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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S9029: IronWind

IronWind is a custom loader malware that has been in use since at least 2023 by actors including WIRTE to target entities in the Middle East.[1]

EnterpriseS9029MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S9029: IronWind describes [IronWind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9029) is a custom loader malware that has been in use since at least 2023 by actors including [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) to target entities in the Middle East.(Citation: Check Point Wirte NOV 2024)

Executive priority

S9029: IronWind is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S9029: IronWind by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S9029: IronWind appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

IronWind

IronWind is a custom loader malware that has been in use since at least 2023 by actors including WIRTE to target entities in the Middle East.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

9 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

IronWind can capture the OS version and computer name of the compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

IronWind can used HTTP to send information to C2 about the targeted system.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

IronWind can enumerate the username on victim's systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

IronWind has used DLL sideloading for execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.010Command ObfuscationSub-technique

IronWind has used Base64 encoding and XOR encryption with the key “53” to obfuscate command strings.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

IronWind can deobfuscate the next stage payload using Base64 and XOR operations with the key "53".[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

IronWind has used the Windows command shell to execute malicious files.[1]

EnterpriseT1518Software Discovery

IronWind can list installed software on targeted hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1070Indicator Removal

IronWind has used a .NET DLL named "exit-DN4-core.dll" to terminate malicious processes running on victim's systems.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0090: WIRTE

WIRTE is a cyberespionage actor, believed to be a subgroup of the Hamas-affiliated Gaza Cybergang, that has been active since at least August 2018. WIRTE has targeted diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology organizations across the Middle East, North Africa, and in Europe to gather intelligence. WIRTE has remained persistently active despite the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and has expanded their operations to include wiper malware attacks against Israeli targets.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0090: WIRTEEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1574.001: DLLEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.010: Command ObfuscationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518: Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070: Indicator RemovalEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
d4b45240aa0e1147...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundled4b45240aa0e…
19.11.0Older bundled4b45240aa0e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Check Point Wirte NOV 2024

    Check Point. (2024, November 12). Hamas-affiliated Threat Actor WIRTE Continues its Middle East Operations and Moves to Disruptive Activity. Retrieved April 20, 2026.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS9029
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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