S0662: RCSession
RCSession is a backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2018 by Mustang Panda and by Threat Group-3390 (Type II Backdoor).[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0662: RCSession describes [RCSession](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0662) is a backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2018 by [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) and by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) (Type II Backdoor).(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)
Executive priority
S0662: RCSession is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0662: RCSession by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0662: RCSession appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
RCSession
RCSession is a backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2018 by Mustang Panda and by Threat Group-3390 (Type II Backdoor).[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1573 | Encrypted Channel | |
| Enterprise | T1055.012 | Process HollowingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | RCSession can identify processes based on PID.CitationProfero APT27 December 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1218.007 | MsiexecSub-technique | RCSession has the ability to execute inside the msiexec.exe process.CitationProfero APT27 December 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | RCSession can capture screenshots from a compromised host.CitationProfero APT27 December 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1056.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | RCSession has the ability to drop additional files to an infected machine.CitationProfero APT27 December 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | RCSession can use WinSock API for communication including |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | RCSession can gather system owner information, including user and administrator privileges.CitationProfero APT27 December 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | RCSession can remove files from a targeted system.CitationProfero APT27 December 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027.015 | CompressionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | |
| Enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | RCSession can gather system information from a compromised host.CitationProfero APT27 December 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1027.011 | Fileless StorageSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0027: Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[1] The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.[2][3][4]
G0129: Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 8abb8941f363… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 8abb8941f363… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 8abb8941f363… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019
Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, December 29). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets NGOs. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021
Lunghi, D. and Lu, K. (2021, April 9). Iron Tiger APT Updates Toolkit With Evolved SysUpdate Malware. Retrieved November 12, 2021.
Open source URL - [3]Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020
Lunghi, D. et al. (2020, February). Uncovering DRBControl. Retrieved November 12, 2021.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackS0662Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.