S0398: HyperBro
HyperBro is a custom in-memory backdoor used by Threat Group-3390.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0398: HyperBro describes [HyperBro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0398) is a custom in-memory backdoor used by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027).(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)
Executive priority
S0398: HyperBro is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0398: HyperBro by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0398: HyperBro appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
HyperBro
HyperBro is a custom in-memory backdoor used by Threat Group-3390.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | HyperBro can unpack and decrypt its payload prior to execution.CitationTrend Micro DRBControl February 2020CitationTrend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1569.002 | Service ExecutionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1007 | System Service Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | |
| Enterprise | T1027.002 | Software PackingSub-technique | HyperBro has the ability to pack its payload.CitationTrend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | HyperBro can be delivered encrypted to a compromised host.CitationTrend Micro DRBControl February 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0027: Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[1] The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.[2][3][4]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.3 | Older bundle | c705720051cf… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.3 | Current bundle | c705720051cf… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.3 | Older bundle | c705720051cf… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019
Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019.
Open source URL - [2]Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018
Legezo, D. (2018, June 13). LuckyMouse hits national data center to organize country-level waterholing campaign. Retrieved August 18, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018
Khandelwal, S. (2018, June 14). Chinese Hackers Carried Out Country-Level Watering Hole Attack. Retrieved August 18, 2018.
Open source URL - [4]HyperBro
(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)
- [5]mitre-attackS0398Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.