S9027: ANELLDR
Security context for executives and security teams
S9027: ANELLDR describes [ANELLDR](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9027), a loader that has been in use since at least 2018, was designed to decrypt and execute [UPPERCUT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0275) in memory. [ANELLDR](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9027) can use anti-analysis techniques and is known to share code overlap with [HiddenFace](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9023).(Citation: Trend Micro Earth Kasha Anel NOV 2024)(Citation: ESET MirrorFace 2025)
Executive priority
S9027: ANELLDR is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S9027: ANELLDR by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S9027: ANELLDR appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
ANELLDR
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1622 | Debugger Evasion | |
| Enterprise | T1027.016 | Junk Code InsertionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information |
Groups, software, and campaigns
C0060: Operation AkaiRyū
Operation AkaiRyū (Japanese for RedDragon) was a cyberespionage spearphishing campaign conducted by MirrorFace between June and September 2024 against entities in Japan and Central Europe. Operation AkaiRyū notably included the first reported targeting of a European entity by MirrorFace, as well as their use of UPPERCUT, which was thought to be exclusive to menuPass.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Older bundle | b8a03baffbb2… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | b8a03baffbb2… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | b8a03baffbb2… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Trend Micro Earth Kasha Anel NOV 2024
Hiroaki, H. (2024, November 26). Guess Who’s Back - The Return of ANEL in the Recent Earth Kasha Spear-phishing Campaign in 2024. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]ESET MirrorFace 2025
Dominik Breitenbacher. (2025, March 18). Operation AkaiRyū: MirrorFace invites Europe to Expo 2025 and revives ANEL backdoor. Retrieved May 22, 2025.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS9027Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.