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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1564: Hide Artifacts

Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.[1][2][3]

Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.[4]

EnterpriseT1564TechniqueObject v2.0 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Hide Artifacts is important because it describes the ways an intruder can make malicious files, accounts, windows, email rules, process details, file metadata, or virtualized activity less visible to users and security tools. For leaders, the practical issue is not one specific trick; it is whether the organization can still find suspicious activity when adversaries abuse normal operating system, Office, filesystem, and virtualization features intended for administration or usability.

Executive priority

Treat this as a visibility and assurance problem across endpoints, email/Office environments, Linux/macOS/Windows systems, and ESXi where in scope. The priority question is whether security investments actually observe hidden artifacts rather than only standard file listings, user-visible windows, or basic process logs. This technique also supports audit and incident response readiness: teams need evidence that hidden files, hidden accounts, email hiding rules, AV/file exclusions, virtual instances, and unusual filesystem metadata can be reviewed during investigations.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for T1564, so validation should be driven by the related detection strategy DET0502 and the sub-techniques. SOC and IR teams should test coverage for hidden files/directories, hidden users, hidden windows, NTFS attributes and alternate data streams, hidden file systems, virtual instances, VBA stomping, email hiding rules, resource forks, process argument spoofing, ignored interrupts, file/path exclusions, bind mounts, and extended attributes. Because supported platforms include ESXi, Linux, macOS, Office Suite, and Windows, detection engineering should not assume one endpoint telemetry source is sufficient.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint file creation, modification, attribute, and metadata events across Windows, Linux, and macOS
  • Account creation and account attribute changes, including attributes that affect login or visibility
  • Process creation telemetry, command-line capture, and where available evidence of command-line or argument inconsistencies
  • Filesystem inspection data such as NTFS attributes/alternate data streams, macOS resource forks, Linux/macOS extended attributes, bind mounts, and hidden filesystem indicators
  • Email and Office administrative logs showing inbox rule creation or modification

Detection direction

  • Map detections to the sub-techniques rather than treating T1564 as a single alert condition; each hiding method has different evidence and blind spots.
  • Validate that endpoint tools collect hidden metadata, alternate streams, extended attributes, resource forks, bind mounts, and file/path exclusions, not just visible file paths.
  • Tune detections with administrative baselines because many hiding features have legitimate operating system or administrator use cases.
  • For Office Suite coverage, confirm whether email rule changes and suspicious embedded VBA document characteristics are logged and reviewable.
  • For ESXi and virtualization-related scope, confirm that monitoring can see virtual instances and related activity rather than only host-level endpoint events.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with audit readiness: ensure systems record activity and configuration changes needed to review hidden artifacts, aligned to M1047 Audit.
  • Limit unauthorized software installation using allowlists, software restriction policies, endpoint management, and least privilege principles where appropriate, aligned to M1033 Limit Software Installation.
  • Deploy and maintain antimalware across relevant endpoints, while also verifying that exclusions and blind spots are governed, aligned to M1049 Antivirus/Antimalware.
  • For internally developed applications or tooling, apply secure development guidance where relevant so applications do not introduce avoidable weaknesses or unsafe artifact-handling behavior, aligned to M1013 Application Developer Guidance.
  • Prioritize controls by platform exposure: Windows filesystem and process visibility, macOS/Linux metadata and hidden file behaviors, Office/email rule auditing, and ESXi/virtualization monitoring where those platforms are used.
Analyst notes and limits

This parent technique is broad and its defensive value comes from decomposing it into the listed sub-techniques. The supplied relationships show one detection strategy, four mitigations, fourteen sub-techniques, and several software examples. Use those relationships to guide coverage reviews, purple-team validation, and incident response checklists without assuming any specific adversary is present.

MITRE does not provide official detection text for this object in the supplied fields. The object describes possible hiding behaviors and supported platforms, but local telemetry, product capabilities, logging configuration, and administrative practices determine actual detection and response coverage. No active exploitation, customer exposure, or guaranteed detection should be inferred from this ATT&CK entry alone.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Hide Artifacts

Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.[1][2][3]

Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.[4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1564.003 Hidden Window Sub-technique Hidden Window subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1564.011 Ignore Process Interrupts Sub-technique Ignore Process Interrupts subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1564.002 Hidden Users Sub-technique Hidden Users subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1564.012 File/Path Exclusions Sub-technique File/Path Exclusions subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1564.014 Extended Attributes Sub-technique Extended Attributes subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1564.008 Email Hiding Rules Sub-technique Email Hiding Rules subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1564.009 Resource Forking Sub-technique Resource Forking subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1564.013 Bind Mounts Sub-technique Bind Mounts subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1564.006 Run Virtual Instance Sub-technique Run Virtual Instance subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1564.010 Process Argument Spoofing Sub-technique Process Argument Spoofing subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories Sub-technique Hidden Files and Directories subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1564.004 NTFS File Attributes Sub-technique NTFS File Attributes subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1564.007 VBA Stomping Sub-technique VBA Stomping subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1564.005 Hidden File System Sub-technique Hidden File System subtechnique of this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Malware Enterprise

S0482: Bundlore

Bundlore is adware written for macOS that has been in use since at least 2015. Though categorized as adware, Bundlore has many features associated with more traditional backdoors.[1]

macOS
Malware Enterprise

S0670: WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT is a malware-as-a-service remote access tool (RAT) written in C++ that has been publicly available for purchase since at least late 2018.[1][2]

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S0332: Remcos

Remcos is a closed-source tool that is marketed as a remote control and surveillance software by a company called Breaking Security. Remcos has been observed being used in malware campaigns.[1][2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1011: Tarrask

Tarrask is malware that has been used by HAFNIUM since at least August 2021. Tarrask was designed to evade digital defenses and maintain persistence by generating concealed scheduled tasks.[1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Malware S0402: OSX/Shlayer Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1564.003: Hidden Window Enterprise uses · Malware S0482: Bundlore Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1033: Limit Software Installation Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1564.011: Ignore Process Interrupts Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1564.002: Hidden Users Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1564.012: File/Path Exclusions Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1013: Application Developer Guidance Enterprise uses · Malware S0670: WarzoneRAT Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1564.014: Extended Attributes Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1047: Audit Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1564.008: Email Hiding Rules Enterprise uses · Malware S1066: DarkTortilla Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1564.009: Resource Forking Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1564.013: Bind Mounts Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1564.006: Run Virtual Instance Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1564.010: Process Argument Spoofing Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1564.001: Hidden Files and Directories Enterprise uses · Tool S0332: Remcos Enterprise detects · Detection Strategy DET0502: Detection Strategy for Hidden Artifacts Across Platforms Enterprise uses · Malware S1011: Tarrask Enterprise uses · Malware S9025: NOOPLDR Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1564.004: NTFS File Attributes Enterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
7afbef43c47af552...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 2.0 Current bundle 7afbef43c47a…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Sofacy Komplex Trojan

    Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Cybereason OSX Pirrit

    Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved December 10, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    MalwareBytes ADS July 2015

    Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Sophos Ragnar May 2020

    SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    mitre-attack T1564
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.