T1643: Generate Traffic from Victim
Adversaries may generate outbound traffic from devices. This is typically performed to manipulate external outcomes, such as to achieve carrier billing fraud or to manipulate app store rankings or ratings. Outbound traffic is typically generated as SMS messages or general web traffic, but may take other forms as well.
If done via SMS messages, Android apps must hold the `SEND_SMS` permission. Additionally, sending an SMS message requires user consent if the recipient is a premium number. Applications cannot send SMS messages on iOS
Security context for executives and security teams
T1643: Generate Traffic from Victim describes Adversaries may generate outbound traffic from devices. This is typically performed to manipulate external outcomes, such as to achieve carrier billing fraud or to manipulate app store rankings or ratings. Outbound traffic is typically generated as SMS messages or general web traffic, but may take other forms as well. If done via SMS messages, Android apps must hold the `SEND_SMS` permission. Additionally, sending an SMS message requires user consent if the recipient is a premium number. Applications cannot send SM...
Executive priority
T1643: Generate Traffic from Victim is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1643: Generate Traffic from Victim by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (impact), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1643: Generate Traffic from Victim appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Generate Traffic from Victim
Adversaries may generate outbound traffic from devices. This is typically performed to manipulate external outcomes, such as to achieve carrier billing fraud or to manipulate app store rankings or ratings. Outbound traffic is typically generated as SMS messages or general web traffic, but may take other forms as well.
If done via SMS messages, Android apps must hold the `SEND_SMS` permission. Additionally, sending an SMS message requires user consent if the recipient is a premium number. Applications cannot send SMS messages on iOS
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1452 | Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings | Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings revoked by this object. |
| Mobile | T1448 | Carrier Billing Fraud | Carrier Billing Fraud revoked by this object. |
| Mobile | T1472 | Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue | Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue revoked by this object. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S1103: FlixOnline
FlixOnline is an Android malware, first detected in early 2021, believed to target users of WhatsApp. FlixOnline primarily spreads via automatic replies to a device’s incoming WhatsApp messages.[1]
S0432: Bread
Bread was a large-scale billing fraud malware family known for employing many different cloaking and obfuscation techniques in an attempt to continuously evade Google Play Store’s malware detection. 1,700 unique Bread apps were detected and removed from the Google Play Store before being downloaded by users.[1]
S0325: Judy
S0290: Gooligan
Gooligan is a malware family that runs privilege escalation exploits on Android devices and then uses its escalated privileges to steal authentication tokens that can be used to access data from many Google applications. Gooligan has been described as part of the Ghost Push Android malware family. [1] [2] [3]
S0494: Zen
S0303: MazarBOT
S0321: HummingWhale
HummingWhale is an Android malware family that performs ad fraud. [1]
S0326: RedDrop
S0440: Agent Smith
Agent Smith is mobile malware that generates financial gain by replacing legitimate applications on devices with malicious versions that include fraudulent ads. As of July 2019 Agent Smith had infected around 25 million devices, primarily targeting India though effects had been observed in other Asian countries as well as Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[1]
S0291: PJApps
S0322: HummingBad
HummingBad is a family of Android malware that generates fraudulent advertising revenue and has the ability to obtain root access on older, vulnerable versions of Android. [1]
S0293: BrainTest
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | cbcb33d85a08… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | cbcb33d85a08… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-16Open source URL
- [2]mitre-attackT1643Open source URL
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