LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0631: Chaes

Chaes is a multistage information stealer written in several programming languages that collects login credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial information. Chaes was first observed in 2020, and appears to primarily target victims in Brazil as well as other e-commerce customers in Latin America.[1]

EnterpriseS0631MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

Chaes matters because it is described by ATT&CK as a Windows multistage information stealer focused on login credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial data, with reporting noting e-commerce customers in Brazil and Latin America. For leaders, the decision value is less about one malware name and more about validating whether Windows endpoint, browser, registry, script, and web-traffic monitoring can expose credential and financial-data theft behaviors before they become fraud, account takeover, or incident-response escalation.

Executive priority

Prioritize Chaes as a control-validation use case for credential theft and e-commerce risk. Security leaders should ask whether the organization can prove coverage for Windows script execution, browser/session theft indicators, registry persistence, fileless or disguised storage, and outbound web or alternative-protocol exfiltration. This is also useful compliance evidence: teams should be able to show that sensitive financial and authentication data paths are monitored, that suspicious persistence and user-executed files are investigated, and that incident responders can quickly determine which users, browsers, and accounts may be affected.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no dedicated detection text for Chaes, so defenders should map coverage to its documented relationships. On Windows, validate telemetry and analytics around malicious-file execution, cmd.exe, Visual Basic, Python, JavaScript, Native API activity, InstallUtil and msiexec proxy execution, registry modification and Run Key persistence, browser session hijacking, web session cookie theft, input capture, screen capture, system and user discovery, deobfuscation, standard encoding, web-protocol C2, ingress tool transfer, and exfiltration over alternate protocols. Because Chaes is multistage and information-stealing, incident response should correlate initial execution, persistence, credential/session access, collection, and outbound transfer rather than treating each alert as isolated.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry for cmd.exe, scripting runtimes, InstallUtil, msiexec, and unusual child-process chains
  • Windows Registry auditing for modifications, Run Keys, startup locations, and suspicious or disguised registry resources
  • Endpoint file and artifact telemetry for user-opened malicious files, downloaded stages, deobfuscation/decoding activity, and files or resources named to resemble legitimate components
  • Browser-related telemetry where available, including cookie/session store access, suspicious browser injection or manipulation indicators, and access to authentication material
  • Network telemetry for outbound HTTP/S or other web-protocol communications, encoded payloads, tool transfer, and possible exfiltration over protocols distinct from primary command-and-control

Detection direction

  • Build behavior-based detection around the ATT&CK relationships rather than relying on a malware family name, since official detection guidance is not provided.
  • Correlate script execution, LOLBin-style proxy execution, registry persistence, and outbound web traffic into a multistage narrative; single-event detections will miss context or create excessive noise.
  • Tune carefully for administrative and software-installation activity involving msiexec, InstallUtil, registry changes, Python, JavaScript, and Visual Basic, because these can be legitimate in enterprise environments.
  • Validate browser and credential-theft visibility explicitly; many environments collect process and network logs but have limited evidence for cookie access, browser session hijacking, or input capture.
  • Review whether encoded outbound content, alternate-protocol exfiltration, and web-protocol C2 are visible after proxy, TLS inspection, EDR, and privacy constraints are considered.

Mitigation priorities

  • Harden Windows execution paths first: reduce exposure to untrusted files, constrain script interpreters where business allows, and monitor trusted utilities that can proxy execution.
  • Protect identity and browser sessions: enforce strong authentication controls, reduce unnecessary session lifetime where feasible, and ensure rapid credential and session revocation procedures exist for suspected theft.
  • Control persistence and stealth opportunities by monitoring and governing Registry Run Keys, startup folders, suspicious registry storage, and resources that imitate legitimate names or locations.
  • Improve egress governance by restricting unnecessary outbound protocols, monitoring web-protocol destinations, and reviewing controls for encoded or unusual outbound data flows.
  • Prepare incident-response playbooks for information stealers: identify affected users and browsers, rotate credentials, revoke sessions, preserve endpoint evidence, and assess potential financial-data exposure.
Additional notes and limits

The object identifies Chaes as a Windows multistage information stealer that collects credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial information, first observed in 2020 and apparently focused on Brazil and other Latin American e-commerce customers. The strongest defensive value comes from its many ATT&CK technique relationships, which span execution, stealth, persistence, discovery, collection, credential access, command-and-control, and exfiltration. Local environment evidence is required to determine relevance, exposure, and detection quality.

ATT&CK does not provide official detection text, aliases, labels, or malware-level tactics for this object. Relationship descriptions include platforms beyond Windows, but the Chaes object itself is supplied with Windows as its platform, so defensive conclusions should be validated against Windows telemetry for this malware. The supplied fields do not support claims of current activity, attribution, customer exposure, guaranteed detection, or specific indicators of compromise.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Chaes

Chaes is a multistage information stealer written in several programming languages that collects login credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial information. Chaes was first observed in 2020, and appears to primarily target victims in Brazil as well as other e-commerce customers in Latin America.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

28 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1218.007MsiexecSub-technique

Chaes has used .MSI files as an initial way to start the infection chain.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Chaes requires the user to click on the malicious Word document to execute the next part of the attack.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

Chaes has used Base64 to encode C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1573Encrypted Channel

Chaes has used encryption for its C2 channel.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Chaes used the CreateFileW() API function with read permissions to access downloaded payloads.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.004InstallUtilSub-technique

Chaes has used Installutill to download content.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Chaes has used VBscript to execute malicious code.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Chaes has been delivered by sending victims a phishing email containing a malicious .docx file.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Chaes has collected the username and UID from the infected machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Chaes has exfiltrated its collected data from the infected machine to the C2, sometimes using the MIME protocol.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.006PythonSub-technique

Chaes has used Python scripts for execution and the installation of additional files.[1]

EnterpriseT1539Steal Web Session Cookie

Chaes has used a script that extracts the web session cookie and sends it to the C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Chaes has used an unsigned, crafted DLL module named hha.dll that was designed to look like a legitimate 32-bit Windows DLL.[1]

EnterpriseT1221Template Injection

Chaes changed the template target of the settings.xml file embedded in the Word document and populated that field with the downloaded URL of the next payload.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Chaes can modify Registry values to stored information and establish persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Chaes has added persistence via the Registry key software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run\microsoft windows html help.[1]

EnterpriseT1056Input Capture

Chaes has a module to perform any API hooking it desires.[1]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

Chaes has used search order hijacking to load a malicious DLL.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.011Fileless StorageSub-technique

Some versions of Chaes stored its instructions (otherwise in a `instructions.ini` file) in the Registry.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Chaes has used HTTP for C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Chaes has used cmd to execute tasks on the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.007JavaScriptSub-technique

Chaes has used JavaScript and Node.Js information stealer script that exfiltrates data using the node process.[1]

EnterpriseT1185Browser Session Hijacking

Chaes has used the Puppeteer module to hook and monitor the Chrome web browser to collect user information from infected hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Chaes can download additional files onto an infected machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

Chaes can capture screenshots of the infected machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Chaes has decrypted an AES encrypted binary file to trigger the download of other files.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Chaes has collected system information, including the machine name and OS version.[1]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

Chaes can steal login credentials and stored financial information from the browser.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1218.007: MsiexecEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573: Encrypted ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.004: InstallUtilEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.006: PythonEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1539: Steal Web Session CookieEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1221: Template InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056: Input CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1574.001: DLLEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.011: Fileless StorageEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.007: JavaScriptEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1185: Browser Session HijackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
9a91670f6b97fe0f...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundle9a91670f6b97…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Chaes

    (Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)

  3. [3]
    Chaes

    (Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)

  4. [4]
    Chaes

    (Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)

  5. [5]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackS0631
    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    mitre-attackS0631
    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    mitre-attackS0631
    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  56. [56]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  57. [57]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  58. [58]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  59. [59]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  60. [60]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use