Live Active security incident? Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1490: Inhibit System Recovery

Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.[1][2] This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.

Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of Data Destruction and Data Encrypted for Impact.[1][2] Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.[3]

A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:

* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet * Windows Management Instrumentation can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete * wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet * bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no * REAgentC.exe can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system * diskshadow.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - diskshadow delete shadows all [4] [5]

On network devices, adversaries may leverage Disk Wipe to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then System Shutdown/Reboot to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.

On ESXi servers, adversaries may delete or encrypt snapshots of virtual machines to support Data Encrypted for Impact, preventing them from being leveraged as backups (e.g., via ` vim-cmd vmsvc/snapshot.removeall`).[6]

Adversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network – whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.[7] In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, database backups, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.[8][9]

EnterpriseT1490TechniqueObject v1.6 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Inhibit System Recovery is the behavior that makes a destructive or ransomware incident harder to recover from. Instead of only damaging or encrypting systems, an adversary may remove recovery points, disable repair features, delete snapshots, corrupt backups, or tamper with cloud and network-device recovery options. For leaders, the key issue is not just prevention; it is whether the organization can still restore critical services when the attacker has targeted the recovery path itself.

Executive priority

Treat T1490 as a resilience and incident-readiness priority. It directly affects recovery time, backup assurance, ransomware decision-making, and audit evidence for disaster recovery controls. Executives should ask whether backups, snapshots, versioning, and recovery notifications are protected by separate privileges, monitored, and regularly restore-tested across Windows, Linux/macOS where applicable, ESXi, IaaS, network devices, containers, and online backup locations. This technique is associated in ATT&CK with destructive and ransomware activity, including multiple ransomware software entries and groups, so it should influence business continuity planning and control prioritization even though local exposure must be validated.

Technical view

ATT&CK places this technique in the Impact tactic and lists platforms including Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, and Windows. The official description highlights Windows recovery utilities, ESXi snapshot removal, cloud backup/versioning/snapshot deletion, online backup deletion, network-device firmware/file-system destruction, and recovery notification tampering. SOC and IR teams should validate behavioral coverage for unusual recovery-control changes, especially when followed by or correlated with Data Destruction, Data Encrypted for Impact, Disk Wipe, or System Shutdown/Reboot. The relationship to DET0329 indicates a behavioral detection strategy exists, but the ATT&CK object itself provides no official detection text, so detection engineering should be based on local telemetry and change-control context.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows process creation and command-line telemetry for recovery and backup utilities such as vssadmin.exe, wmic, wbadmin.exe, bcdedit.exe, REAgentC.exe, and diskshadow.exe
  • Windows event logs and configuration-change records related to shadow copies, backup catalogs, boot recovery settings, WinRE, services, and scheduled backup jobs
  • Backup platform logs showing deletion, policy changes, catalog changes, failed notifications, or restore-point removal
  • ESXi or virtualization management task logs for virtual machine snapshot deletion or modification
  • Cloud audit logs for changes to versioning, backup policies, snapshots, database backups, machine images, and object versions

Detection direction

  • Validate DET0329-style behavioral detection for recovery inhibition rather than relying only on malware signatures.
  • Alert on rare or unauthorized use of native recovery and backup administration utilities, with command-line and parent-process context where available.
  • Correlate recovery tampering with encryption, data destruction, disk wipe, or reboot activity to distinguish high-severity impact operations from routine administration.
  • Tune detections against approved backup maintenance windows, imaging workflows, disaster-recovery testing, and administrator activity to reduce false positives.
  • Review blind spots in cloud, ESXi, network devices, NAS, and online backup systems; endpoint EDR alone may not see recovery deletion in those control planes.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize M1053 Data Backup: maintain secure, isolated backups and regularly test restoration of critical services, not just file recovery.
  • Apply M1018 User Account Management: restrict and review privileges that can delete backups, disable versioning, remove snapshots, or change recovery policy.
  • Apply M1028 Operating System Configuration: harden recovery settings and backup configurations so recovery features cannot be casually disabled or removed.
  • Apply M1038 Execution Prevention: limit unauthorized execution of scripts, tools, and binaries used to tamper with recovery capabilities.
  • Separate administrative roles for production, backup, virtualization, cloud, and network-device recovery where feasible, and monitor changes to those roles.
Analyst notes and limits

The relationship context shows this technique is used by several ATT&CK groups, campaigns, and software entries, including destructive and ransomware-related examples such as Olympic Destroyer, WannaCry, Ryuk, Maze, REvil, BlackByte, Medusa Group, Storm-0501, and others. This supports treating recovery tampering as a common impact-pattern to plan for, but it does not prove current activity in any specific environment. The supplied mitigations are M1018, M1028, M1038, and M1053, with DET0329 as the related detection strategy.

The official ATT&CK detection field is not provided, so specific analytics must be developed from local logging, platform coverage, and administrative baselines. The object lists multiple platforms, but detailed examples are strongest for Windows, ESXi, IaaS/cloud, network devices, and online backups. No claim is made that any organization is exposed or that detection coverage exists without validation.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Inhibit System Recovery

Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.[1][2] This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.

Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of Data Destruction and Data Encrypted for Impact.[1][2] Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.[3]

A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:

* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet * Windows Management Instrumentation can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete * wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet * bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no * REAgentC.exe can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system * diskshadow.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - diskshadow delete shadows all [4] [5]

On network devices, adversaries may leverage Disk Wipe to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then System Shutdown/Reboot to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.

On ESXi servers, adversaries may delete or encrypt snapshots of virtual machines to support Data Encrypted for Impact, preventing them from being leveraged as backups (e.g., via ` vim-cmd vmsvc/snapshot.removeall`).[6]

Adversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network – whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.[7] In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, database backups, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.[8][9]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G1051: Medusa Group

Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” [1] [2] Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. [3] For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally. [4]

Group Enterprise

G1053: Storm-0501

Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.[1][2][3][4]

Group Enterprise

G1055: VOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE is a threat group assessed to operate on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Active since at least mid-2022, VOID MANTICORE has targeted government entities, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations across Albania, Israel, and the United States.[1][2] VOID MANTICORE conducts destructive cyber operations, combining wiper attacks with hack-and-leak campaigns. The group has operated under multiple public-facing personas, including HomeLand Justice in operations against Albania, Karma and Karma Below in campaigns targeting Israeli organizations, and Handala Hack, its current primary persona, which has claimed activity against Israeli and U.S. entities, including a March 2026 attack against Stryker Corporation.[1][3] VOID MANTICORE has been observed collaborating with Scarred Manticore, which has been linked to initial access operations preceding VOID MANTICORE’s activity.[4]

Group Enterprise

G0102: Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of TrickBot since at least 2016. Wizard Spider possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G1043: BlackByte

BlackByte is a ransomware threat actor operating since at least 2021. BlackByte is associated with several versions of ransomware also labeled BlackByte Ransomware. BlackByte ransomware operations initially used a common encryption key allowing for the development of a universal decryptor, but subsequent versions such as BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware use more robust encryption mechanisms. BlackByte is notable for operations targeting critical infrastructure entities among other targets across North America.[1][2][3][4][5]

Group Enterprise

G1015: Scattered Spider

Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022. [1] [2] The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. [2] Scattered Spider relies heavily on social engineering, including impersonating IT and help-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial gain. [3] [4] [5] Scattered Spider had expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, using help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administrator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. [6]

Group Enterprise

G0034: Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]

In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]

Malware Enterprise

S1070: Black Basta

Black Basta is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered within the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model since at least April 2022; there are variants that target Windows and VMWare ESXi servers. Black Basta operations have included the double extortion technique where in addition to demanding ransom for decrypting the files of targeted organizations the cyber actors also threaten to post sensitive information to a leak site if the ransom is not paid. Black Basta affiliates have targeted multiple high-value organizations, with the largest number of victims based in the U.S. Based on similarities in TTPs, leak sites, payment sites, and negotiation tactics, security researchers assess the Black Basta RaaS operators could include current or former members of the Conti group.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

WindowsESXi
Malware Enterprise

S0260: InvisiMole

InvisiMole is a modular spyware program that has been used by the InvisiMole Group since at least 2013. InvisiMole has two backdoor modules called RC2FM and RC2CL that are used to perform post-exploitation activities. It has been discovered on compromised victims in the Ukraine and Russia. Gamaredon Group infrastructure has been used to download and execute InvisiMole against a small number of victims.[1][2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1162: Playcrypt

Playcrypt is a ransomware that has been used by Play since at least 2022 in attacks against against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. Playcrypt derives its name from adding the .play extension to encrypted files and has overlap with tactics and tools associated with Hive and Nokoyawa ransomware and infrastructure associated with Quantum ransomware.[1][2][3]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0132: H1N1

H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality. [1]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0446: Ryuk

Ryuk is a ransomware designed to target enterprise environments that has been used in attacks since at least 2018. Ryuk shares code similarities with Hermes ransomware.[1][2][3]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1244: Medusa Ransomware

Medusa Ransomware has been utilized in attacks since at least 2021. Medusa Ransomware has been known to be utilized in conjunction with living off the land techniques and remote management software. Medusa Ransomware has been used in campaigns associated with “double extortion” ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Medusa Ransomware software was initially a closed ransomware variant which later evolved to a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS). Medusa Ransomware has impacted victims from a diverse range of sectors within a multitude of countries, and it is assessed Medusa Ransomware is used in an opportunistic manner.[1][2][3][4]

Malware Enterprise

S0605: EKANS

EKANS is ransomware variant written in Golang that first appeared in mid-December 2019 and has been used against multiple sectors, including energy, healthcare, and automotive manufacturing, which in some cases resulted in significant operational disruptions. EKANS has used a hard-coded kill-list of processes, including some associated with common ICS software platforms (e.g., GE Proficy, Honeywell HMIWeb, etc), similar to those defined in MegaCortex.[1][2]

Windows
Campaign Enterprise

C0063: 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

2025 Poland Wiper Attacks is a Russian state-sponsored campaign that conducted destructive cyberattacks against Polish energy infrastructure in December 2025. Targets included more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, and a manufacturing sector company. The attacks on the distributed energy resources (DER) disrupted communications between affected facilities and the distribution system operator, but did not impact electricity generation or heat supply. Across the campaign, threat actors deployed two previously undocumented wiper tools, DynoWiper, a Windows-based wiper and LazyWiper, a PowerShell wiper, distributed via malicious Group Policy Objects. At the CHP plant, threat actors had maintained access since at least March 2025, using that foothold to obtain credentials and move laterally before attempting wiper deployment. Some reporting has assessed the activity to be consistent with Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) threat activity group Dragonfly, also tracked as STATIC TUNDRA, while other reporting attributes the destructive wiper activities to the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) threat activity group ELECTRUM, also tracked as Sandworm Team.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Group G1051: Medusa Group Enterprise uses · Malware S1070: Black Basta Enterprise uses · Malware S0481: Ragnar Locker Enterprise uses · Malware S0260: InvisiMole Enterprise uses · Group G1053: Storm-0501 Enterprise uses · Malware S1162: Playcrypt Enterprise uses · Malware S0612: WastedLocker Enterprise uses · Malware S0132: H1N1 Enterprise uses · Malware S0400: RobbinHood Enterprise uses · Malware S0446: Ryuk Enterprise uses · Malware S0673: DarkWatchman Enterprise uses · Malware S1244: Medusa Ransomware Enterprise uses · Malware S0605: EKANS Enterprise uses · Malware S1139: INC Ransomware Enterprise uses · Malware S0576: MegaCortex Enterprise uses · Malware S0616: DEATHRANSOM Enterprise uses · Malware S1073: Royal Enterprise uses · Malware S1181: BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware Enterprise uses · Malware S0640: Avaddon Enterprise uses · Group G1055: VOID MANTICORE Enterprise uses · Malware S1058: Prestige Enterprise uses · Malware S1111: DarkGate Enterprise uses · Malware S0697: HermeticWiper Enterprise uses · Malware S0366: WannaCry Enterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Mitigation Enterprise

M1038: Execution Prevention

Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms. This ensures that only trusted and authorized code is executed, reducing the risk of malware and unauthorized actions. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Application Control:

- Use Case: Use tools like AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create whitelists of authorized applications and block unauthorized ones. On Linux, use tools like SELinux or AppArmor to define mandatory access control policies for application execution. - Implementation: Allow only digitally signed or pre-approved applications to execute on servers and endpoints. (e.g., `New-AppLockerPolicy -PolicyType Enforced -FilePath "C:\Policies\AppLocker.xml"`)

Script Blocking:

- Use Case: Use script control mechanisms to block unauthorized execution of scripts, such as PowerShell or JavaScript. Web Browsers: Use browser extensions or settings to block JavaScript execution from untrusted sources. - Implementation: Configure PowerShell to enforce Constrained Language Mode for non-administrator users. (e.g., `Set-ExecutionPolicy AllSigned`)

Executable Blocking:

- Use Case: Prevent execution of binaries from suspicious locations, such as `%TEMP%` or `%APPDATA%` directories. - Implementation: Block execution of `.exe`, `.bat`, or `.ps1` files from user-writable directories.

Dynamic Analysis Prevention: - Use Case: Use behavior-based execution prevention tools to identify and block malicious activity in real time. - Implemenation: Employ EDR solutions that analyze runtime behavior and block suspicious code execution.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1028: Operating System Configuration

Operating System Configuration involves adjusting system settings and hardening the default configurations of an operating system (OS) to mitigate adversary exploitation and prevent abuse of system functionality. Proper OS configurations address security vulnerabilities, limit attack surfaces, and ensure robust defense against a wide range of techniques. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Disable Unused Features:

- Turn off SMBv1, LLMNR, and NetBIOS where not needed. - Disable remote registry and unnecessary services.

Enforce OS-level Protections:

- Enable Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), and Control Flow Guard (CFG) on Windows. - Use AppArmor or SELinux on Linux for mandatory access controls.

Secure Access Settings:

- Enable User Account Control (UAC) for Windows. - Restrict root/sudo access on Linux/macOS and enforce strong permissions using sudoers files.

File System Hardening:

- Implement least-privilege access for critical files and system directories. - Audit permissions regularly using tools like icacls (Windows) or getfacl/chmod (Linux/macOS).

Secure Remote Access:

- Restrict RDP, SSH, and VNC to authorized IPs using firewall rules. - Enable NLA for RDP and enforce strong password/lockout policies.

Harden Boot Configurations:

- Enable Secure Boot and enforce UEFI/BIOS password protection. - Use BitLocker or LUKS to encrypt boot drives.

Regular Audits:

- Periodically audit OS configurations using tools like CIS Benchmarks or SCAP tools.

*Tools for Implementation*

Windows:

- Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO): Centrally enforce OS security settings. - Windows Defender Exploit Guard: Built-in OS protection against exploits. - CIS-CAT Pro: Audit Windows security configurations based on CIS Benchmarks.

Linux/macOS:

- AppArmor/SELinux: Enforce mandatory access controls. - Lynis: Perform comprehensive security audits. - SCAP Security Guide: Automate configuration hardening using Security Content Automation Protocol.

Cross-Platform:

- Ansible or Chef/Puppet: Automate configuration hardening at scale. - OpenSCAP: Perform compliance and configuration checks.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1018: User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege

- Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions.

Implementing Strong Password Policies

- Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks.

Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts

- Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers.

Account Lockout Policies

- Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts.

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts

- Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen.

Restricting Interactive Logins

- Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.

*Tools for Implementation*

Built-in Tools:

- Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.

Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools:

- Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.

Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1053: Data Backup

Data Backup involves taking and securely storing backups of data from end-user systems and critical servers. It ensures that data remains available in the event of system compromise, ransomware attacks, or other disruptions. Backup processes should include hardening backup systems, implementing secure storage solutions, and keeping backups isolated from the corporate network to prevent compromise during active incidents. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Regular Backup Scheduling: - Use Case: Ensure timely and consistent backups of critical data. - Implementation: Schedule daily incremental backups and weekly full backups for all critical servers and systems.

Immutable Backups: - Use Case: Protect backups from modification or deletion, even by attackers. - Implementation: Use write-once-read-many (WORM) storage for backups, preventing ransomware from encrypting or deleting backup files.

Backup Encryption: - Use Case: Protect data integrity and confidentiality during transit and storage. - Implementation: Encrypt backups using strong encryption protocols (e.g., AES-256) before storing them in local, cloud, or remote locations.

Offsite Backup Storage: - Use Case: Ensure data availability during physical disasters or onsite breaches. - Implementation: Use cloud-based solutions like AWS S3, Azure Backup, or physical offsite storage to maintain a copy of critical data.

Backup Testing: - Use Case: Validate backup integrity and ensure recoverability. - Implementation: Regularly test data restoration processes to ensure that backups are not corrupted and can be recovered quickly.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.6
Created
Modified
Raw hash
f192cad6e025e056...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.6 Current bundle f192cad6e025…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018

    Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FireEye WannaCry 2017

    Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    disable_notif_synology_ransom

    TheDFIRReport. (2022, March 1). Disabling notifications on Synology servers before ransom. Retrieved September 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Diskshadow

    Microsoft Windows Server. (2023, February 3). Diskshadow. Retrieved November 21, 2023.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Crytox Ransomware

    Romain Dumont . (2022, September 21). Technical Analysis of Crytox Ransomware. Retrieved November 22, 2023.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Cybereason

    Cybereason Nocturnus. (n.d.). Cybereason vs. BlackCat Ransomware. Retrieved March 26, 2025.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020

    Steve Ranger. (2020, February 27). Ransomware victims thought their backups were safe. They were wrong. Retrieved March 21, 2023.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack

    Brian Prince. (2014, June 20). Code Hosting Service Shuts Down After Cyber Attack. Retrieved March 21, 2023.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware

    Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS Simple Storage Service S3 Ransomware Part 2: Prevention and Defense. Retrieved March 21, 2023.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    mitre-attack T1490
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK site Official STIX data repository MITRE ATT&CK terms of use