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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0499: Hancitor

Hancitor is a downloader that has been used by Pony and other information stealing malware.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0499MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0499: Hancitor describes [Hancitor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0499) is a downloader that has been used by [Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) and other information stealing malware.(Citation: Threatpost Hancitor)(Citation: FireEye Hancitor)

Executive priority

S0499: Hancitor is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0499: Hancitor by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0499: Hancitor appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Hancitor

Hancitor is a downloader that has been used by Pony and other information stealing malware.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Hancitor has used malicious Microsoft Word documents, sent via email, which prompted the victim to enable macros.[2]

EnterpriseT1218.012VerclsidSub-technique

Hancitor has used verclsid.exe to download and execute a malicious script.CitationRed Canary Verclsid.exe

EnterpriseT1027.015CompressionSub-technique

Hancitor has delivered compressed payloads in ZIP files to victims.[2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Hancitor has the ability to download additional files from C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

Hancitor has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through phishing.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Hancitor has used CallWindowProc and EnumResourceTypesA to interpret and execute shellcode.[2]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Hancitor has been delivered via phishing emails with malicious attachments.[2]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Hancitor has added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

Hancitor has used PowerShell to execute commands.[2]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

Hancitor has been delivered via phishing emails which contained malicious links.[1]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

Hancitor has used Base64 to encode malicious links.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Hancitor has deleted files using the VBA kill function.[2]

EnterpriseT1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads.[2]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Hancitor has decoded Base64 encoded URLs to insert a recipient’s name into the filename of the Word document. Hancitor has also extracted executables from ZIP files.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.012: VerclsidEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.015: CompressionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.001: Malicious LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.002: Spearphishing LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497: Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
94bbce7e57c37f4d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.0Older bundle94bbce7e57c3…
19.21.0Current bundle94bbce7e57c3…
19.11.0Older bundle94bbce7e57c3…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Threatpost Hancitor

    Tom Spring. (2017, January 11). Spammers Revive Hancitor Downloader Campaigns. Retrieved August 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FireEye Hancitor

    Anubhav, A., Jallepalli, D. (2016, September 23). Hancitor (AKA Chanitor) observed using multiple attack approaches. Retrieved August 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Chanitor

    (Citation: FireEye Hancitor)

  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0499
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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