2.0 is an affiliate-based Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that has been in use since at least June 2021 as the successor to LockBit Ransomware. LockBit 2.0 has versions capable of infecting Windows and VMware ESXi virtual machines, and has been observed targeting multiple industry verticals globally.[1][2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1020: Kevin

Kevin is a backdoor implant written in C++ that has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2020, including in operations against organizations in Tunisia.[1]

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S0250: Koadic

Koadic is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool that is publicly available on GitHub. Koadic has several options for staging payloads and creating implants, and performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host.[1][2][3]

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S0692: SILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. SILENTTRINITY was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.[1][2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0387: KeyBoy

KeyBoy is malware that has been used in targeted campaigns against members of the Tibetan Parliament in 2016.[1][2]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
49172fc7c81a5716...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 2.0 Current bundle 49172fc7c81a…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Antiquated Mac Malware

    Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    PowerShell About 2019

    Wheeler, S. et al.. (2019, May 1). About PowerShell.exe. Retrieved October 11, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Cantoris Computing

    Cantoris. (2016, July 22). PowerShell Malware. Retrieved December 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Hidden VNC

    Hutchins, Marcus. (2015, September 13). Hidden VNC for Beginners. Retrieved November 28, 2023.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Anatomy of an hVNC Attack

    Keshet, Lior. Kessem, Limor. (2017, January 25). Anatomy of an hVNC Attack. Retrieved November 28, 2023.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Cybereason - Hidden Malicious Remote Access

    Cybereason Security Services Team. (n.d.). Behind Closed Doors: The Rise of Hidden Malicious Remote Access. Retrieved July 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    LOLBAS Project GitHub Device Cred Dep

    Elliot Killick. (n.d.). /DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe. Retrieved July 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    SecureList BlueNoroff Device Cred Dev

    Seongsu Park. (2022, December 27). BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW. Retrieved July 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    mitre-attack T1564.003
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.