T1537: Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.
A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.[1]
Adversaries may also use cloud-native mechanisms to share victim data with adversary-controlled cloud accounts, such as creating anonymous file sharing links or, in Azure, a shared access signature (SAS) URI.[2]
Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.[3]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1537: Transfer Data to Cloud Account describes Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service. A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space...
Executive priority
T1537: Transfer Data to Cloud Account is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1537: Transfer Data to Cloud Account by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (exfiltration), supported platforms (IaaS, Office Suite, SaaS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Cloud control-plane, SaaS audit, and container platform logs
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1537: Transfer Data to Cloud Account appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.
A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.[1]
Adversaries may also use cloud-native mechanisms to share victim data with adversary-controlled cloud accounts, such as creating anonymous file sharing links or, in Azure, a shared access signature (SAS) URI.[2]
Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.[3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1053: Storm-0501
Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.[1][2][3][4]
G1039: RedCurl
RedCurl is a threat actor active since 2018 notable for corporate espionage targeting a variety of locations, including Ukraine, Canada and the United Kingdom, and a variety of industries, including but not limited to travel agencies, insurance companies, and banks.[1] RedCurl is allegedly a Russian-speaking threat actor.[1][2] The group’s operations typically start with spearphishing emails to gain initial access, then the group executes discovery and collection commands and scripts to find corporate data. The group concludes operations by exfiltrating files to the C2 servers.
G1032: INC Ransom
INC Ransom is a ransomware and data extortion threat group associated with the deployment of INC Ransomware that has been active since at least July 2023. INC Ransom has targeted organizations worldwide most commonly in the industrial, healthcare, and education sectors in the US and Europe.[1][2][3][4]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.5 | Current bundle | 34e3d925cd4a… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.5 | Older bundle | 34e3d925cd4a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]TLDRSec AWS Attacks
Clint Gibler and Scott Piper. (2021, January 4). Lesser Known Techniques for Attacking AWS Environments. Retrieved March 4, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]Microsoft Azure Storage Shared Access Signature
Microsoft. (2023, June 7). Grant limited access to Azure Storage resources using shared access signatures (SAS). Retrieved March 4, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018
Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing
Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Share an Amazon EBS snapshot. Retrieved March 2, 2022.
Open source URL - [5]Azure Blob Snapshots
Microsoft Azure. (2021, December 29). Blob snapshots. Retrieved March 2, 2022.
Open source URL - [6]Azure Shared Access Signature
Delegate access with a shared access signature. (2019, December 18). Delegate access with a shared access signature. Retrieved March 2, 2022.
Open source URL - [7]mitre-attackT1537Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
