T1686.003: Windows Host Firewall
Adversaries may disable or modify the Windows host firewall to bypass controls limiting network usage. This can include disabling the Windows host firewall entirely, suppressing specific profiles (domain, private, public), or adding, deleting, and modifying firewall rules to allow or restrict traffic.[1]
Adversaries may perform these modifications through multiple mechanisms depending on the Windows operating system and access level. For example, adversaries may use command-line utilities (e.g., `netsh advfirewall` or PowerShell cmdlets like `Set-NetFirewallProfile`, `New-NetFirewallRule`), Windows Registry modifications (e.g., altering firewall states and rule configurations via registry keys), or the Windows Control Panel to modify firewall settings through the Windows Security interface.
By disabling or modifying Windows firewall services, adversaries may enable access to remote services, open ports for command and control traffic, or configure rules for further actions.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Windows Host Firewall modification matters because it can turn a compromised Windows endpoint into a less restricted staging point for remote access, command-and-control traffic, or follow-on activity. For leaders, the practical issue is not only whether the firewall is enabled, but whether the organization can prove who changed profiles or rules, when, and whether those changes were authorized.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a defense-impairment behavior for Windows environments. It affects business resilience because host firewall changes can weaken local containment and make incident scoping harder. Executives and risk owners should ask whether firewall policy is centrally governed, whether privileged users are tightly managed, whether registry and file permissions prevent unauthorized tampering, and whether audit evidence is sufficient for investigations and compliance review.
Technical view
ATT&CK identifies this as a Windows sub-technique of Disable or Modify System Firewall under defense-impairment. Adversaries may disable the Windows firewall, suppress domain/private/public profiles, or add, delete, and modify rules using mechanisms such as command-line utilities, PowerShell cmdlets, registry changes, or the Windows Security interface. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility for firewall profile state changes, rule creation/deletion/modification, registry changes affecting firewall configuration, and execution of administrative utilities associated with firewall management. Relationship context includes DET0901 Detect Windows Firewall, plus mitigations for user account management, file and directory permissions, registry permissions, and auditing.
Likely telemetry
- Windows firewall profile state and rule change events
- Process execution telemetry for firewall administration utilities and PowerShell firewall cmdlets
- Registry modification telemetry for Windows firewall state and rule configuration keys
- Windows security, system, and administrative audit logs showing account, privilege, and configuration changes
- Endpoint management or configuration compliance records showing expected firewall policy versus observed state
Detection direction
- Confirm DET0901-style coverage exists for Windows firewall changes rather than assuming endpoint security tools will alert on all configuration tampering.
- Baseline expected firewall profiles and rules so detection can distinguish authorized administration from suspicious disabling, profile suppression, or unexpected allow rules.
- Correlate firewall modifications with the initiating account, privilege context, parent process, host role, and nearby remote service or network traffic changes.
- Tune for legitimate administrative activity, software installation, troubleshooting, and policy deployment to reduce false positives while preserving alerts on unmanaged or local changes.
- Look for blind spots where registry changes, Control Panel changes, or local administrator actions may not be captured by command-line-focused detections.
Mitigation priorities
- Enforce user account management and least privilege so only authorized administrators can modify Windows firewall policy.
- Restrict registry permissions for sensitive firewall configuration locations to reduce unauthorized tampering opportunities.
- Restrict file and directory permissions where they affect tools, scripts, or configuration paths used to alter firewall behavior.
- Use auditing to record and review firewall configuration changes, account activity, and deviations from expected host policy.
- Maintain centrally governed firewall configuration and investigate endpoints whose local state diverges from approved policy.
Analyst notes and limits
The relationship set shows this behavior used by multiple campaigns, groups, and Windows software entries, including Operation Wocao, APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, Lazarus Group, OilRig, Magic Hound, Moses Staff, MirrorFace, VOID MANTICORE, Remsec, H1N1, BADCALL, HARDRAIN, TYPEFRAME, DarkComet, njRAT, BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware, and HiddenFace. Treat that as prioritization context, not as evidence that any specific organization is targeted. The supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection text, so defensive guidance should be validated against local telemetry and the DET0901 detection strategy where available.
This take is limited to the supplied ATT&CK fields, external references, and relationships. No official detection content was provided for the technique, and the object only supports Windows as the platform. Local operating procedures, endpoint logging configuration, central policy enforcement, and approved administrative workflows are required to determine actual detection and mitigation coverage.
Windows Host Firewall
Adversaries may disable or modify the Windows host firewall to bypass controls limiting network usage. This can include disabling the Windows host firewall entirely, suppressing specific profiles (domain, private, public), or adding, deleting, and modifying firewall rules to allow or restrict traffic.[1]
Adversaries may perform these modifications through multiple mechanisms depending on the Windows operating system and access level. For example, adversaries may use command-line utilities (e.g., `netsh advfirewall` or PowerShell cmdlets like `Set-NetFirewallProfile`, `New-NetFirewallRule`), Windows Registry modifications (e.g., altering firewall states and rule configurations via registry keys), or the Windows Control Panel to modify firewall settings through the Windows Security interface.
By disabling or modifying Windows firewall services, adversaries may enable access to remote services, open ports for command and control traffic, or configure rules for further actions.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1686 | Disable or Modify System Firewall | This object subtechnique of Disable or Modify System Firewall. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1054: MirrorFace
MirrorFace is a People's Republic of China (PRC)-aligned cyberespionage actor believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella based on targeting, tools, and infrastructure overlaps. MirrorFace has been active since at least 2019, at first exclusively targeting Japanese organizations across the media, defense, diplomatic, financial, manufacturing, and academic sectors. Subsequent MirrorFace operations included targets in Central Europe and featured use of LODEINFO, HiddenFace, and UPPERCUT malware.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
G0049: OilRig
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
G1009: Moses Staff
Moses Staff is a suspected Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Israeli companies since at least September 2021. Moses Staff openly stated their motivation in attacking Israeli companies is to cause damage by leaking stolen sensitive data and encrypting the victim's networks without a ransom demand.[1]
Security researchers assess Moses Staff is politically motivated, and has targeted government, finance, travel, energy, manufacturing, and utility companies outside of Israel as well, including those in Italy, India, Germany, Chile, Turkey, the UAE, and the US.[2]
G1055: VOID MANTICORE
VOID MANTICORE is a threat group assessed to operate on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Active since at least mid-2022, VOID MANTICORE has targeted government entities, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations across Albania, Israel, and the United States.[1][2] VOID MANTICORE conducts destructive cyber operations, combining wiper attacks with hack-and-leak campaigns. The group has operated under multiple public-facing personas, including HomeLand Justice in operations against Albania, Karma and Karma Below in campaigns targeting Israeli organizations, and Handala Hack, its current primary persona, which has claimed activity against Israeli and U.S. entities, including a March 2026 attack against Stryker Corporation.[1][3] VOID MANTICORE has been observed collaborating with Scarred Manticore, which has been linked to initial access operations preceding VOID MANTICORE’s activity.[4]
G0059: Magic Hound
Magic Hound is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted European, U.S., and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, academics, journalists, and organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering campaigns since at least 2014.[1][2][3][4][5]
G0032: Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]
North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]
S0245: BADCALL
BADCALL is a Trojan malware variant used by the group Lazarus Group. [1]
S0334: DarkComet
S0125: Remsec
S0263: TYPEFRAME
TYPEFRAME is a remote access tool that has been used by Lazarus Group. [1]
S0132: H1N1
S0385: njRAT
S0246: HARDRAIN
S1181: BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware
BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware is a replacement for BlackByte Ransomware. Unlike BlackByte Ransomware, BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware does not have a common key for victim decryption. BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware remains uniquely associated with BlackByte operations.[1]
S9023: HiddenFace
HiddenFace is a modular backdoor developed and used exclusively by MirrorFace since at least 2021. HiddenFace can communicate both actively and passively and has been used against political and academic targets.[1][2][3]
C0051: APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign
APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign was conducted by APT28 from early February 2022 to November 2024 against organizations and individuals with expertise on Ukraine. APT28 primarily leveraged living-off-the-land techniques, while leveraging the zero-day exploitation of CVE-2022-38028. Notably, APT28 leveraged Wi-Fi networks in close proximity to the intended target to gain initial access to the victim environment. By daisy-chaining multiple compromised organizations nearby the intended target, APT28 discovered dual-homed systems (with both a wired and wireless network connection) to enable Wi-Fi and use compromised credentials to connect to the victim network.[1]
C0014: Operation Wocao
Operation Wocao was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted organizations around the world, including in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The suspected China-based actors compromised government organizations and managed service providers, as well as aviation, construction, energy, finance, health care, insurance, offshore engineering, software development, and transportation companies.[1]
Security researchers assessed the Operation Wocao actors used similar TTPs and tools as APT20, suggesting a possible overlap. Operation Wocao was named after an observed command line entry by one of the threat actors, possibly out of frustration from losing webshell access.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | dcc33d4d55bf… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Nearest Neighbor Volexity
Koessel, Sean. Adair, Steven. Lancaster, Tom. (2024, November 22). The Nearest Neighbor Attack: How A Russian APT Weaponized Nearby Wi-Fi Networks for Covert Access. Retrieved February 25, 2025.
Open source URL -
[2]
mitre-attack T1686.003Open source URL
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