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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0439: Okrum

Okrum is a Windows backdoor that has been seen in use since December 2016 with strong links to Ke3chang.[1]

EnterpriseS0439MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0439: Okrum describes [Okrum](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0439) is a Windows backdoor that has been seen in use since December 2016 with strong links to [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004).(Citation: ESET Okrum July 2019)

Executive priority

S0439: Okrum is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0439: Okrum by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0439: Okrum appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Okrum

Okrum is a Windows backdoor that has been seen in use since December 2016 with strong links to Ke3chang.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

34 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1003.005Cached Domain CredentialsSub-technique

Okrum was seen using modified Quarks PwDump to perform credential dumping.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.009Shortcut ModificationSub-technique

Okrum can establish persistence by creating a .lnk shortcut to itself in the Startup folder.[1]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive via UtilitySub-technique

Okrum was seen using a RAR archiver tool to compress/decompress data.[1]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

Okrum's loader can check the amount of physical memory and terminates itself if the host has less than 1.5 Gigabytes of physical memory in total.[1]

EnterpriseT1497.002User Activity Based ChecksSub-technique

Okrum loader only executes the payload after the left mouse button has been pressed at least three times, in order to avoid being executed within virtualized or emulated environments.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Okrum has built-in commands for uploading, downloading, and executing files to the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Okrum's backdoor has used cmd.exe to execute arbitrary commands as well as batch scripts to update itself to a newer version.[1]

EnterpriseT1497.003Time Based ChecksSub-technique

Okrum's loader can detect presence of an emulator by using two calls to GetTickCount API, and checking whether the time has been accelerated.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

To establish persistence, Okrum can install itself as a new service named NtmSsvc.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Okrum can collect network information, including the host IP address, DNS, and proxy information.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Okrum uses HTTP for communication with its C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1001Data Obfuscation

Okrum leverages the HTTP protocol for C2 communication, while hiding the actual messages in the Cookie and Set-Cookie headers of the HTTP requests.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Okrum's installer can attempt to achieve persistence by creating a scheduled task.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.003SteganographySub-technique

Okrum's payload is encrypted and embedded within its loader, or within a legitimate PNG file.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

Okrum can establish persistence by adding a new service NtmsSvc with the display name Removable Storage to masquerade as a legitimate Removable Storage Manager.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Okrum can collect the victim username.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Okrum can collect computer name, locale information, and information about the OS and architecture.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Data exfiltration is done by Okrum using the already opened channel with the C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

Okrum has used base64 to encode C2 communication.[1]

EnterpriseT1569.002Service ExecutionSub-technique

Okrum's loader can create a new service named NtmsSvc to execute the payload.[1]

EnterpriseT1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftSub-technique

Okrum can impersonate a logged-on user's security context using a call to the ImpersonateLoggedOnUser API.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Okrum has used DriveLetterView to enumerate drive information.[1]

EnterpriseT1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique

Before exfiltration, Okrum's backdoor has used hidden files to store logs and outputs from backdoor commands.[1]

EnterpriseT1090.002External ProxySub-technique

Okrum can identify proxy servers configured and used by the victim, and use it to make HTTP requests to C2 its server.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Okrum uses AES to encrypt network traffic. The key can be hardcoded or negotiated with the C2 server in the registration phase. [1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Okrum's loader can decrypt the backdoor code, embedded within the loader or within a legitimate PNG file. A custom XOR cipher or RC4 is used for decryption.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Okrum's backdoor deletes files after they have been successfully uploaded to C2 servers.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Okrum establishes persistence by creating a .lnk shortcut to itself in the Startup folder.[1]

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

Okrum was seen using NetSess to discover NetBIOS sessions.[1]

EnterpriseT1560.003Archive via Custom MethodSub-technique

Okrum has used a custom implementation of AES encryption to encrypt collected data.[1]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

Okrum was seen using a keylogger tool to capture keystrokes. [1]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

Okrum can obtain the date and time of the compromised system.[1]

EnterpriseT1003.001LSASS MemorySub-technique

Okrum was seen using MimikatzLite to perform credential dumping.[1]

EnterpriseT1001.003Protocol or Service ImpersonationSub-technique

Okrum leverages the HTTP protocol for C2 communication, while hiding the actual messages in the Cookie and Set-Cookie headers of the HTTP requests.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0004: Ke3chang

Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. Ke3chang has targeted oil, government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since at least 2010.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
c0f051c7ee8422c4...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundlec0f051c7ee84…
19.11.0Older bundlec0f051c7ee84…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET Okrum July 2019

    Hromcova, Z. (2019, July). OKRUM AND KETRICAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT KE3CHANG GROUP ACTIVITY. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0439
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.