T1564: Hide Artifacts
Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.[1][2][3]
Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.[4]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Hide Artifacts is important because it describes the ways an intruder can make malicious files, accounts, windows, email rules, process details, file metadata, or virtualized activity less visible to users and security tools. For leaders, the practical issue is not one specific trick; it is whether the organization can still find suspicious activity when adversaries abuse normal operating system, Office, filesystem, and virtualization features intended for administration or usability.
Executive priority
Treat this as a visibility and assurance problem across endpoints, email/Office environments, Linux/macOS/Windows systems, and ESXi where in scope. The priority question is whether security investments actually observe hidden artifacts rather than only standard file listings, user-visible windows, or basic process logs. This technique also supports audit and incident response readiness: teams need evidence that hidden files, hidden accounts, email hiding rules, AV/file exclusions, virtual instances, and unusual filesystem metadata can be reviewed during investigations.
Technical view
ATT&CK provides no official detection text for T1564, so validation should be driven by the related detection strategy DET0502 and the sub-techniques. SOC and IR teams should test coverage for hidden files/directories, hidden users, hidden windows, NTFS attributes and alternate data streams, hidden file systems, virtual instances, VBA stomping, email hiding rules, resource forks, process argument spoofing, ignored interrupts, file/path exclusions, bind mounts, and extended attributes. Because supported platforms include ESXi, Linux, macOS, Office Suite, and Windows, detection engineering should not assume one endpoint telemetry source is sufficient.
Likely telemetry
- Endpoint file creation, modification, attribute, and metadata events across Windows, Linux, and macOS
- Account creation and account attribute changes, including attributes that affect login or visibility
- Process creation telemetry, command-line capture, and where available evidence of command-line or argument inconsistencies
- Filesystem inspection data such as NTFS attributes/alternate data streams, macOS resource forks, Linux/macOS extended attributes, bind mounts, and hidden filesystem indicators
- Email and Office administrative logs showing inbox rule creation or modification
Detection direction
- Map detections to the sub-techniques rather than treating T1564 as a single alert condition; each hiding method has different evidence and blind spots.
- Validate that endpoint tools collect hidden metadata, alternate streams, extended attributes, resource forks, bind mounts, and file/path exclusions, not just visible file paths.
- Tune detections with administrative baselines because many hiding features have legitimate operating system or administrator use cases.
- For Office Suite coverage, confirm whether email rule changes and suspicious embedded VBA document characteristics are logged and reviewable.
- For ESXi and virtualization-related scope, confirm that monitoring can see virtual instances and related activity rather than only host-level endpoint events.
Mitigation priorities
- Start with audit readiness: ensure systems record activity and configuration changes needed to review hidden artifacts, aligned to M1047 Audit.
- Limit unauthorized software installation using allowlists, software restriction policies, endpoint management, and least privilege principles where appropriate, aligned to M1033 Limit Software Installation.
- Deploy and maintain antimalware across relevant endpoints, while also verifying that exclusions and blind spots are governed, aligned to M1049 Antivirus/Antimalware.
- For internally developed applications or tooling, apply secure development guidance where relevant so applications do not introduce avoidable weaknesses or unsafe artifact-handling behavior, aligned to M1013 Application Developer Guidance.
- Prioritize controls by platform exposure: Windows filesystem and process visibility, macOS/Linux metadata and hidden file behaviors, Office/email rule auditing, and ESXi/virtualization monitoring where those platforms are used.
Analyst notes and limits
This parent technique is broad and its defensive value comes from decomposing it into the listed sub-techniques. The supplied relationships show one detection strategy, four mitigations, fourteen sub-techniques, and several software examples. Use those relationships to guide coverage reviews, purple-team validation, and incident response checklists without assuming any specific adversary is present.
MITRE does not provide official detection text for this object in the supplied fields. The object describes possible hiding behaviors and supported platforms, but local telemetry, product capabilities, logging configuration, and administrative practices determine actual detection and response coverage. No active exploitation, customer exposure, or guaranteed detection should be inferred from this ATT&CK entry alone.
Hide Artifacts
Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.[1][2][3]
Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.[4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden Window Sub-technique | Hidden Window subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564.011 | Ignore Process Interrupts Sub-technique | Ignore Process Interrupts subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564.002 | Hidden Users Sub-technique | Hidden Users subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564.012 | File/Path Exclusions Sub-technique | File/Path Exclusions subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564.014 | Extended Attributes Sub-technique | Extended Attributes subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564.008 | Email Hiding Rules Sub-technique | Email Hiding Rules subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564.009 | Resource Forking Sub-technique | Resource Forking subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564.013 | Bind Mounts Sub-technique | Bind Mounts subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564.006 | Run Virtual Instance Sub-technique | Run Virtual Instance subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564.010 | Process Argument Spoofing Sub-technique | Process Argument Spoofing subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564.001 | Hidden Files and Directories Sub-technique | Hidden Files and Directories subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564.004 | NTFS File Attributes Sub-technique | NTFS File Attributes subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564.007 | VBA Stomping Sub-technique | VBA Stomping subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564.005 | Hidden File System Sub-technique | Hidden File System subtechnique of this object. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0402: OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer is a Trojan designed to install adware on macOS that was first discovered in 2018.[1][2]
S0482: Bundlore
S0670: WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT is a malware-as-a-service remote access tool (RAT) written in C++ that has been publicly available for purchase since at least late 2018.[1][2]
S1066: DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla is a highly configurable .NET-based crypter that has been possibly active since at least August 2015. DarkTortilla has been used to deliver popular information stealers, RATs, and payloads such as Agent Tesla, AsyncRat, NanoCore, RedLine, Cobalt Strike, and Metasploit.[1]
S0332: Remcos
S1011: Tarrask
S9025: NOOPLDR
NOOPLDR is a shellcode loader with XML/C# and DLL versions that has been used by MirrorFace to load HiddenFace.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 7afbef43c47a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
-
[1]
Sofacy Komplex Trojan
Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
Open source URL -
[2]
Cybereason OSX Pirrit
Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved December 10, 2021.
Open source URL -
[3]
MalwareBytes ADS July 2015
Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.
Open source URL -
[4]
Sophos Ragnar May 2020
SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
Open source URL -
[5]
mitre-attack T1564Open source URL
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