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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1013: ZxxZ

ZxxZ is a trojan written in Visual C++ that has been used by BITTER since at least August 2021, including against Bangladeshi government personnel.[1]

EnterpriseS1013MalwareObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1013: ZxxZ describes [ZxxZ](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1013) is a trojan written in Visual C++ that has been used by [BITTER](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1002) since at least August 2021, including against Bangladeshi government personnel.(Citation: Cisco Talos Bitter Bangladesh May 2022)

Executive priority

S1013: ZxxZ is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1013: ZxxZ by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1013: ZxxZ appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

ZxxZ

ZxxZ is a trojan written in Visual C++ that has been used by BITTER since at least August 2021, including against Bangladeshi government personnel.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1106Native API

ZxxZ has used API functions such as `Process32First`, `Process32Next`, and `ShellExecuteA`.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

ZxxZ can download and execute additional files.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

ZxxZ has created a snapshot of running processes using `CreateToolhelp32Snapshot`.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

ZxxZ has collected the host name and operating system product name from a compromised machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

ZxxZ can search a compromised host to determine if it is running Windows Defender or Kasperky antivirus.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

ZxxZ has been disguised as a Windows security update service.[1]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

ZxxZ can search the registry of a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

ZxxZ has been encoded to avoid detection from static analysis tools.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

ZxxZ has used scheduled tasks for persistence and execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

ZxxZ has relied on victims to open a malicious attachment delivered via email.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

ZxxZ has been distributed via spearphishing emails, usually containing a malicious RTF or Excel attachment.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

ZxxZ can collect the username from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

ZxxZ can collect data from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

ZxxZ has used a XOR key to decrypt strings.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1002: BITTER

BITTER is a suspected South Asian cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2013. BITTER has targeted government, energy, and engineering organizations in Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG1002: BITTEREnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518.001: Security Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.004: Masquerade Task or ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
5ff73d3032123ac2...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle5ff73d303212…
19.11.1Older bundle5ff73d303212…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Cisco Talos Bitter Bangladesh May 2022

    Raghuprasad, C . (2022, May 11). Bitter APT adds Bangladesh to their targets. Retrieved June 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1013
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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