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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0576: MegaCortex

MITRE ATT&CK S0576: MegaCortex Malware details for Windows, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.

EnterpriseS0576MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0576: MegaCortex describes [MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) is ransomware that first appeared in May 2019. (Citation: IBM MegaCortex) [MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has mainly targeted industrial organizations. (Citation: FireEye Ransomware Disrupt Industrial Production)(Citation: FireEye Financial Actors Moving into OT)

Executive priority

S0576: MegaCortex is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0576: MegaCortex by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0576: MegaCortex appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

MegaCortex

No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

16 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify ToolsThis object uses Disable or Modify Tools.
EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-techniqueThis object uses Rundll32.
EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-techniqueThis object uses System Checks.
EnterpriseT1588.003Code Signing CertificatesSub-techniqueThis object uses Code Signing Certificates.
EnterpriseT1531Account Access RemovalThis object uses Account Access Removal.
EnterpriseT1490Inhibit System RecoveryThis object uses Inhibit System Recovery.
EnterpriseT1083File and Directory DiscoveryThis object uses File and Directory Discovery.
EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-techniqueThis object uses Dynamic-link Library Injection.
EnterpriseT1489Service StopThis object uses Service Stop.
EnterpriseT1112Modify RegistryThis object uses Modify Registry.
EnterpriseT1561.001Disk Content WipeSub-techniqueThis object uses Disk Content Wipe.
EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for ImpactThis object uses Data Encrypted for Impact.
EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-techniqueThis object uses Windows Command Shell.
EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationThis object uses Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information.
EnterpriseT1106Native APIThis object uses Native API.
EnterpriseT1134Access Token ManipulationThis object uses Access Token Manipulation.
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
3316ed882e437f35...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle3316ed882e43…
19.11.1Older bundle3316ed882e43…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    IBM MegaCortex

    Del Fierro, C. Kessem, L.. (2020, January 8). From Mega to Giga: Cross-Version Comparison of Top MegaCortex Modifications. Retrieved February 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FireEye Ransomware Disrupt Industrial Production

    Zafra, D. Lunden, K. Brubaker, N. Kennelly, J.. (2020, February 24). Ransomware Against the Machine: How Adversaries are Learning to Disrupt Industrial Production by Targeting IT and OT. Retrieved February 9, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    FireEye Financial Actors Moving into OT

    Brubaker, N. Zafra, D. K. Lunden, K. Proska, K. Hildebrandt, C.. (2020, July 15). Financially Motivated Actors Are Expanding Access Into OT: Analysis of Kill Lists That Include OT Processes Used With Seven Malware Families. Retrieved February 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0576
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.