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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0631: Chaes

Chaes is a multistage information stealer written in several programming languages that collects login credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial information. Chaes was first observed in 2020, and appears to primarily target victims in Brazil as well as other e-commerce customers in Latin America.[1]

EnterpriseS0631MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0631: Chaes describes [Chaes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0631) is a multistage information stealer written in several programming languages that collects login credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial information. [Chaes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0631) was first observed in 2020, and appears to primarily target victims in Brazil as well as other e-commerce customers in Latin America.(Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)

Executive priority

S0631: Chaes is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0631: Chaes by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0631: Chaes appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Chaes

Chaes is a multistage information stealer written in several programming languages that collects login credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial information. Chaes was first observed in 2020, and appears to primarily target victims in Brazil as well as other e-commerce customers in Latin America.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

28 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1218.007MsiexecSub-technique

Chaes has used .MSI files as an initial way to start the infection chain.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Chaes requires the user to click on the malicious Word document to execute the next part of the attack.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

Chaes has used Base64 to encode C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1573Encrypted Channel

Chaes has used encryption for its C2 channel.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Chaes used the CreateFileW() API function with read permissions to access downloaded payloads.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.004InstallUtilSub-technique

Chaes has used Installutill to download content.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Chaes has used VBscript to execute malicious code.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Chaes has been delivered by sending victims a phishing email containing a malicious .docx file.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Chaes has collected the username and UID from the infected machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Chaes has exfiltrated its collected data from the infected machine to the C2, sometimes using the MIME protocol.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.006PythonSub-technique

Chaes has used Python scripts for execution and the installation of additional files.[1]

EnterpriseT1539Steal Web Session Cookie

Chaes has used a script that extracts the web session cookie and sends it to the C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Chaes has used an unsigned, crafted DLL module named hha.dll that was designed to look like a legitimate 32-bit Windows DLL.[1]

EnterpriseT1221Template Injection

Chaes changed the template target of the settings.xml file embedded in the Word document and populated that field with the downloaded URL of the next payload.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Chaes can modify Registry values to stored information and establish persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Chaes has added persistence via the Registry key software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run\microsoft windows html help.[1]

EnterpriseT1056Input Capture

Chaes has a module to perform any API hooking it desires.[1]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

Chaes has used search order hijacking to load a malicious DLL.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.011Fileless StorageSub-technique

Some versions of Chaes stored its instructions (otherwise in a `instructions.ini` file) in the Registry.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Chaes has used HTTP for C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Chaes has used cmd to execute tasks on the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.007JavaScriptSub-technique

Chaes has used JavaScript and Node.Js information stealer script that exfiltrates data using the node process.[1]

EnterpriseT1185Browser Session Hijacking

Chaes has used the Puppeteer module to hook and monitor the Chrome web browser to collect user information from infected hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Chaes can download additional files onto an infected machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

Chaes can capture screenshots of the infected machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Chaes has decrypted an AES encrypted binary file to trigger the download of other files.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Chaes has collected system information, including the machine name and OS version.[1]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

Chaes can steal login credentials and stored financial information from the browser.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
9a91670f6b97fe0f...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle9a91670f6b97…
19.11.1Older bundle9a91670f6b97…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020

    Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Chaes

    (Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0631
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.