S0410: Fysbis
Security context for executives and security teams
S0410: Fysbis describes [Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) is a Linux-based backdoor used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) that dates back to at least 2014.(Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis)
Executive priority
S0410: Fysbis is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0410: Fysbis by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Linux), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0410: Fysbis appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Fysbis
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | Fysbis can use Base64 to encode its C2 traffic.CitationFysbis Dr Web Analysis |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Fysbis has the ability to search for files.CitationFysbis Dr Web Analysis |
| Enterprise | T1056.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique | Fysbis has masqueraded as the rsyncd and dbus-inotifier services.CitationFysbis Dr Web Analysis |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | Fysbis can collect information about running processes.CitationFysbis Dr Web Analysis |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | Fysbis has been encrypted using XOR and RC4.CitationFysbis Dr Web Analysis |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | Fysbis has the ability to delete files.CitationFysbis Dr Web Analysis |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1543.002 | Systemd ServiceSub-technique | Fysbis has established persistence using a systemd service.CitationFysbis Dr Web Analysis |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | Fysbis has masqueraded as trusted software rsyncd and dbus-inotifier.CitationFysbis Dr Web Analysis |
| Enterprise | T1547.013 | XDG Autostart EntriesSub-technique | If executing without root privileges, Fysbis adds a `.desktop` configuration file to the user's `~/.config/autostart` directory.CitationRed Canary Netwire Linux 2022CitationFysbis Dr Web Analysis |
| Enterprise | T1059.004 | Unix ShellSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0007: APT28
APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.4 | Current bundle | 6e5bf2b18b90… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.4 | Older bundle | 6e5bf2b18b90… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.4 | Older bundle | 6e5bf2b18b90… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis
Bryan Lee and Rob Downs. (2016, February 12). A Look Into Fysbis: Sofacy’s Linux Backdoor. Retrieved September 10, 2017.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0410Open source URL
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