S0350: zwShell
zwShell is a remote access tool (RAT) written in Delphi that has been seen in the wild since the spring of 2010 and used by threat actors during Night Dragon.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0350: zwShell describes [zwShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0350) is a remote access tool (RAT) written in Delphi that has been seen in the wild since the spring of 2010 and used by threat actors during [Night Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0002).(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)
Executive priority
S0350: zwShell is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0350: zwShell by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0350: zwShell appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
zwShell
zwShell is a remote access tool (RAT) written in Delphi that has been seen in the wild since the spring of 2010 and used by threat actors during Night Dragon.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1021.001 | Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
C0002: Night Dragon
Night Dragon was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted oil, energy, and petrochemical companies, along with individuals and executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States. The unidentified threat actors searched for information related to oil and gas field production systems, financials, and collected data from SCADA systems. Based on the observed techniques, tools, and network activities, security researchers assessed the campaign involved a threat group based in China.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 90b4dcf79a5d… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 90b4dcf79a5d… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]McAfee Night Dragon
McAfee® Foundstone® Professional Services and McAfee Labs™. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0350Open source URL
- [3]zwShell
(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.