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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0568: EVILNUM

EVILNUM is fully capable backdoor that was first identified in 2018. EVILNUM is used by the APT group Evilnum which has the same name.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0568MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0568: EVILNUM describes [EVILNUM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0568) is fully capable backdoor that was first identified in 2018. [EVILNUM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0568) is used by the APT group [Evilnum](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0120) which has the same name.(Citation: ESET EvilNum July 2020)(Citation: Prevailion EvilNum May 2020)

Executive priority

S0568: EVILNUM is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0568: EVILNUM by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0568: EVILNUM appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

EVILNUM

EVILNUM is fully capable backdoor that was first identified in 2018. EVILNUM is used by the APT group Evilnum which has the same name.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1102.003One-Way CommunicationSub-technique

EVILNUM has used a one-way communication method via GitLab and Digital Point to perform C2.[2]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

EVILNUM can achieve persistence through the Registry Run key.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1070Indicator Removal

EVILNUM has a function called "DeleteLeftovers" to remove certain artifacts of the attack.[2]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

EVILNUM can obtain the computer name from the victim's system.[2]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

EVILNUM can upload files over the C2 channel from the infected host.[2]

EnterpriseT1539Steal Web Session Cookie

EVILNUM can harvest cookies and upload them to the C2 server.[2]

EnterpriseT1070.006TimestompSub-technique

EVILNUM has changed the creation date of files.[2]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

EVILNUM can make modifications to the Regsitry for persistence.[2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

EVILNUM can download and upload files to the victim's computer.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

EVILNUM can obtain the username from the victim's machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

EVILNUM can execute commands and scripts through rundll32.[2]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

EVILNUM can search for anti-virus products on the system.[2]

EnterpriseT1218.010Regsvr32Sub-technique

EVILNUM can run a remote scriptlet that drops a file and executes it via regsvr32.exe.[1]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

EVILNUM has used the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) tool to enumerate infected machines.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0120: EvilnumEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1102.003: One-Way CommunicationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070: Indicator RemovalEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1539: Steal Web Session CookieEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.006: TimestompEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518.001: Security Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.010: Regsvr32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
981233a34729dceb...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle981233a34729…
19.11.0Older bundle981233a34729…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET EvilNum July 2020

    Porolli, M. (2020, July 9). More evil: A deep look at Evilnum and its toolset. Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Prevailion EvilNum May 2020

    Adamitis, D. (2020, May 6). Phantom in the Command Shell. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    EVILNUM

    (Citation: Prevailion EvilNum May 2020)(Citation: ESET EvilNum July 2020)

  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0568
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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