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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0334: DarkComet

DarkComet is a Windows remote administration tool and backdoor.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0334MalwareObject v1.1 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

DarkComet matters because ATT&CK describes it as a Windows remote administration tool and backdoor, with relationships to behaviors that support persistence, command execution, discovery, collection, command-and-control, and defense impairment. For leaders, the practical issue is not the tool name alone: it is whether Windows endpoint, identity, RDP, network, and registry telemetry can prove or disprove remote access, data collection, and persistence activity during an incident.

Executive priority

Prioritize DarkComet as a readiness test for Windows remote-access malware coverage. ATT&CK links it to multiple groups and to techniques such as RDP use, Windows command shell execution, registry modification, Run Keys/Startup Folder persistence, web-protocol C2, keylogging, clipboard collection, audio/video capture, tool transfer, and firewall/security-tool impairment. Executives should ask whether SOC and IR teams can quickly answer: which Windows hosts have suspicious remote access, what accounts were used, what persistence was created, what data or peripherals may have been accessed, and whether security controls or Windows Firewall were modified.

Technical view

The official object has no ATT&CK detection text, so detection engineering should be built from the related techniques and validated locally. Focus on Windows evidence for unusual RDP logons, command shell execution, new or modified registry keys including Run Keys, startup-folder changes, host firewall changes, process and system discovery, file transfer into the environment, web-protocol outbound communications, packed or disguised executables, clipboard access, keylogging indicators, and microphone/camera access. Relationship context also shows ATT&CK reporting of use by APT38, SilverTerrier, and Transparent Tribe; use that as threat-intelligence context, not as proof of attribution in any local case.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry, especially cmd.exe and discovery commands
  • Windows Security and RDP logon/session events for remote interactive access
  • Registry auditing for autoruns, Run Keys, startup-related persistence, and other modifications
  • File creation and executable metadata for newly introduced, packed, or suspiciously named binaries
  • Network proxy, DNS, firewall, and EDR network telemetry for outbound web-protocol communications

Detection direction

  • Treat the absence of official ATT&CK detection guidance as a coverage gap to close with behavior-based analytics mapped to the related techniques.
  • Correlate suspicious RDP activity with subsequent command shell execution, registry changes, file transfer, discovery commands, and outbound web traffic from the same Windows host.
  • Tune for false positives from legitimate administration tools, helpdesk activity, software deployment, remote support, and normal RDP use by requiring context such as unusual account, source, time, destination, newly created persistence, or security-control changes.
  • Validate detections for Run Key/Startup Folder persistence and Windows Firewall modification because those behaviors materially affect incident containment and recovery.
  • Review blind spots around endpoint telemetry depth: packed executables, renamed binaries in trusted-looking locations, clipboard/peripheral access, and security-tool impairment may be missed by log-only monitoring.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with Windows remote access governance: restrict and monitor RDP exposure, require strong account controls, and review who can initiate remote interactive sessions.
  • Harden persistence and configuration-change surfaces by controlling write access to autorun registry locations, startup folders, and Windows Firewall settings.
  • Maintain endpoint protection and logging resilience so attempts to disable, modify, or degrade security tools generate actionable alerts.
  • Use application control or equivalent execution controls where feasible to reduce execution of unauthorized remote administration tools, backdoors, and packed binaries.
  • Ensure IR playbooks cover credential risk, persistence removal, host isolation, log preservation, and review of possible collection from keyboard, clipboard, audio, and video sources.
Analyst notes and limits

ATT&CK identifies DarkComet as software S0334, a Windows remote administration tool and backdoor. The object has no aliases listed in the main fields, but external references include names such as DarkKomet, FYNLOS, Fynloski, and Krademok. Related techniques provide the most useful defensive framing: RDP, software packing, user/process/system discovery, command shell execution, web-protocol C2, tool transfer, registry modification, clipboard/audio/video collection, Run Key persistence, security-tool impairment, and Windows host firewall modification.

The supplied ATT&CK object does not provide official detection guidance and does not list tactics directly on the malware object. Several related technique descriptions are truncated or have broader platform lists, so this take limits platform-specific conclusions to the supplied DarkComet platform: Windows. Local telemetry, baselines, business-approved remote administration patterns, and incident evidence are required before determining exposure, impact, or attribution.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

DarkComet

DarkComet is a Windows remote administration tool and backdoor.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

18 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1686.003 Windows Host Firewall Sub-technique

DarkComet can disable Security Center functions like the Windows Firewall.CitationTrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

DarkComet can execute various types of scripts on the victim’s machine.CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1115 Clipboard Data

DarkComet can steal data from the clipboard.CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1125 Video Capture

DarkComet can access the victim’s webcam to take pictures.CitationTrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1082 System Information Discovery

DarkComet can collect the computer name, RAM used, and operating system version from the victim’s machine.CitationTrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

DarkComet can load any files onto the infected machine to execute.CitationTrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1057 Process Discovery

DarkComet can list active processes running on the victim’s machine.CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Sub-technique

DarkComet can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol Sub-technique

DarkComet can open an active screen of the victim’s machine and take control of the mouse and keyboard.CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Sub-technique

DarkComet adds several Registry entries to enable automatic execution at every system startup.CitationTrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

DarkComet can disable Security Center functions like anti-virus.CitationTrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1071.001 Web Protocols Sub-technique

DarkComet can use HTTP for C2 communications.CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1123 Audio Capture

DarkComet can listen in to victims' conversations through the system’s microphone.CitationTrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1027.002 Software Packing Sub-technique

DarkComet has the option to compress its payload using UPX or MPRESS.CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1112 Modify Registry

DarkComet adds a Registry value for its installation routine to the Registry Key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System Enable LUA=”0” and HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\DC3_FEXEC.CitationTrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014CitationMalwarebytes DarkComet March 2018
Enterprise T1056.001 Keylogging Sub-technique

DarkComet has a keylogging capability.CitationTrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014
Enterprise T1033 System Owner/User Discovery

DarkComet gathers the username from the victim’s machine.CitationTrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014
Enterprise T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location Sub-technique

DarkComet has dropped itself onto victim machines with file names such as WinDefender.Exe and winupdate.exe in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate file.CitationTrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0082: APT38

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2]; some of their attacks have been destructive.[1][2][3][4]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Group G0134: Transparent Tribe Enterprise uses · Technique T1686.003: Windows Host Firewall Enterprise uses · Technique T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter Enterprise uses · Technique T1115: Clipboard Data Enterprise uses · Technique T1125: Video Capture Enterprise uses · Technique T1082: System Information Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer Enterprise uses · Technique T1057: Process Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1059.003: Windows Command Shell Enterprise uses · Technique T1021.001: Remote Desktop Protocol Enterprise uses · Technique T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Enterprise uses · Technique T1685: Disable or Modify Tools Enterprise uses · Technique T1071.001: Web Protocols Enterprise uses · Technique T1123: Audio Capture Enterprise uses · Technique T1027.002: Software Packing Enterprise uses · Technique T1112: Modify Registry Enterprise uses · Technique T1056.001: Keylogging Enterprise uses · Group G0083: SilverTerrier Enterprise uses · Technique T1033: System Owner/User Discovery Enterprise uses · Group G0082: APT38 Enterprise uses · Technique T1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
bda8046af7fa88ec...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.1 Current bundle bda8046af7fa…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    DarkComet

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  4. [4]
    DarkKomet

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  5. [5]
    FYNLOS

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  6. [6]
    Fynloski

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  7. [7]
    Krademok

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  8. [8]
    mitre-attack S0334
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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