S1046: PowGoop
PowGoop is a loader that consists of a DLL loader and a PowerShell-based downloader; it has been used by MuddyWater as their main loader.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1046: PowGoop describes [PowGoop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1046) is a loader that consists of a DLL loader and a PowerShell-based downloader; it has been used by [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) as their main loader.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022)
Executive priority
S1046: PowGoop is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1046: PowGoop by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1046: PowGoop appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
PowGoop
PowGoop is a loader that consists of a DLL loader and a PowerShell-based downloader; it has been used by MuddyWater as their main loader.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1573 | Encrypted Channel | |
| Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1132.002 | Non-Standard EncodingSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0069: MuddyWater
MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 21d11ac7d735… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 21d11ac7d735… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022
FBI, CISA, CNMF, NCSC-UK. (2022, February 24). Iranian Government-Sponsored Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against Global Government and Commercial Networks. Retrieved September 27, 2022.
Open source URL - [2]CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022
Cyber National Mission Force. (2022, January 12). Iranian intel cyber suite of malware uses open source tools. Retrieved September 30, 2022.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS1046Open source URL
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