S0495: RDAT

S0495: RDAT describes [RDAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0495) is a backdoor used by the suspected Iranian threat group [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049). [RDAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0495) was originally identified in 2017 and targeted companies in the telecommunications sector.(Citation: Unit42 RDAT July 2020)

Executive priority

S0495: RDAT is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0495: RDAT by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0495: RDAT appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

RDAT

RDAT is a backdoor used by the suspected Iranian threat group OilRig. RDAT was originally identified in 2017 and targeted companies in the telecommunications sector.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques20 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	RDAT can use HTTP communications for C2, as well as using the WinHTTP library to make requests to the Exchange Web Services API.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.003	SteganographySub-technique	RDAT can also embed data within a BMP image prior to exfiltration.[1]
Enterprise	T1036.004	Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique	RDAT has used Windows Video Service as a name for malicious services.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	RDAT has executed commands using `cmd.exe /c`.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.004	DNSSub-technique	RDAT has used DNS to communicate with the C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1036.005	Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique	RDAT has masqueraded as VMware.exe.[1]
Enterprise	T1113	Screen Capture	RDAT can take a screenshot on the infected system.[1]
Enterprise	T1132.001	Standard EncodingSub-technique	RDAT can communicate with the C2 via base32-encoded subdomains.[1]
Enterprise	T1132.002	Non-Standard EncodingSub-technique	RDAT can communicate with the C2 via subdomains that utilize base64 with character substitutions.[1]
Enterprise	T1543.003	Windows ServiceSub-technique	RDAT has created a service when it is installed on the victim machine.[1]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	RDAT can deobfuscate the base64-encoded and AES-encrypted files downloaded from the C2 server.[1]
Enterprise	T1573.001	Symmetric CryptographySub-technique	RDAT has used AES ciphertext to encode C2 communications.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.003	Mail ProtocolsSub-technique	RDAT can use email attachments for C2 communications.[1]
Enterprise	T1030	Data Transfer Size Limits	RDAT can upload a file via HTTP POST response to the C2 split into 102,400-byte portions. RDAT can also download data from the C2 which is split into 81,920-byte portions.[1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	RDAT can download files via DNS.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.004	File DeletionSub-technique	RDAT can issue SOAP requests to delete already processed C2 emails. RDAT can also delete itself from the infected system.[1]
Enterprise	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	RDAT can exfiltrate data gathered from the infected system via the established Exchange Web Services API C2 channel.[1]
Enterprise	T1008	Fallback Channels	RDAT has used HTTP if DNS C2 communications were not functioning.[1]
Enterprise	T1001	Data Obfuscation	RDAT has used encoded data within subdomains as AES ciphertext to communicate from the host to the C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1001.002	SteganographySub-technique	RDAT can process steganographic images attached to email messages to send and receive C2 commands. RDAT can also embed additional messages within BMP images to communicate with the RDAT operator.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0049: OilRig

OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: Jul 28, 2020, 17:26 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 25, 2025, 14:43 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 557a765e33f150ad...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 25, 2025, 14:43 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`557a765e33f1…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 25, 2025, 14:43 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`557a765e33f1…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Unit42 RDAT July 2020
Falcone, R. (2020, July 22). OilRig Targets Middle Eastern Telecommunications Organization and Adds Novel C2 Channel with Steganography to Its Inventory. Retrieved July 28, 2020.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS0495
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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