S0380: StoneDrill
StoneDrill is wiper malware discovered in destructive campaigns against both Middle Eastern and European targets in association with APT33.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0380: StoneDrill describes [StoneDrill](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0380) is wiper malware discovered in destructive campaigns against both Middle Eastern and European targets in association with [APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064).(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
Executive priority
S0380: StoneDrill is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0380: StoneDrill by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0380: StoneDrill appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
StoneDrill
StoneDrill is wiper malware discovered in destructive campaigns against both Middle Eastern and European targets in association with APT33.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1497 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | StoneDrill has used several anti-emulation techniques to prevent automated analysis by emulators or sandboxes.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | StoneDrill has downloaded and dropped temporary files containing scripts; it additionally has a function to upload files from the victims machine.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | StoneDrill has been observed deleting the temporary files once they fulfill their task.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1124 | System Time Discovery | StoneDrill can obtain the current date and time of the victim machine.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | StoneDrill has relied on injecting its payload directly into the process memory of the victim's preferred browser.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | StoneDrill can check for antivirus and antimalware programs.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | StoneDrill has used the WMI command-line (WMIC) utility to run tasks.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | StoneDrill has obfuscated its module with an alphabet-based table or XOR encryption.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | StoneDrill has the capability to discover the system OS, Windows version, architecture and environment.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1561.002 | Disk Structure WipeSub-technique | StoneDrill can wipe the master boot record of an infected computer.CitationSymantec Elfin Mar 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | StoneDrill has looked in the registry to find the default browser path.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1561.001 | Disk Content WipeSub-technique | StoneDrill can wipe the accessible physical or logical drives of the infected machine.CitationSymantec Elfin Mar 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual BasicSub-technique | StoneDrill has several VBS scripts used throughout the malware's lifecycle.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | StoneDrill can take screenshots.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1485 | Data Destruction | StoneDrill has a disk wiper module that targets files other than those in the Windows directory.[2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0064: APT33
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 94be35b74cdd… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 94be35b74cdd… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]FireEye APT33 Sept 2017
O'Leary, J., et al. (2017, September 20). Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017
Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
Open source URL - [3]DROPSHOT
(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017)
- [4]StoneDrill
(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
- [5]mitre-attackS0380Open source URL
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