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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1537: Transfer Data to Cloud Account

Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.

A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.[1]

Adversaries may also use cloud-native mechanisms to share victim data with adversary-controlled cloud accounts, such as creating anonymous file sharing links or, in Azure, a shared access signature (SAS) URI.[2]

Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.[3]

EnterpriseT1537TechniqueObject v1.5Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1537: Transfer Data to Cloud Account describes Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service. A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space...

Executive priority

T1537: Transfer Data to Cloud Account is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1537: Transfer Data to Cloud Account by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (exfiltration), supported platforms (IaaS, Office Suite, SaaS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Cloud control-plane, SaaS audit, and container platform logs

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1537: Transfer Data to Cloud Account appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Transfer Data to Cloud Account

Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.

A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.[1]

Adversaries may also use cloud-native mechanisms to share victim data with adversary-controlled cloud accounts, such as creating anonymous file sharing links or, in Azure, a shared access signature (SAS) URI.[2]

Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.[3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1053: Storm-0501

Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.[1][2][3][4]

GroupEnterprise

G1039: RedCurl

RedCurl is a threat actor active since 2018 notable for corporate espionage targeting a variety of locations, including Ukraine, Canada and the United Kingdom, and a variety of industries, including but not limited to travel agencies, insurance companies, and banks.[1] RedCurl is allegedly a Russian-speaking threat actor.[1][2] The group’s operations typically start with spearphishing emails to gain initial access, then the group executes discovery and collection commands and scripts to find corporate data. The group concludes operations by exfiltrating files to the C2 servers.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.5
Created
Modified
Raw hash
34e3d925cd4a288f...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.5Current bundle34e3d925cd4a…
19.11.5Older bundle34e3d925cd4a…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    TLDRSec AWS Attacks

    Clint Gibler and Scott Piper. (2021, January 4). Lesser Known Techniques for Attacking AWS Environments. Retrieved March 4, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Microsoft Azure Storage Shared Access Signature

    Microsoft. (2023, June 7). Grant limited access to Azure Storage resources using shared access signatures (SAS). Retrieved March 4, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018

    Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing

    Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Share an Amazon EBS snapshot. Retrieved March 2, 2022.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Azure Blob Snapshots

    Microsoft Azure. (2021, December 29). Blob snapshots. Retrieved March 2, 2022.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Azure Shared Access Signature

    Delegate access with a shared access signature. (2019, December 18). Delegate access with a shared access signature. Retrieved March 2, 2022.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackT1537
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.