S0424: Triada
Security context for executives and security teams
S0424: Triada describes [Triada](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0424) was first reported in 2016 as a second stage malware. Later versions in 2019 appeared with new techniques and as an initial downloader of other Trojan apps.(Citation: Kaspersky Triada March 2016)
Executive priority
S0424: Triada is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0424: Triada by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0424: Triada appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Triada
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1407 | Download New Code at Runtime | Triada utilizes a backdoor in a Play Store app to install additional trojanized apps from the Command and Control server.CitationGoogle Triada June 2019 |
| Mobile | T1636.004 | SMS MessagesSub-technique | |
| Mobile | T1418 | Software Discovery | Triada is able to modify code within the com.android.systemui application to gain access to `GET_REAL_TASKS` permissions. This permission enables access to information about applications currently on the foreground and other recently used apps.CitationGoogle Triada June 2019 |
| Mobile | T1474.003 | Compromise Software Supply ChainSub-technique | Triada was added into the Android system by a third-party vendor identified as Yehuo or Blazefire during the production process.CitationGoogle Triada June 2019CitationKrebs-Triada June 2019 |
| Mobile | T1532 | Archive Collected Data | Triada encrypts data prior to exfiltration.CitationGoogle Triada June 2019 |
| Mobile | T1631.001 | Ptrace System CallsSub-technique | |
| Mobile | T1646 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Triada utilized HTTP to exfiltrate data through POST requests to the command and control server.CitationGoogle Triada June 2019 |
| Mobile | T1643 | Generate Traffic from Victim | Triada can redirect ad banner URLs on websites visited by the user to specific ad URLs.CitationGoogle Triada June 2019CitationKaspersky Triada June 2016 |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | bea2ee61581a… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | bea2ee61581a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Kaspersky Triada March 2016
Snow, J. (2016, March 3). Triada: organized crime on Android. Retrieved July 16, 2019.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0424Open source URL
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