S1114: ZIPLINE
ZIPLINE is a passive backdoor that was used during Cutting Edge on compromised Secure Connect VPNs for reverse shell and proxy functionality.[1]
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ZIPLINE
ZIPLINE is a passive backdoor that was used during Cutting Edge on compromised Secure Connect VPNs for reverse shell and proxy functionality.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy | |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1205 | Traffic Signaling | |
| Enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | ZIPLINE can communicate with C2 using a custom binary protocol.CitationMandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | ZIPLINE can use AES-128-CBC to encrypt data for both upload and download.CitationMandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1059.004 | Unix ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools |
Groups, software, and campaigns
C0029: Cutting Edge
Cutting Edge was a campaign conducted by suspected China-nexus espionage actors, variously identified as UNC5221/UTA0178 and UNC5325, that began as early as December 2023 with the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure (previously Pulse Secure) VPN appliances. Cutting Edge targeted the U.S. defense industrial base and multiple sectors globally including telecommunications, financial, aerospace, and technology. Cutting Edge featured the use of defense evasion and living-off-the-land (LoTL) techniques along with the deployment of web shells and other custom malware.[1][2][3][4][5]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
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Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 28bd9e681f43… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 28bd9e681f43… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 28bd9e681f43… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Mandiant Cutting Edge January 2024
McLellan, T. et al. (2024, January 12). Cutting Edge: Suspected APT Targets Ivanti Connect Secure VPN in New Zero-Day Exploitation. Retrieved February 27, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1114Open source URL
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