S0528: Javali
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Javali matters because it is a Windows banking trojan associated with financial-theft tradecraft: phishing-driven entry, user execution, command-and-control redirection, tool transfer, browser credential access, and stealth through binary padding, msiexec, Visual Basic, and DLL abuse. For leaders, the practical question is not only “do we block this malware,” but whether the organization can prove coverage across email, endpoint, web, DNS, and credential telemetry when a banking-themed intrusion starts with a user action.
Executive priority
Prioritize Javali as a financial-fraud and credential-risk scenario, especially for organizations with Portuguese- or Spanish-speaking users, customers, or operations connected to Brazil and Mexico. The ATT&CK record does not provide detection guidance, so executive assurance should focus on evidence: phishing controls, endpoint visibility on Windows, browser credential protections, outbound web monitoring, and incident response playbooks that connect user-reported email events to endpoint and network investigation.
Technical view
Validate coverage around the ATT&CK relationships rather than relying on malware names or hashes. SOC and IR teams should test whether they can correlate spearphishing attachments or links with malicious file/link execution, Visual Basic activity, msiexec-proxied execution, suspicious DLL loading, process discovery, external file transfer, dead-drop-style web lookups, and attempts to access browser-stored credentials. Binary padding makes hash-only and static-signature workflows a weak control by themselves.
Likely telemetry
- Email security and mailbox logs for spearphishing attachments and links
- Web proxy, DNS, and secure web gateway logs for external services used as dead drop resolvers and payload retrieval
- Windows endpoint process creation telemetry, including msiexec.exe and Visual Basic-related execution
- File creation, download, and executable metadata telemetry, including unusually large or padded binaries
- DLL load and module telemetry on Windows endpoints
Detection direction
- Do not depend on malware family names, hashes, or static signatures alone; binary padding can change file representation and bypass hash-based controls.
- Tune detections for chained behavior: phishing delivery followed by user execution, msiexec or Visual Basic activity, payload download, and outbound web lookups.
- Review allowlisting and web reputation assumptions for legitimate external web services that could be abused as dead drop resolvers.
- Baseline legitimate msiexec, DLL loading, and Visual Basic use to reduce false positives while preserving alerts for unusual parent-child processes, remote MSI execution, or unexpected user-context execution.
- Confirm endpoint tooling can observe browser credential access; this is often a blind spot when browser data access is not treated as credential-access telemetry.
Mitigation priorities
- Strengthen email filtering, attachment/link inspection, and user reporting workflows for phishing-led initial access.
- Reduce user-execution risk with application control, script control, and restrictions on untrusted files where operationally feasible.
- Harden and monitor Windows installer and LOLBin-style execution paths such as msiexec rather than treating signed Microsoft binaries as automatically benign.
- Limit exposure of browser-saved credentials through enterprise password management, browser policy, and credential hygiene controls.
- Improve egress control and DNS/web logging for external payload transfer and dead-drop-style resolution.
Analyst notes and limits
The malware object identifies Javali as a Windows banking trojan targeting Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries since 2017, primarily customers of financial institutions in Brazil and Mexico. The object itself lists no tactics and provides no official detection text, so the defensive take is derived from the supplied ATT&CK relationships and the single Securelist reference cited by MITRE.
This summary does not establish current activity, attribution, customer exposure, or guaranteed detection. Local relevance depends on the organization’s geography, user population, financial-services exposure, Windows estate, telemetry retention, and control configuration.
Javali
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers Sub-technique | Javali can capture login credentials from open browsers including Firefox, Chrome, Internet Explorer, and Edge.CitationSecurelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLL Sub-technique | Javali can use DLL side-loading to load malicious DLLs into legitimate executables.CitationSecurelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1027.001 | Binary Padding Sub-technique | Javali can use large obfuscated libraries to hinder detection and analysis.CitationSecurelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing Link Sub-technique | Javali has been delivered via malicious links embedded in e-mails.CitationSecurelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious Link Sub-technique | Javali has achieved execution through victims clicking links to malicious websites.CitationSecurelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | Javali can monitor processes for open browsers and custom banking applications.CitationSecurelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1218.007 | Msiexec Sub-technique | Javali has used the MSI installer to download and execute malicious payloads.CitationSecurelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1102.001 | Dead Drop Resolver Sub-technique | Javali can read C2 information from Google Documents and YouTube.CitationSecurelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious File Sub-technique | Javali has achieved execution through victims opening malicious attachments, including MSI files with embedded VBScript.CitationSecurelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment Sub-technique | Javali has been delivered as malicious e-mail attachments.CitationSecurelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual Basic Sub-technique | Javali has used embedded VBScript to download malicious payloads from C2.CitationSecurelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Javali can download payloads from remote C2 servers.CitationSecurelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020 |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | eacff64c6f32… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020
GReAT. (2020, July 14). The Tetrade: Brazilian banking malware goes global. Retrieved November 9, 2020.
Open source URL -
[2]
mitre-attack S0528Open source URL
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