T1529: System Shutdown/Reboot

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2]; some of their attacks have been destructive.[1][2][3][4]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

APT37 is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. APT37 has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018.[1][2][3]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” [1] [2] Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. [3] For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally. [4]

AcidRain is an ELF binary targeting modems and routers using MIPS architecture.[1] AcidRain is associated with the ViaSat KA-SAT communication outage that took place during the initial phases of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Analysis indicates overlap with another network device-targeting malware, VPNFilter, associated with Sandworm Team.[1] US and European government sources linked AcidRain to Russian government entities, while Ukrainian government sources linked AcidRain specifically to Sandworm Team.[2][3]

DCSrv is destructive malware that has been used by Moses Staff since at least September 2021. Though DCSrv has ransomware-like capabilities, Moses Staff does not demand ransom or offer a decryption key.[1]

DynoWiper is a destructive malware associated with the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks in December of 2025. DynoWiper is a native Windows binary that is distributed by a PowerShell script and overwrites files using data generated by the Mersenne Twister algorithm before they are deleted from the system. Multiple variants of DynoWiper have been identified, with the primary differences being that one variant shuts down the system after completing its destructive operations, and another introduces a time delay between file overwriting and deletion.[1][2]

BFG Agonizer is a wiper related to the open-source project CRYLINE-v.5.0. The malware is associated with wiping operations conducted by the Agrius threat actor.[1]

Qilin is a ransomware family operated as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) that has been active since at least 2022. It includes variants written in Go and Rust capable of targeting Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi environments. Qilin shares functionality overlaps with Black Basta, REvil, and BlackCat ransomware. Qilin affiliates have targeted multiple entities worldwide with the majority of victims in the US, France, Canada, and the UK, primarily in the manufacturing, technology, financial services, and healthcare sectors.[1][2][3][4][5]

MultiLayer Wiper is wiper malware written in .NET associated with Agrius operations. Observed samples of MultiLayer Wiper have an anomalous, future compilation date suggesting possible metadata manipulation.[1]

AcidPour is a variant of AcidRain designed to impact a wider range of x86 architecture Linux devices. AcidPour is an x86 ELF binary that expands on the targeted devices and locations in AcidRain by including items such as Unsorted Block Image (UBI), Deice Mapper (DM), and various flash memory references. Based on this expanded targeting, AcidPour can impact a variety of device types including IoT, networking, and ICS embedded device types.[1] AcidPour is a wiping payload associated with the Sandworm Team threat actor, and potentially linked to attacks against Ukrainian internet service providers (ISPs) in 2023.[2]

LockerGoga is ransomware that was first reported in January 2019, and has been tied to various attacks on European companies, including industrial and manufacturing firms.[1][2]

Olympic Destroyer is malware that was used by Sandworm Team against the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The main purpose of the malware was to render infected computer systems inoperable. The malware leverages various native Windows utilities and API calls to carry out its destructive tasks. Olympic Destroyer has worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network in order to maximize its destructive impact.[1][2]

Maze ransomware, previously known as "ChaCha", was discovered in May 2019. In addition to encrypting files on victim machines for impact, Maze operators conduct information stealing campaigns prior to encryption and post the information online to extort affected companies.[1][2][3]

LookBack is a remote access trojan written in C++ that was used against at least three US utility companies in July 2019. The TALONITE activity group has been observed using LookBack.[1][2][3]

Apostle is malware that has functioned as both a wiper and, in more recent versions, as ransomware. Apostle is written in .NET and shares various programming and functional overlaps with IPsec Helper.[1]

2025 Poland Wiper Attacks is a Russian state-sponsored campaign that conducted destructive cyberattacks against Polish energy infrastructure in December 2025. Targets included more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, and a manufacturing sector company. The attacks on the distributed energy resources (DER) disrupted communications between affected facilities and the distribution system operator, but did not impact electricity generation or heat supply. Across the campaign, threat actors deployed two previously undocumented wiper tools, DynoWiper, a Windows-based wiper and LazyWiper, a PowerShell wiper, distributed via malicious Group Policy Objects. At the CHP plant, threat actors had maintained access since at least March 2025, using that foothold to obtain credentials and move laterally before attempting wiper deployment. Some reporting has assessed the activity to be consistent with Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) threat activity group Dragonfly, also tracked as STATIC TUNDRA, while other reporting attributes the destructive wiper activities to the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) threat activity group ELECTRUM, also tracked as Sandworm Team.[1][2][3][4]