G0115: GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD is a financially motivated threat group active since at least 2018 that operates the REvil Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS). GOLD SOUTHFIELD provides backend infrastructure for affiliates recruited on underground forums to perpetrate high value deployments. By early 2020, GOLD SOUTHFIELD started capitalizing on the new trend of stealing data and further extorting the victim to pay for their data to not get publicly leaked.[1][2][3][4]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
GOLD SOUTHFIELD matters because ATT&CK describes it as a financially motivated group operating the REvil ransomware-as-a-service model, with affiliates used for high-value deployments and data-theft extortion. For leaders, the decision point is not only “ransomware prevention,” but whether the organization can withstand affiliate-driven intrusion paths that may involve phishing, exposed services, trusted third parties, legitimate remote access tools, and eventual extortion pressure.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as an operational resilience and incident decision-making issue. The supplied relationships connect GOLD SOUTHFIELD to REvil, ConnectWise, external remote services, public-facing application exploitation, phishing, trusted relationships, and software supply chain compromise. Executives should ask whether critical business services, third-party access paths, remote administration tooling, backup recovery, legal/comms extortion procedures, and audit evidence for access control are tested together rather than managed as separate controls.
Technical view
ATT&CK does not provide a dedicated detection section for this group, so coverage should be validated through the related behaviors and software. SOC and IR teams should test visibility for Windows-focused ransomware activity associated with REvil, legitimate remote administration tool use such as ConnectWise, suspicious PowerShell and obfuscated command execution, screen capture behavior, phishing-driven access, exploitation of Internet-facing applications, external remote service abuse, trusted-relationship access, and software supply chain exposure. Because the group object has no specified platforms or tactics, detection engineering should anchor analytics to the relationship set rather than assume a single intrusion path.
Likely telemetry
- Identity provider and VPN authentication logs for external remote services, unusual access patterns, and third-party logins
- Endpoint process creation, command-line, PowerShell, script block, and obfuscation-related telemetry
- Remote administration and support tool logs, including authorized ConnectWise usage where deployed
- Email security, URL click, attachment, and user-reporting telemetry for phishing-related access
- Public-facing application, web server, WAF, vulnerability, and exposure management data
Detection direction
- Start with control-point coverage: identity, endpoint, remote access, exposed applications, email, and third-party access should all produce searchable evidence before writing group-specific detections.
- Tune detections for suspicious PowerShell and command obfuscation while accounting for legitimate administration scripts to reduce false positives.
- Baseline approved remote access tools and investigate use outside expected users, hosts, hours, or support workflows; legitimate tools can otherwise appear normal.
- Correlate initial-access signals, such as phishing, public-facing application alerts, external remote service logins, and trusted-relationship access, with later endpoint execution or remote administration activity.
- Use REvil as ransomware context, but avoid assuming every ransomware or remote access alert is GOLD SOUTHFIELD without supporting evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Harden and monitor external remote services with strong authentication, least privilege, session logging, and rapid disablement procedures.
- Reduce Internet-facing application risk through asset inventory, patch prioritization, configuration review, and exposure management.
- Govern legitimate remote administration tools with approved inventories, restricted operators, logging, and alerting on unexpected installation or use.
- Strengthen phishing resilience through email controls, user reporting, identity protections, and incident playbooks for suspected credential compromise.
- Review trusted third-party and software supply chain access, especially elevated vendor connectivity into internal or cloud environments.
Analyst notes and limits
The most useful defensive interpretation is the RaaS affiliate model: organizations should expect multiple possible access paths and should validate layered readiness rather than search for one fixed playbook. The ConnectWise relationship is especially important for distinguishing authorized remote support from adversary use of legitimate administration tooling.
The supplied ATT&CK group object does not specify platforms, tactics, or an official detection section. Platform and behavior guidance here is derived from the supplied relationships to REvil, ConnectWise, and related ATT&CK techniques. Local asset inventory, tool usage, identity architecture, vendor access, and incident history are required to assess actual exposure or coverage.
GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD is a financially motivated threat group active since at least 2018 that operates the REvil Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS). GOLD SOUTHFIELD provides backend infrastructure for affiliates recruited on underground forums to perpetrate high value deployments. By early 2020, GOLD SOUTHFIELD started capitalizing on the new trend of stealing data and further extorting the victim to pay for their data to not get publicly leaked.[1][2][3][4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1199 | Trusted Relationship | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has breached Managed Service Providers (MSP's) to deliver malware to MSP customers.CitationSecureworks REvil September 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has exploited Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities for initial compromise.CitationSecureworks REvil September 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used the remote monitoring and management tool ConnectWise to obtain screen captures from victim's machines.CitationTetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1219 | Remote Access Tools | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used the cloud-based remote management and monitoring tool "ConnectWise Control" to deploy REvil.CitationTetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1195.002 | Compromise Software Supply Chain Sub-technique | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has distributed ransomware by backdooring software installers via a strategic web compromise of the site hosting Italian WinRAR.CitationSecureworks REvil September 2019CitationSecureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019CitationSecureworks GOLD SOUTHFIELD |
| Enterprise | T1027.010 | Command Obfuscation Sub-technique | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has executed base64 encoded PowerShell scripts on compromised hosts.CitationTetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used publicly-accessible RDP and remote management and monitoring (RMM) servers to gain access to victim machines.CitationSecureworks REvil September 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShell Sub-technique | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has staged and executed PowerShell scripts on compromised hosts.CitationTetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1566 | Phishing | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has conducted malicious spam (malspam) campaigns to gain access to victim's machines.CitationSecureworks REvil September 2019 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0591: ConnectWise
ConnectWise is a legitimate remote administration tool that has been used since at least 2016 by threat actors including MuddyWater and GOLD SOUTHFIELD to connect to and conduct lateral movement in target environments.[1][2]
S0496: REvil
REvil is a ransomware family that has been linked to the GOLD SOUTHFIELD group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. REvil, which as been used against organizations in the manufacturing, transportation, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 72f889d06ace… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Secureworks REvil September 2019
Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 24). REvil/Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020.
Open source URL -
[2]
Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019
Secureworks . (2019, September 24). REvil: The GandCrab Connection. Retrieved August 4, 2020.
Open source URL -
[3]
Secureworks GOLD SOUTHFIELD
Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD SOUTHFIELD. Retrieved October 6, 2020.
Open source URL -
[4]
CrowdStrike Evolution of Pinchy Spider July 2021
Meyers, Adam. (2021, July 6). The Evolution of PINCHY SPIDER from GandCrab to REvil. Retrieved March 28, 2023.
Open source URL -
[5]
Pinchy Spider
(Citation: CrowdStrike Evolution of Pinchy Spider July 2021)
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[6]
mitre-attack G0115Open source URL
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