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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1102: Pcexter

Pcexter is an uploader that has been used by ToddyCat since at least 2023 to exfiltrate stolen files.[1]

EnterpriseS1102MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1102: Pcexter describes [Pcexter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1102) is an uploader that has been used by [ToddyCat](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1022) since at least 2023 to exfiltrate stolen files.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

Executive priority

S1102: Pcexter is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1102: Pcexter by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1102: Pcexter appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Pcexter

Pcexter is an uploader that has been used by ToddyCat since at least 2023 to exfiltrate stolen files.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

4 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Pcexter has the ability to search for files in specified directories.[1]

EnterpriseT1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageSub-technique

Pcexter can upload stolen files to OneDrive storage accounts via HTTP `POST`.[1]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

Pcexter has been distributed and executed as a DLL file named Vspmsg.dll via DLL side-loading.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Pcexter can upload files from targeted systems.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1022: ToddyCat

ToddyCat is a sophisticated threat group that has been active since at least 2020 using custom loaders and malware in multi-stage infection chains against government and military targets across Europe and Asia.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
6c5b6d6d418f003f...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle6c5b6d6d418f…
19.11.0Older bundle6c5b6d6d418f…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023

    Dedola, G. et al. (2023, October 12). ToddyCat: Keep calm and check logs. Retrieved January 3, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1102
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.