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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0375: Remexi

Remexi is a Windows-based Trojan that was developed in the C programming language.[1]

EnterpriseS0375MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0375: Remexi describes [Remexi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0375) is a Windows-based Trojan that was developed in the C programming language.(Citation: Securelist Remexi Jan 2019)

Executive priority

S0375: Remexi is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0375: Remexi by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0375: Remexi appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Remexi

Remexi is a Windows-based Trojan that was developed in the C programming language.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

16 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Remexi utilizes scheduled tasks as a persistence mechanism.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Remexi silently executes received commands with cmd.exe.[1]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

Remexi gathers and exfiltrates keystrokes from the machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Remexi performs exfiltration over BITSAdmin, which is also used for the C2 channel.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Remexi obfuscates its configuration data with XOR.[1]

EnterpriseT1115Clipboard Data

Remexi collects text from the clipboard.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Remexi utilizes Run Registry keys in the HKLM hive as a persistence mechanism.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Remexi uses BITSAdmin to communicate with the C2 server over HTTP.[1]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Remexi executes received commands with wmic.exe (for WMI commands). [1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Remexi decrypts the configuration data using XOR with 25-character keys.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLSub-technique

Remexi achieves persistence using Userinit by adding the Registry key HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit.[1]

EnterpriseT1010Application Window Discovery

Remexi has a command to capture active windows on the machine and retrieve window titles.[1]

EnterpriseT1560Archive Collected Data

Remexi encrypts and adds all gathered browser data into files for upload to C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Remexi uses AutoIt and VBS scripts throughout its execution process.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

Remexi takes screenshots of windows of interest.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Remexi searches for files on the system. [1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0087: APT39

APT39 is one of several names for cyber espionage activity conducted by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014. APT39 has primarily targeted the travel, hospitality, academic, and telecommunications industries in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America to track individuals and entities considered to be a threat by the MOIS.[1][2][3][4][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0087: APT39Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056.001: KeyloggingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1115: Clipboard DataEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLLEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1010: Application Window DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560: Archive Collected DataEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1113: Screen CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
07342e836fe1ffd2...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundle07342e836fe1…
19.11.2Older bundle07342e836fe1…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Securelist Remexi Jan 2019

    Legezo, D. (2019, January 30). Chafer used Remexi malware to spy on Iran-based foreign diplomatic entities. Retrieved April 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0375
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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